Optimal Taxation with
Behavioral Agents

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Abstract

This paper develops a theory of optimal taxation with behavioral agents. We use a general behavioral framework that encompasses a wide range of behavioral biases such as misperceptions and internalities. We revisit the three pillars of optimal taxation: Ramsey (linear commodity taxation to raise revenues and redistribute), Pigou (linear commodity taxation to correct externalities) and Mirrlees (nonlinear income taxation). We show how the canonical optimal tax formulas are modified and lead to a rich set of novel economic insights. We also show how to incorporate nudges in the optimal taxation frameworks, and jointly characterize optimal taxes and nudges. Under some conditions, the optimal tax system is simple, in the sense that all tax rates are equal. For instance, all goods are optimally taxed at the same rate (or a few different rates), and the optimal income tax features just one marginal tax rate (or a few different marginal tax rates). This contrasts with the traditional optimal tax results, that generically features complex tax systems that depend on the details of the environment. Finally, we explore the Diamond-Mirrlees productive efficiency result and the Atkinson-Stiglitz uniform commodity taxation proposition, and find that they are more likely to fail with behavioral agents.

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1 Introduction

This paper develops a systematic theory of optimal taxation with behavioral agents. Our framework is general. It allows for arbitrary behavioral biases, structures of demand, externalities, and population heterogeneity, as well as a wide range of tax instruments. We derive a behavioral version of the three pillars of optimal taxation: Ramsey (1927) (linear commodity taxation to raise revenues and redistribute), Pigou (1920) (linear commodity taxation to correct for externalities) and Mirrlees (1971) (nonlinear income taxation).

Our results take the form of optimal tax formulas that generalize the canonical formulas derived by Diamond (1975), Sandmo (1975) and Saez (2001). Our formulas are expressed in terms of similar sufficient statistics and share a common structure.

The sufficient statistics can be decomposed into two classes: traditional and behavioral. Traditional sufficient statistics, which arise in non-behavioral models, include: social marginal utilities of income and of public funds, compensated demand elasticities, marginal externalities and equilibrium demands. Behavioral sufficient statistics are marginal internalities that arise only in behavioral models. They can be thought of as the ideal corrective taxes that would undo the underlying behavioral biases, such as misperception of taxes and internalities. The behavioral tax formulas differ from their traditional counterparts because of the behavioral sufficient statistics and because the presence of behavioral biases shapes the traditional sufficient statistics, and in particular cross and own price elasticities as well as social marginal utilities of income.

The generality of our framework allows us to unify existing results in behavioral public finance as well as to derive new insights. A non-exhaustive list includes: a modified Ramsey inverse elasticity rule (for a given elasticity, inattention increases the optimal tax); a modified optimal Pigouvian tax rule (one dollar of externality should be taxed by more than a dollar if people are inattentive to the tax); a new role for quantity regulation (heterogeneity in attention favors quantity regulation over price regulation); the attractiveness of targeted nudges (which respects freedom of choice for rational agents and limit the tax burden of the poor); a modification of the principle of targeting (in the traditional model, it is optimal to tax the externality-generating good, but not to subsidize substitute goods; in the behavioral model, it is actually optimal to subsidize substitute goods); marginal income tax rates can be negative even with only an intensive labor margin; if the top marginal tax rate is particularly salient and contaminates perceptions of other marginal tax rates, then it should be lower than prescribed in the traditional analysis; conversely, if the wealthy overperceive the productivity of effort, top marginal rates are higher than the traditional analysis.

Under some conditions regarding agents’ misperceptions of taxes, the optimal tax system is simple, in the sense that all tax rates are equal. For instance, all goods are optimally taxed at the same rate (or a few different rates) and the optimal income tax features just one marginal tax rate (or a few different marginal tax rates). This contrasts with the traditional optimal tax results that generically feature complex tax systems that depend on the details of the environment,
because when the tax system is too complex, agents make mistakes (and anchor too much on some salient taxes). This is an extra cost absent from the traditional model. Then, if the mistake can be large enough, the optimal tax systems features just one uniform tax rates across goods or income brackets. It appears that this is the first time that a “simple tax system” arises in public finance because of agents’ bounded rationality.

We also revisit two classical results regarding supply elasticities and production efficiency. The first classical result states that optimal tax formulas do not depend directly on supply elasticities if there is a full set of commodity taxes. The second classical result, due to Diamond and Mirrlees (1971), states that under some technical conditions, production efficiency holds at the optimum (so that for example, intermediate goods should not be taxed, and inputs should be taxed at the same rate in all sectors) if there is a complete set of commodity taxes and if there are constant returns to scale or if profits are fully taxed. We show that both results can fail when agents are behavioral, because agents might misperceive taxes. Roughly, a more stringent condition is required, namely a full set of commodity taxes that agents perceive like prices (in addition perhaps to other commodity taxes which could be perceived differently from prices).

Finally, we show that when agents are behavioral, the celebrated uniform commodity taxation result of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1972) requires more stringent conditions when agents are behavioral.

Taken together, our results show that when agents are behavioral, the arguments that deliver some form of simplicity of optimal tax systems on efficiency grounds (Diamond and Mirrlees 1971, Atkinson and Stiglitz 1972), are weakened when agents are behavioral. However, new behavioral arguments for simple taxes based on misperceptions come into play, which would have no bite if agents were rational.

We assume here that individuals have behavioral biases, and the government is perfect. Of course, this is just a benchmark and a fuller treatment would take into account imperfect government.

Relation to the literature We rely on recent progress in behavioral public finance and basic behavioral modelling. We build on earlier behavioral public finance theory.\(^1\) Chetty (2009) and Chetty, Kroft and Looney (CKL, 2009) analyze tax incidence and welfare with misperceiving agents; however, they do not analyze optimal taxation in this context - our paper can thus be viewed as a next logical step after CKL. An emphasis of previous work is on the correction of “internalities,” i.e. misoptimization because of self-control or limited foresight, which can lead to optimal “sin taxes” on cigarettes or fats (Gruber and Kőszegi 2001, O’Donoghue and Rabin 2006).

Mullainathan, Schwarzstein and Congdon (2012) offer a rich overview of behavioral public fi-

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nance. In particular, they derive optimality conditions for linear taxes, in a framework with a binary action and a single good. Allcott, Mullainathan and Taubinsky (2014) analyze optimal energy policy when consumers underestimate the cost of gas with two goods (e.g. cars and gas) and two linear tax instruments. The Ramsey and Pigou models in our paper generalize those two analyses by allowing for multiple goods with arbitrary patterns of own and cross elasticities and for multiple tax instruments. We derive a behavioral version of the Ramsey inverse elasticity rule.

Liebman and Zeckhauser (2004) study a Mirrlees framework when agent misperceive the marginal tax rate for the average tax rate. Two recent, independent papers by Gerritseen (2014) and Lockwood and Wozny (2015a) study a Mirrlees problem in a decision vs experienced model, including a calibration and evidence. Our behavioral Mirrlees framework is general enough to encompass, at a formal level, these models as well as many other relying on alternative behavioral biases.

We also take advantage of recent advances in behavioral modeling of inattention. We use a general framework that reflects previous analyses, including misperceptions and internalities. We rely on the sparse agent of Gabaix (2014) for many illustrations, which builds on the burgeoning literature on inattention (Bordalo, Gennaioli Shleifer (2013), Caplin and Dean (2015), Chetty, Kroft and Looney (2009), Gabaix and Laibson (2006), Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013), Schwartzstein (2014), Sims (2003), Woodford (2012)). This agent misperceives prices in a way that can be endogenized to economize on attention (hence the name “sparse”), respects the budget constraint in a way that keeps a tractable behavioral version of basic objects of consumer theory, e.g. the Slutsky matrix and Roy’s identity. Second, we also use the “decision utility” paradigm, in which the agent maximizes the wrong utility function. We unify those two strands in a general, agnostic framework that can be particularized to various situations.

Our result - that simple tax systems can be optimal with boundedly rational agents - is conceptually different from other results in public finance regarding simple taxes with rational agents. First, some results prescribes zero or uniform taxes at the rational optimum: Diamond and Mirrlees (1971)’s productive efficiency result yields zero taxation of intermediate inputs, and Atkinson and Stiglitz (1972, 1976) show that optimal commodity taxes are uniform under strong assumption regarding separability and homogeneity of preferences. Second, some results show that simple tax systems can sometimes be approximately optimal: see Farhi and Werning (2013) and Stantcheva (2014) for such results in dynamic environments.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives introduction to the topic, using a minimum of mathematical apparatus to uncover some of the intuitions and economic forces. Section 3 then develops the general theory, with heterogeneous agents, arbitrary utility and decision functions. Section 4 studies the optimal nonlinear income tax problem. Section 5 studies the impact of endogenous attention and salience as a policy choice. Section 6 revisits Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) and Atkinson and Stiglitz (1972). Section 7 offers a discussion, in particular of objects that
would be important to measure. The online appendix contains more proofs and extensions.\footnote{The online appendix is available at https://www.dropbox.com/s/isgosq6t0fhvzli/BR-Taxes-OA.pdf}

\section{The Basic Behavioral Ramsey and Pigou Problems}

This section is meant as a simple introduction to the topic of this paper, using a lighter formal apparatus than the rest of the paper. We start with an elementary treatment of the basic Ramsey problem with behavioral agents. We then move to Pigouvian taxation.

The simplicity of the analysis in this section arises from a set of assumptions that we relax later: we mostly abstract from heterogeneity and confine ourselves to the case of a representative agent; we ignore distributive concerns and focus only on taxes to raise revenues and to correct externalities and internalities; we consider quasi-linear and separable preferences; we study the limit of small taxes; and we restrict ourselves to a simple parametrized set of behavioral biases with misperceptions of taxes (Ramsey) and temptation (Pigou).

Section 3 relaxes all these assumptions and extends the results in this section in the context of our general model, which allows for arbitrary heterogeneity, redistributive motives for taxation, general preferences, large taxes, and general behavioral biases.

\subsection{Basic Ramsey Problem: Raising Revenues with Behavioral Agents}

\subsubsection{The Consumer}

We consider a representative agent with utility function $u(c)$ and budget constraint $q \cdot c \leq w$. Here $c = (c_0, \ldots, c_n)$ is the consumption vector, $p = (p_0, \ldots, p_n)$ is the before-tax price vector, $\tau = (\tau_0, \ldots, \tau_n)$ is a vector of linear commodity taxes, $q = p + \tau$ is the after-tax price vector, and $w$ is wealth. If the representative agent were fully rational, he would solve:

$$\max_c u(c) \quad \text{s.t.} \quad q \cdot c \leq w,$$

with resulting demand $c^*(q, w)$.

But the representative agent may not be rational. In the general model in Section 3, we specify a general demand function $c(q, w)$ which reflects arbitrary behavioral biases, but still exhausts the budget $q \cdot c(q, w) = w$. This flexible and general modelling strategy allows us to capture a range of behavioral traits, ranging from temptation to misperception of prices and taxes. In this introductory section, we use a simple specialization of the general model. We assume that behavioral biases take the form of misperception of prices and taxes as captured by the sparse max model developed in Gabaix (2014). Demand depends on both true prices $q$, perceived prices $q^*$ and wealth $w$. It can
be represented as
\[
\text{smax } u(c) \text{ s.t. } q \cdot c \leq w.
\]
The resulting demand \( c^s(q, q^s, w) \) has the following characterization
\[
c^s(q, q^s, w) = c^r(q^s, w),
\]
where \( w \) solves \( q \cdot c^r(q^s, w) = w \), and the superscript \( s \) stands for "sparse". In other words, the demand of a behavioral agent perceiving prices \( q^s \) and with budget \( w \) is the demand \( c^r(q^s, w') \) of a rational agent facing prices \( q^s \) and a different budget \( w' \). The value of \( w' \) is chosen to satisfy the true budget constraint, \( q \cdot c^r(q^s, w) = w \).

With this formulation, the usual “trade-off” intuition applies in the space of perceived prices: marginal rates of substitution are equal to relative perceived prices \( \frac{u'_1}{u'_2} = \frac{q^s_1}{q^s_2} \). For example with quasilinear utility \( u(c) = c_0 + U(c_1, \ldots, c_n) \) and \( q_0 = q^s_0 = 1 \), all wealth effects are absorbed in the demand for good 0, and we can write \( c^s_i(q, q^s, w) = c^r_i(q^s) \) for \( i \in \{1, \ldots, n\} \). The demand of the behavioral agent is then simply the demand of a rational agent with perceived prices \( q^s \).

Perceived prices \( q^s \) are a function of true prices \( q \) and wealth \( w \). In the general model in Section 3, we allow for arbitrary perception functions \( q^s(q, w) \). The resulting demand function is
\[
c(q, w) = c^s(q, q^s(q, w), w),
\]
so that demand depends on both perceived prices and true prices, and perceived prices depend on true prices. In this section, we use a simple parametrization and assume that the agent correctly perceives prices \( p \) but perceives taxes to be
\[
\tau^s_i(\tau) = m_i \tau_i + (1 - m_i) \tau^d(\tau),
\]
for a “default” tax \( \tau^d \) (which we discuss later), and \( m_i \in [0, 1] \) is an attention parameter. Full attention/rationality corresponds to \( m_i = 1 \), and full inattention to \( m_i = 0 \). In the general model we also allow attention \( m \) to be endogenous, but we take it to be exogenous in this section. Perceived prices are then given by
\[
q^s_i(q, w) = p_i + (1 - m_i) \tau^d_i(\tau) + m_i \tau_i \text{ with } \tau = q - p. \tag{2}
\]

\(^3\)This adjustment rule is discussed in Chetty, Looney and Kroft (2009) in a two-good context; its statement for general constrained maximization problems is systematized in the sparse max.
2.1.2 Planning Problem

The government must raise revenues using linear commodity taxes \( \tau \). We assume that good 0 (e.g. leisure) is untaxed with \( \tau_0 = 0 \) throughout the paper.\(^4\) In the general model in Section 3, we allow for a general production function. In this section, we assume a simple linear production function. Normalizing \( p_0 = 1 \), prices are therefore set by the technological resource constraint: \( p \cdot y \leq w \), where \( w = p \cdot e \) is the value of the initial endowment. The government planning problem is

\[
\max_{\tau} \mathcal{L}(\tau),
\]

where

\[
\mathcal{L}(\tau) = u(c) + \lambda \cdot c(p + \tau, w)
\]

and \( \lambda > 0 \) is the marginal utility of public funds.\(^5\)

From now on in this section, we consider a quasi-linear and separable utility

\[
u(c) = c_0 + \sum_{i=1}^{n} U_i(c_i).
\]

As is common in many introductory expositions of the Ramsey problem, we work in the limit of small taxes (i.e. in the limit of \( \Lambda = \lambda - 1 \) close to zero). Without loss of generality, we normalize production prices to \( p_i = 1 \), so that \( \tau_i \) is both the specific and ad valorem tax on commodity \( i \).

**Lemma 1** (Approximation of the government’s objective function). We have the following approximation

\[
\mathcal{L}(\tau) - \mathcal{L}(0) = L(\tau) + o(\|\tau\|^2) + O(\Lambda \|\tau\|^2),
\]

where

\[
L(\tau) = \frac{-1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \tau_i^s \psi_i y_i + \Lambda \sum_{i=1}^{n} \tau_i y_i.
\] (3)

Here \( \tau_i^s \) is the perceived tax, \( \psi_i \) is the price-elasticity of demand for good \( i \) at zero taxes, and \( y_i \) expenditure on good \( i \) at zero taxes.

From now on in this section, we use (3) as the government’s objective function in this section. As we shall see, optimal taxes \( \tau \) are of order \( O(\Lambda) \) so that \( L(\tau) \) is of order \( O(\Lambda^2) \) and captures the leading approximation term in \( \Lambda \) of the government objective function \( \mathcal{L}(\tau) \). This approximation generalizes the traditional approximation by replacing true taxes \( \tau_i \) with perceived taxes \( \tau_i^s \). The first term \( \frac{-1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \tau_i^s \psi_i y_i \) in (3) captures the welfare distortions arising from taxation. Crucially,

\(^4\)Otherwise, the taxation problem with a representative agent is trivial. The government can replicate lump-sum taxes with a uniform tax on all commodities.

\(^5\)If the government needs to raise revenues \( G \) from taxes, the problem is \( \max_{\tau} u(c) \) s.t. \( \tau \cdot c \geq G \) and \( c = c(p + \tau, w) \). Then, \( \lambda \) is endogenous and equal to the Lagrange multiplier on the government budget constraint.
it is the perceived tax $\tau^s_i$, not the actual tax $\tau_i$, that matters for welfare distortions.\(^6\) The second term $\Lambda \sum_{i=1}^n \tau_i y_i$ captures the net benefit from raising revenues (benefit to the government, minus cost to the agents). There, it is the real tax $\tau_i$, not the perceived tax, that matters.

### 2.1.3 Optimal Taxes

We start with the simplest case where $\tau^d = 0$ and $m_i > 0$ for all $i$. The perceived tax is then simply $\tau^s_i = m_i \tau_i$. The objective function (3) becomes

$$L(\tau) = -\frac{1}{2} \sum_i m_i^2 \tau^2_i \psi_i y_i + \Lambda \sum_i \tau_i y_i.$$  

Maximization over $\tau_i$ yields the following result.

**Proposition 1** (Modified Ramsey inverse elasticity rule) When $\tau^d$ is fixed at 0 and $m_i > 0$, the optimum is characterized by the following inverse-elasticity rule modified by inattention

$$\tau_i = \frac{\Lambda}{m_i^2 \psi_i}, \quad \tau^s_i = \frac{\Lambda}{m_i \psi_i}.$$  

This Proposition generalizes the traditional Ramsey inverse elasticity rule, which prescribes that the optimal tax should be $\tau^R_i = \frac{\Lambda}{\psi_i}$ (this traditional rule is recovered when consumers are fully attentive so that $m_i = 1$ for all $i$). Optimal taxes are higher at $\tau_i = \frac{\Lambda}{m_i^2 \psi_i}$ than they would be in the traditional Ramsey solution. Loosely speaking, this is because inattention makes agents less elastic. Given partial attention $m_i \leq 1$, the effective elasticity is $m_i \psi_i$, rather than the parametric elasticity $\psi_i$. In the spirit of the traditional Ramsey formula, lower elasticity leads to higher optimal taxes.\(^7\)

However, a naive application of the Ramsey rule would lead to the erroneous conclusion that $\tau_i = \frac{\Lambda}{m_i \psi_i}$, rather than $\tau_i = \frac{\Lambda}{m_i^2 \psi_i}$. To gain intuition for this discrepancy, consider the effect of a marginal increase in $\tau_i$. The marginal benefit in terms of increased tax revenues is $\Lambda y_i$. The marginal cost in terms of increased distortions is $\tau^s_i m_i \psi_i y_i$. At the optimum, the marginal cost and the marginal benefit are equalized. The result is that $\tau^s_i = \frac{\Lambda}{m_i \psi_i}$, i.e. it is the perceived tax $\tau^s_i$ that is inversely related to the effective elasticity $m_i \psi_i$. This in turns implies $\tau_i = \frac{\tau^s_i}{m_i} = \frac{\Lambda}{m_i^2 \psi_i}$.\(^8\)

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\(^6\)This effect is anticipated in Chetty, Looney and Kroft (2009).

\(^7\)Finkelstein (2009) finds evidence for this effect. When highway tolls are paid automatically thus are less salient, people are less elastic to them, and government react by increase the toll (i.e., the tax rate).

\(^8\)In the general model case with perceptions as in equation (1), we can write $L(\tau, \tau^d) = -\frac{1}{2} \sum_i (m_i + (1 - m_i) \tau^d)^2 \psi_i y_i + \Lambda \sum_i \tau_i y_i$. We have $\frac{\partial L(\tau, \tau^d)}{\partial \tau_i} = -\tau^s_i m_i \psi_i y_i + \Lambda y_i + \frac{\partial L(\tau, \tau^d)}{\partial \tau^d} \frac{\partial \tau^d(\tau)}{\partial \tau_i}$ with $\frac{\partial L(\tau, \tau^d)}{\partial \tau^d} = -\sum_j \tau^s_j (1 - m_j) \psi_j y_j$. The optimal tax is then given by

$$\tau_i = \frac{\Lambda}{m_i^2 \psi_i} + \frac{\partial L(\tau, \tau^d)}{\partial \tau^d} \frac{\partial \tau^d(\tau)}{\partial \tau_i} - \frac{1 - m_i}{m_i} \tau^d.$$
2.2 Simple Tax Systems at the Optimum

2.2.1 Condition Yielding a Uniform Tax Rate

In this subsection we take a stand on the default tax $\tau^d$, and assume that it has the following form

$$\tau^d = \alpha \tau_{\text{max}} + \beta \tau_\omega,$$

where $\alpha > 0$, $\beta \geq 0$, $\tau_{\text{max}} = \max_i \tau_i$ and $\tau_\omega = \sum_i \omega_i \tau_i$ is the average tax, where the weights $\omega_i$ satisfy $\omega_i \geq 0$ and $\sum_i \omega_i = 1$.

This formulation is meant to capture the psychology of salience. The maximum tax is one particularly salient features in a tax system. This is a plausible conjecture: we do not know of any direct evidence on it. Arguably though, there is encouraging circumstantial evidence. For instance, Kahneman, Wakker and Sarin (1997) report the “peak-end” rule for the memory of past experiences: the “peak” (most intense) experience is disproportionately remembered. Similarly, the maximum tax might disproportionately affect memories of the tax system. Somewhat in the same spirit, cumulative prospect theory puts a higher weight on extreme scenarios (Tversky and Kahneman 1992). Bordalo, Gennaioli and Shleifer (2014) also note that the extremes are important in the mental representations of stereotypes. Finally, a disproportionate weight on the maximum tax could also arise from robustness concerns and min-max behavior (Hansen and Sargent 2007) in the face of policy uncertainty.

**Proposition 2** For a given $\alpha > 0$, and for sufficiently small $\beta$ and $m_i$ (for all $i$), the optimal tax system is simple, i.e. it features the same tax on all goods. In the case where $\alpha = 1$ and $\beta = 0$, we have the following explicit sufficient condition for simple taxes: for all $i$, $m_i \psi_i < \bar{\psi}$ where

$$\bar{\psi} = \frac{\sum_j y_j \psi_j}{\sum_j y_j}.$$

The condition $m_i \psi_i < \bar{\psi}$ means that the attention $m_i$ to the price of goods with high elasticities (those that should have low tax rates) is low enough.\(^9\)

**Proof.** Consider the case $m_i = \beta = 0$. Then, perceived taxes are $\tau_i^* = \alpha \tau_{\text{max}}$, and equation (3) can be rewritten as

$$L(\tau) = -\frac{1}{2} \sum_i \alpha^2 \tau_{\text{max}}^2 \psi_i y_i + \Lambda \sum_i \tau_i y_i.$$

Towards a contradiction, suppose that there is a good $j$ with $\tau_j < \tau_{\text{max}}$. Then $\frac{\partial L(\tau)}{\partial \tau_j} = \Lambda y_j > 0$

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Since $\frac{\partial L}{\partial \tau^d} \leq 0$, the optimal tax on a good $i$ is lower when the tax on this good raises the default tax (the term $\frac{\partial \tau^d}{\partial \tau_i}$).

When $\beta > 0$, $\alpha + \beta = 1$, Proposition 32 in the online appendix gives a quantitative sufficient condition: we have simple taxes when $0 \leq -m_i \frac{\psi_i y_i}{\bar{\psi}} s_i + s_i - (1 - \bar{m}) \beta \omega_i \leq \alpha (1 - \bar{m})$, for $\bar{m} = \frac{\sum_j m_j \psi_j y_j}{\sum_j \psi_j y_j}$ and $s_i = \frac{\psi_i y_i}{\sum_j \psi_j y_j}$. This means that the $m_i$ are low enough, $\frac{\alpha}{s_i}$ high enough, and $\frac{\beta \omega_i}{s_i}$ is low enough. Indeed, take the case where all $m_i = 0$: then the condition states that $0 \leq s_i - \beta \omega_i \leq \alpha$. Hence we must have $\beta \omega_i \leq s_i$, i.e. the weight $\omega_i$ on the $\tau^d$ cannot be too much higher than the true weight $s_i$ in the basket. Otherwise, the planner would be tempted to set a very low, negative tax on a good $i$, in order to lower the perceived tax.
so that the planner’s objective function is increased by marginal increase in the tax \( \tau_j \) on the good \( j \), because it does not impact any perceived tax. This holds up to the point where \( \tau_j = \tau_{\text{max}} \). By implication, at the optimum, all taxes are equal to \( \tau_{\text{max}} \). The proof of the general case is more involved and can be found in the online appendix. □

2.2.2 Conditions Yielding a Small Number of Different Tax Rates

We now generalize this idea to other quantiles. For example, agents can pay also attention to the median tax \( \tau_{\text{median}}(\tau) \), as well as the max tax

\[
\tau^d(\tau) = \alpha_1 \tau_{\text{max}}(\tau) + \alpha_2 \tau_{\text{median}}(\tau) + \beta \bar{\tau}_\omega.
\]

More generally, assume that agents use the following quantile-based default model

\[
\tau^d(\tau) = \sum_{k=1}^Q \alpha_k \tau^{(r_k)}(\tau) + \beta \bar{\tau}_\omega, \tag{5}
\]

where \( r \) is the \( r \)-th quantile (with the convention that \( \tau^{(1)} = \tau_{\text{max}}, \tau^{(0)} = \tau_{\text{min}} \), and the \( r_k \)'s correspond to different quantiles of taxes, and \( \alpha_k \) is the weight on quantile \( r_k \). We assume that people pay attention to the maximum tax, so that \( r_1 = 1 \) and \( \alpha_1 > 0 \). As before, \( \bar{\tau}_\omega \) is the mean tax with weight \( \omega = (\omega_i)_{i=1..n} \). We assume that \( \beta \geq 0 \) and \( \alpha_k \geq 0 \).

**Proposition 3** Suppose that people pay attention to \( Q \) different quantiles, including a positive weight on \( \tau_{\text{max}} \), as in the “quantile-based default model” (5). For small enough \( \beta \) and \( m_i \) (for all \( i \)) the optimal tax system features at most \( Q \) different tax rates.

**Proof** We start with the case \( m = 0 \) and \( \beta = 0 \). We show that each \( \tau_j \) must be exactly at some quantile \( \tau^{(r_k)} \). Towards a contradiction, suppose that there is a good \( j \) such that \( \tau_j \) is not equal to any of the quantiles \( \tau^{(r_k)} \). Since \( L(\tau) = \frac{1}{2} \sum_i \tau^2_i(\tau) \psi_i y_i + \Lambda \sum_i \tau_i y_i \), we have \( \frac{dL}{d\tau_j} = \Lambda y_j > 0 \). As a result, the planners can increase its objective function by marginally increasing \( \tau_j \), proving that the value of \( \tau_j \) was not optimal, a contradiction.

In the general case where \( m \) and \( \beta \) are close to 0, the proof is the same, by continuity. We provide a rigorous proof in Proposition 14, which is a strict generalization of Proposition 3. □

One could also imagine that consumers form a different default tax for each category of goods. For example, suppose that the default tax for all food items puts a large weight on the maximum tax within all food items, and that attention is low (as in Proposition 2). Then the optimal tax system features a uniform tax on all food items.
2.3 Basic Pigou Problem: Externalities, Internaties and Inattention

2.3.1 Optimal Corrective Taxes

We continue to assume a quasilinear utility function. We assume that there is only one taxed good \( n = 1 \). The representative agent maximizes \( u(c_0, c) = c_0 + U(c) \) subject to \( c_0 + pc \leq w \). Here \( c \) stands from the consumption the good 1 (we could call it \( c_1 \), but expressions are cleaner by calling it \( c \)). If the representative agent were rational, he would solve

\[
\max_c U(c) - pc.
\]

However, there is a negative externality that depends on the aggregate consumption of good 1 (think for example of second-hand smoke), so that total utility is \( c_0 + U(c) - \xi_c \). Alternatively, \( \xi_c \) could be an internality: a divergence between decision utility \( c_0 + U(c) \) and experienced utility \( c_0 + U(c) - \xi_c \). This would capture the idea that good 1 is tempting and has extra unperceived negative effects \( \xi_c \) (e.g. a heart attack). The analysis is exactly identical in both cases.

To focus on the corrective role of taxes, we assume that \( \Lambda = 0 \) and that the government can rebate tax revenues lump-sum to consumers. The objective function of the government is therefore

\[
U(c) - (p + \xi)c.
\]  

To attempt to correct the externality/internality, the government can set a tax \( \tau \). If the agent correctly perceived taxes, he would solve

\[
\max_c U(c) - (p + \tau)c.
\]

The optimal tax is \( \tau = \xi_c \). It ensures that the agent maximizes the same objective function as that of the government. This is the classic Pigouvian prescription: the optimal tax makes the agent exactly internalize the externality/internality. Now consider an agent who only perceives a fraction \( m \) of the tax. Then he solves

\[
\max_c U(c) - (p + m\tau)c.
\]

The optimal Pigouvian corrective tax required to ensure that agents correctly internalize the externality/internality is now \( \tau = \frac{\xi_c}{m} \). We record this simple result.

**Proposition 4** If the consumer pays only partial attention \( m \leq 1 \) to the tax and the externality/internality is \( \xi_c \), then the optimal Pigouvian corrective tax is \( \tau = \frac{\xi_c}{m} \).

Suppose for concreteness that a good has a negative externality of $1. With rational agents, it should be taxed by exactly $1. However, suppose that agents perceive only half of the tax. Then, the good should be taxed by $2, so that agents perceive a tax of $1.
It may be contrasted to the modified optimal Ramsey tax (Proposition 1), which had $\tau_i = \frac{\Lambda_i}{m_i}$. In the Pigou case, partial attention $m$ leads to a multiplication of the traditional tax by $\frac{1}{m}$ in the Pigou case, and by $\frac{1}{m^2}$ in the Ramsey case. This illustrates how a bit of mathematics leads to sharpening of one’s intuitions.\footnote{The fact that the tax should be higher when it is underperceived is qualitatively anticipated in Mullainathan, Schwartzstein and Cogdon (2012), but without the specific $\frac{1}{m}$ factor.}

If different consumers have heterogenous perceptions, then Proposition 4 suggests that no uniform tax can perfectly correct all of them. Hence, heterogeneity in attention prevents the implementation of the first best. We now explore this issue more thoroughly.

### 2.3.2 Heterogeneity in Attention and Its Consequences

We now assume that there are several consumers, indexed by $h = 1...H$. Agent $h$ maximizes $u^h(c^h_0, c^h) = c^h_0 + U^h(c^h)$. The associated externality/internality is $\xi^h c^h$. He pays an attention $m_h$ to the tax so that perceived taxes are $\tau^*_h = m_h \tau$ (we continue to assume $\tau^d = 0$). The government is Utilitarian, so that the government planning problem is

$$\sum_h U^h(c^h) - (p + \xi^h) c^h.$$  

We call $c^* = \arg \max_{c^h} U^h(c^h) - (p + \xi^h) c^h$ the quantity consumed by the agent at the first best.

To make things transparent, we use

$$U^h(c) = \frac{a^h c - \frac{1}{2} c^2}{\Psi},$$

which using $U^h_c = \frac{a^h - c}{\Psi} = q^*$, implies a demand function

$$c^h(q^*) = a^h - q^*.$$

The expressions in the rest of this section are exact with that quadratic utility function. For generality utility functions, they hold provided that they are understood as the leading order terms in a Taylor expansion around an economy with no heterogeneity.

After some algebraic manipulations, social welfare compared to the first best can be written as

$$L(\tau) = -\frac{\Psi}{2} \sum_h \left( m^h \tau - \xi^h \right)^2.$$  

The first best cannot be implemented unless all agents have the same $\xi_h/m_h$.

**Proposition 5** (Heterogeneity in attention or externality/internality creates welfare losses) The
optimal Pigouvian tax is
\[ \tau^* = \frac{E[\xi_h m_h]}{E[m_h^2]}. \]

Welfare compared to the first best is then \( L(\tau^*) = L^{tax} \) with
\[ L^{tax} = L(0) \frac{E[\xi_h^2] E[m_h^2] - (E[\xi_h m_h])^2}{E[m_h^2] E[\xi_h^2]}, \]

where \( L(0) = -\frac{1}{2} \Psi HE[\xi_h^2] \) is welfare without corrective taxation.

A key message of Proposition 5 is that heterogeneity in attention creates welfare losses. Take the case of a uniform externality/externality \( \xi_h = \xi \), but heterogeneous attention to the tax. Welfare compared to the first best is
\[ L(0) \text{var}(m_h) \frac{E[m_h^2]}{E[m_h^2] E[\xi_h^2]}, \]
and is increasing in the variance of perceptions \( m_h \). No tax can fully correct the externality/externality, unlike in the basic Pigouvian model. This opens up a potential role for quantity regulations, an issue to which we now turn.

2.3.3 Quantity vs. Price regulation

Suppose the government imposes a uniform quantity restriction, mandating \( c_h = c^* \). For instance, banning the good corresponds to setting \( c^* = 0 \).

Lemma 2 The optimal quantity restriction \( c^* \) is \( c^* = E[c_h^*] \). Social welfare compared to the first best is then
\[ L^Q = -\frac{H}{2 \Psi} \text{var}(c_h^*). \]

This proposition shows that the key disadvantage of uniform quantity restrictions is that the optimal quantity is typically heterogenous across agents.

Corollary 1 (Quantity vs Price regulation under inattention) Quantity restrictions are better than corrective taxes \( (L^Q \geq L^{tax}) \) if and only if
\[ \frac{1}{\Psi} \text{var}(c_h^*) \leq \frac{E[\xi_h^2] E[m_h^2] - (E[\xi_h m_h])^2}{E[m_h^2]} \]

Several insights can be gleaned from this formula. First, quantity restrictions tend to dominate if attention \( m_h \) is very heterogeneous. Taxes are better if optimal quantities \( c_h^* \) are very heterogeneous. Second, when the demand elasticity is low (low \( \Psi \)), quantity restrictions are worse. This is because agents suffer more from a given deviation from their optimal quantity, an effect reminiscent of Weitzman (1974). Third, for small enough externalities, taxes are better than quantity restrictions. Indeed, there are only second order losses from the externality \( E[\xi_h^2] \), while the quantity restriction
discretely lowers welfare (to the zeroth order).\textsuperscript{11} A natural instrument in this context is a nudge, which we develop in detail below in the context of the general model in Section 3.

We have concluded our introductory tour of the most elementary impacts of bounded rationality on taxation. We now move on to a more general analysis.

3 Optimal Linear Commodity Taxation

In this section, we introduce our general model of behavioral biases. We then describe how the basic results of price theory are modified in the presence of behavioral biases. Armed with these results, we then analyze the problem of optimal linear commodity taxation without externalities (Ramsey) where the objective of the government is to raise revenues and redistribute, and with externalities (Pigou) where an additional objective is to correct externalities. We also propose a model of nudges. We show how to incorporate nudges in the optimal taxation framework and characterize the joint optimal use of taxes and nudges. This analysis is performed at a general and rather abstract level. We then derive a number of concrete results in a series of simple examples. These example are simple particularizations of the general model and results.

3.1 Price Theory with Behavioral Agents

Consider a consumer. Our primitive is a demand function \( c(q, w) \) where \( q \) is the price vector and \( w \) is the budget. The demand function incorporates all the behavioral biases that the agent might be subject to (internalities, misperceptions, etc.). The only restriction that we impose on this demand function is that it exhausts the agent’s budget so that \( q \cdot c(q, w) = w \). We evaluate the welfare of this agent according to a utility function \( u(c) \). This utility function represents the agent’s true or “experienced” utility, with a resulting indirect utility function given by \( v(q, w) = u(c(q, w)) \). Crucially, the demand function \( c(q, w) \) is not assumed to result from the maximization of the utility function \( u(c) \) subject to the budget constraint \( q \cdot c = w \).

This formulation imposes another implicit restriction, namely that producer prices \( p \) and taxes \( \tau \) matter to the consumer only through \( q = p + \tau \). We relax this assumption in Sections 5.2 and 6.1 where we consider a demand function of the form \( c(p, \tau, w) \). Note however that this distinction is immaterial if producer prices \( p \) are exogenously fixed, an assumption which we maintain throughout this section, but which we relax in Section 6.1.

We now introduce the basic objects of price theory and explain how their relations are modified in the presence of behavioral biases. We only highlight the main results. We refer the reader to Appendix 10.1 for the detailed derivations.

\textsuperscript{11}This third point is specific to a quantity mandate (which has no free disposal). It would not hold with a quantity ceiling (which has free disposal).
We define two different Slutsky matrices. First there is the “income-compensated” Slutsky matrix

\[
S^C_{ij}(q, w) = c_{ij}(q, w) + c_w(q, w)c_j(q, w).
\]

Second there is the “utility-compensated” Slutsky matrix

\[
S^H_{ij}(q, w) = c_{ij}(q, w) - c_w(q, w) \frac{v_{ij}(q, w)}{v_w(q, w)}.
\]

The utility-compensated Slutsky matrix \(S^H_{ij}(q, w)\) can also be computed using the expenditure function \(e(q, \tilde{u}) = \min_w w \text{ s.t. } v(q, w) \geq \tilde{u}\), and the corresponding Hicksian demand function \(h(q, \tilde{u}) = c(q, e(q, \tilde{u}))\). Indeed we have

\[
S^H_{ij}(q, v(q, w)) = h_{ij}(q, v(q, w)).
\]

The two Slutsky matrices \(S^C_{ij}(q, w)\) and \(S^H_{ij}(q, w)\) correspond to two different ways of decompose the marginal consumption change \(c_{ij}(q, w) dq_j\) resulting from a marginal price change \(dq_j\) into an income effect and a substitution effect depending on whether the substitution effect is assumed to be computed at constant income or at constant utility. In the first case, the income effect is \(-c_w(q, w)c_j(q, w) dq_j\) and the substitution effect is \(S^C_{ij}(q, w) dq_j\). In the second case, the income effect is \(c_w(q, w) \frac{v_{ij}(q, w)}{v_w(q, w)}\) and the substitution effect is \(S^H_{ij}(q, w) dq_j\).

In the traditional model with no behavioral biases, income-compensated marginal prices changes preserve utility since by Roy’s identity \(v_{ij}(q, \tilde{u}) dq_j + v_w(q, w) c_w(q, w)c_j(q, w) dq_j = 0\). As a result \(S^C_{ij}(q, w) = S^H_{ij}(q, w)\) and the two decompositions coincide. But with behavioral biases, income-compensated marginal prices changes do not preserve utility since, as we shall see below, Roy’s identity fails. As a result, \(S^C_{ij}(q, w) \neq S^H_{ij}(q, w)\) and the two decompositions differ.

With behavioral biases, two other properties of Slutsky matrices are modified. First, in general, the Slutsky matrices \(S^C_{ij}(q, w)\) and \(S^H_{ij}(q, w)\) are not symmetric. Second, in general, the vectors \(S^C_{ij}(q, w) \cdot q\), \(S^H_{ij}(q, w) \cdot q\) and \(q \cdot S^H_{ij}(q, w)\) are not necessarily equal to 0.\(^{12}\)

To see how Roy’s identity is modified in the presence of behavioral biases, it is useful to first define the misoptimization wedge

\[
\tau^b(q, w) = q - \frac{u_c(c(q, w))}{v_w(q, w)}.
\]

\(^{12}\)We treat the case of \(S^H_{ij}(q, w)\). In the traditional model with no behavioral biases, we can rewrite the planning problem defining the expenditure function as \(e(q, \tilde{u}) = \min_c q \cdot c \text{ s.t. } u(c) \geq \tilde{u}\) and apply the envelope theorem to get \(h(q, \tilde{u}) = e_q(q, \tilde{u})\). This in turn implies that \(S^H_{ij}(q, v(q, w)) = e_{q,ij}(q, \tilde{u})\) is necessarily symmetric. And together with the homogeneity of degree 0 of the Hicksian demand function \(h(q, \tilde{u})\), this implies that \(S^H_{ij}(q, w) \cdot q = q \cdot S^H_{ij}(q, w) = 0\). With behavioral biases, this rewriting of the planning problem defining the expenditure function is invalid. As a result, in general \(S^H_{ij}(q, v(q, w)) \neq e_{q,ij}(q, \tilde{u})\) so that we cannot conclude that \(S^H_{ij}(q, w)\) is symmetric. See below for an explicit example using the misperception model.
In the traditional model without behavioral biases, \( \tau^b(q, w) = 0 \). The wedge \( \tau^b(q, w) \) is an important sufficient statistic for behavioral biases. For reasons that will appear clear below, we also call \( \tau^b(q, w) \) the ideal misoptimization corrective tax. Of course, the imposition of such a tax would change the price vector \( q \), which would in turn modify the ideal misoptimization corrective tax etc. At this stage, we use the term ideal misoptimization corrective tax in a purely definitional sense, without any implication about the structure of optimal taxes.

Armed with the definition of \( \tau^b(q, w) \) we can now state the behavioral version of Roy’s identity

\[
\frac{v_{q_j}(q, w)}{v_w(q, w)} = -c_j(q, w) - \tau^b(q, w) \cdot S^C_j(q, w),
\]

where the term \( \tau^b(q, w) \cdot S^C_j(q, w) \) is a discrepancy term that arises from a failure of the envelope theorem because agents do not fully optimize. The intuition for equation (11) is the following. The impact on welfare \( v_{q_j}(q, w) \) of a change \( dq_j \) in the price of commodity \( j \) can be decomposed into an income effect \( -u'(c) c_{w}(q, w) c_j(q, w) dq_j \) and a substitution effect \( u'(c) \cdot S^C_j(q, w) dq_j \). In the traditional model with no behavioral biases, the income-compensated price change that underlies the substitution effect does not lead to any change in welfare—an application of the envelope theorem. The traditional version of Roy’s identity follows. As we have already argued above, with behavioral biases, income-compensated price changes lead to changes in welfare—a failure of the envelope theorem. The behavioral version of Roy’s identity accounts for the associated welfare effects.

In the online appendix, we establish the following set of identities, which will be useful at times in our characterization of optimal taxes

\[
\tau^b(q, w) \cdot c_w(q, w) = 0, \quad \tau^b(q, w) \cdot S^H(q, w) = \tau^b(q, w) \cdot S^C(q, w), \quad S^C_j(q, w) = S^H_j(q, w) - c_w(q, w) [\tau^b(q, w) \cdot S^H_j(q, w)].
\]

We now present two useful concrete particularizations of the general model: the decision vs. experienced utility model, and the misperception model.

**Decision vs. experienced utility model** We start with the decision vs. experienced utility model, in which the demand function could arise from a “decision utility” \( u^b(c) \) so that

\[
c(q, w) = \arg \max_c u^b(c) \quad \text{s.t.} \quad q \cdot c \leq w.
\]

However the true “experienced” utility remains \( u(c) \) which can be different from \( u^b(c) \). In this case the ideal misoptimization corrective tax is simply given by the wedge between the decision and
experience marginal utilities

\[
\tau^b(q, w) = \frac{u^b_c(q, w) - u_c(q, w)}{v_w(q, w)} - \frac{u_c(q, w)}{v_w(q, w)}.
\]

The income-compensated Slutsky matrix \( S^C_j(q, w) \) is the Slutsky matrix of an agent with preference \( u^b(c) \). It is different from the utility-compensated Slutsky matrix \( S^H_j(q, w) \) since the underlying compensation is for experienced utility \( u(c) \) rather than decision utility \( u^b(c) \).

As an example, consider the case of two goods \( c = (c_0, c_1) \) quasilinear utilities \( u^b(c) = c_0 + U^b(c_1) \) and \( u(c) = c_0 + U(c_1) \) with \( U(c_1) = U^b(c_1) - \xi c_1 \) and \( \xi > 0 \). The consumption \( c_1 \) of good 1 entails a negative internality \( -\xi c_1 \). For instance, good 1 could be ice creams, \( U^b(c_1) \) would then represent the immediate pleasure from eating the ice cream, while \( U(c_1) \) represent those immediate pleasures minus the future pain \( \xi c_1 \) from the extra weight gained (see e.g. O’Donoghue and Rabin 2006). Then, \( \tau^b(q, w) = (\tau^b_0, \tau^b_1) \) where \( \tau^b_0 = 0 \) and \( \tau^b_1 = \xi > 0 \), so that the ideal misoptimization corrective tax \( \tau^b_1 \) on good 1 is exactly equal to the associated internality \( \xi \).

**Misperception model** We turn to the misperception model, which was already outlined in Section 2. There are two primitives: a utility function \( u(c) \) and a perception function \( q^s(q, w) \).

Given true prices \( q \), perceived prices \( q^s(q, w) \), and budget \( w \), the demand

\[
c^s(q, q^s, w) = \arg \max_{c|q^s} \ c \cdot u(c) \text{ s.t. } q \cdot c \leq w
\]

is the consumption vector \( c \) satisfying \( u_c(c) = \lambda^s q^s \) for some \( \lambda^s > 0 \) and \( q \cdot c = w \).

Then the primitive demand function \( c(q, w) \) of the general model is given by

\[
c(q, w) = c^s(q, q^s(q, w), w).
\]

The ideal misoptimization corrective tax is formally given by \( \tau^b(q, w) = q - \frac{q^s(q, w)}{q^s - u_c(q, w)} \). However, because in the misperception model, we have \( q^s(q, w) \cdot S^H(q, w) = 0 \), and because \( \tau^b(q, w) \) enters all our formulas through \( \tau^b(q, w) \cdot S^H(q, w) \), we can take

\[
\tau^b(q, w) = q - q^s(q, w)
\]

in all of our formulas involving \( \tau^b \cdot S^H \). This fleshes out the idea that \( \tau^b(q, w) \) represents the impact of the discrepancy between true prices and perceived prices.

Given this demand function \( c(q, w) \), the notions of the general model apply and receive a

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13 If there are several such \( \lambda \), we take the lowest one, which is also the utility-maximizing one.
concrete interpretation. First, we define the matrix of marginal perceptions

\[ M_{ij}(q, w) = \frac{\partial q^*_{i}(q, w)}{\partial q_j}, \]

where the \( j \)-th column \( M_j(q, w) = \frac{\partial q^*(q, w)}{\partial q_j} \) encodes the marginal impact of a change in true price \( q_j \) on the perceived price \( q^* \). It is convenient to define the Hicksian demand of a fictitious rational agent facing prices \( q^* \)

\[ h^r(q^*, \widehat{u}) = \arg \min_c q^* \cdot c \text{ s.t. } u(c) \geq \widehat{u}, \]

and the associated Slutsky matrix

\[ S^r_j(q^*, \widehat{u}) = h^r_{q_j}(q^*, \widehat{u}). \]

We also define \( S^r(q, w) = S^r(q^*(q, w), v(q, w)) \). Then the utility-compensated Slutsky matrix \( S^H(q, w) \) of the general model is given by

\[ S^H(q, w) = S^r(q, w) \cdot M(q, w). \] (15)

i.e. \( S^H_{ij}(q, w) = \sum_k S^r_{ik}(q, w) M_{kj}(q, w) \). That is, when the price of good \( j \) changes, it creates a change in a change \( M_{kj}(q, w) = \frac{\partial q^*_k(q, w)}{\partial q_j} \) in the perceived prices \( q^*_k \) of a generic good \( k \), which in turn changes (via the rational Slutsky matrix \( S^r(q, w) \)) the demand for good \( i \).

**Model isomorphisms** The decision vs. experienced utility model and the misperception model are particular cases of the general model. We now show that the general model can always be represented as a misperception model, but not as a decision vs. experienced utility model.

Given a general demand \( c(q, w) \), we can define a perception function

\[ q^*(q, w) = \frac{u_c(c(q, w))}{v_w(q, w)}. \]

We can then study the misperception model with utility function \( u(c) \) and perception function \( q^*(q, w) \), with resulting demand function \( c^*(q, q^*(q, w), w) \). Lemma 4 in the appendix shows that \( c(q, w) = c^*(q, q^*(q, w), w) \). This proves that the demand function in the general model can always be represented as arising from an underlying misperception model.

By contrast, the general model cannot in general be represented by a decision vs. experienced utility model. Indeed, a decision utility model always generates a symmetric Slutsky matrix \( S^H(q, w) \), and this property does not hold in general for the general model. For example, the misperception model with exogenous perception \( M_{ij}(q, w) = m_j1_{i=j} \) features \( S^H_{ij}(q, w) = S^r_{ij}(q, w) m_j \).

\[ ^{14} \text{For instance, in specification (2), } M_{ij} = m_j1_{i=j} + (1 - m_i) \frac{\partial q^*}{\partial q_j}. \]
Since $S^r(q, w)$ is symmetric, $S^H(q, w)$ is not symmetric as long as there exists $i$ and $j$ with $m_i \neq m_j$.

3.2 Optimal Taxation to Raise Revenues and Redistribute: Ramsey

There are $H$ agents indexed by $h$. Each agent is competitive (price taker) as described in Section 3.1. All the functions describing the behavior and welfare of agents are allowed to depend on $h$. It will sometimes be convenient to assume that each agent has a type $t(h)$, that all agents of the same type are identical with the number of agents of type $h$ given by by $H_h$. This configuration is allowed by our formalism. With some abuse of terminology, we sometimes refer to $h$ as the type of agent $h$. We omit the dependence of all functions on $(q, w)$, unless an ambiguity arises.

We introduce a social welfare function $W(v^1, \ldots, v^H)$ and a marginal value of public funds $\lambda$. The planning problem is

$$\max_{\tau} L(\tau),$$

where

$$L(\tau) = W((v^h(p + \tau, w))_{h=1}^H) + \lambda \sum_h [\tau \cdot c^h(p + \tau, w) - w].$$

Good 0 is constrained to be untaxed: $\tau_0 = 0$. We assume perfectly elastic supply with fixed producer prices $p$. We relax this assumption in Section 6.1 where we consider the case of imperfectly elastic supply with endogenous producer prices $p$.

Following Diamond (1975), we define $\gamma^h$ to be the social marginal utility of income for agent $h$

$$\gamma^h = W_{v^h} v^h_w + \lambda \tau \cdot c^h_w,$$  \hspace{1cm} (16)

where

$$\beta^h = W_{v^h} v^h_w$$  \hspace{1cm} (17)

is the social marginal welfare weight. The difference $\lambda \tau \cdot c^h_w$ between $\gamma^h$ and $\beta^h$ captures the marginal impact on tax revenues of a marginal increase in the income of agent $h$.

We also renormalize the ideal misoptimization corrective tax

$$\tau^{b,h} = \frac{\beta^h}{\lambda} \tau^{b,h}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (18)

We now characterize the optimal tax system.\textsuperscript{15,16}

\textsuperscript{15}It is instructive to see how to obtain the simple Ramsey model that we analyzed in Section 2. The limit of small taxes corresponds to $\lambda - \gamma^h$ small, with one type of agent and formula (19) becomes $0 = (\lambda - \gamma^h) c^1_i + \gamma^h \tau^{b,h} \cdot S^{C,h}_i = 0$, which generalizes (4) to the case of a non-diagonal matrix $S^{C,h}$.

\textsuperscript{16}Suppose that there is uncertainty, possibly heterogeneous beliefs, several dates for consumption, and complete markets. Then, our formula (19) applies without modifications, interpreting goods as a state-and-date contingent goods. See Spinnewijn (2014) for an analysis of unemployment insurance when agents misperceive the probability of finding a job, and Davila (2014) for an analysis of a Tobin tax in financial markets with heterogeneous beliefs.
**Proposition 6**  (Multiperson Ramsey, behavioral). If commodity \(i\) can be taxed, then at the optimum
\[
\frac{\partial L(\tau)}{\partial \tau_i} = 0 \quad \text{with} \quad \frac{\partial L(\tau)}{\partial \tau_i} = \sum_h \left[ (\lambda - \gamma^h) c_i^h + \lambda(\tau - \tau^{b,h}_i) \cdot S_i^{C,h} \right].
\] (19)

**Proof** We have
\[
\frac{\partial L}{\partial \tau_i} = \sum_h \left[ W_{v,h} v^h_{w,h} + \lambda c_i^h + \lambda \tau \cdot c_i^h \right],
\]
Using the definition of \(\beta^h = W_{v,h} v^h_{w,h}\), the behavioral versions of Roy’s identity (11), and the Slustky relation, we can rewrite this as
\[
\frac{\partial L}{\partial \tau_i} = \sum_h \left[ \beta^h \left( -c_i^h - \tau^{b,h} \cdot S_i^{C,h} \right) + \lambda c_i^h + \lambda \tau \cdot (-c_i^h + S_i^{C,h}) \right].
\]
We then use the definition of the social marginal utility of income \(\gamma^h = \beta^h \cdot c_i^h\) to get
\[
\frac{\partial L}{\partial \tau_i} = \sum_h \left[ (\lambda - \gamma^h) c_i^h + \lambda \tau \cdot \tau^{b,h} \right] \cdot S_i^{C,h}.
\]
The result follows using the renormalization (18) of the ideal misoptimization corrective tax.

An intuition for this formula can be given along the following lines. The impact of a marginal increase in \(d\tau_i\) on social welfare is the sum of three effects: a mechanical effect, a substitution effect, and a misoptimization effect.

Let us start with the mechanical effect \(\sum_h (\lambda - \gamma^h) c_i^h d\tau_i\). If there were no changes in behavior, then the government would collect additional revenues \(c_i^h d\tau_i\) from agent \(h\), which are valued by the government as \((\lambda - \gamma^h) c_i^h d\tau_i\). Indeed, taxing one dollar from agent \(h\) to the government creates a net welfare change of \(\lambda - \gamma^h\), where \(\lambda\) is the value of public funds and \(\gamma^h\) is the social marginal utility of income for agent \(h\) (which includes the associated income effect on tax revenues).

Let us turn to the substitution effect \(\sum_h \lambda \tau \cdot S_i^{C,h} d\tau_i\). The change in consumer prices resulting from the tax change \(d\tau_i\) induces a change in behavior \(S_i^{C,h} d\tau_i\) of agent \(h\) over and above the income effect accounted for in the mechanical effect. The resulting change \(\tau \cdot S_i^{C,h} d\tau_i\) in tax revenues is valued by the government as \(\lambda \tau \cdot S_i^{C,h} d\tau_i\).

Finally, let us analyze the misoptimization effect \(\sum_h \lambda \tau^{b,h} \cdot S_i^{C,h}\). This effect is linked to the substitution effect. If agent \(h\) were rational, then the change in behavior captured by the substitution effect would have no first-order effects on his utility. This is a consequence of the envelope theorem. When agent \(h\) is behavioral, this logic fails, and the change in behavior associated with the substitution effect has first-order effects \(-\beta^h \tau^{b,h} \cdot S_i^{C,h} d\tau_i = -\lambda \tau^{b,h} \cdot S_i^{C,h} d\tau_i\) on his utility.

One way to think about the optimal tax formulas (19) is as a linear system of equations indexed
by \( i \) in the optimal taxes \( \tau_j \) for the different commodities

\[
-\frac{\sum_h S_{ji}^{C,h}}{c_i} \tau_j = 1 - \frac{\bar{\gamma}}{\lambda} - \text{cov}\left(\frac{\gamma^h}{\lambda}, \frac{H c_i^h}{c_i}\right) + \frac{-\sum_j \tilde{\tau}_j S_{ji}^{C,h}}{c_i},
\]

where \( c_i = \sum_h c_i^h \) is total consumption of good \( i \) and \( \bar{\gamma} = \frac{1}{H} \sum_h \gamma^h \) is the average social marginal utility of income. Of course the coefficients in this linear system of equations and the forcing terms (on the right-hand side) are endogenous and depend on taxes \( \tau_j \). Nevertheless, at the optimum, one can in principle solve out the linear system to express the taxes \( \tau_j \) as a function of these coefficients and forcing terms (valued at optimal taxes). The first forcing term \( 1 - \frac{\bar{\gamma}}{\lambda} - \text{cov}\left(\frac{\gamma^h}{\lambda}, \frac{H c_i^h}{c_i}\right) \) captures the revenue raising and redistributive objectives of taxation. The second forcing term \( \frac{-\sum_j \tilde{\tau}_j S_{ji}^{C,h}}{c_i} \) capture the corrective objective of taxation to address the effects of misoptimization. Note that the formulas feature \( \frac{\gamma^h}{\lambda} \) so that the ideal misoptimization corrective taxes are weighted by the social marginal welfare weights \( \frac{H c_i^h}{c_i} \). Intuitively, optimal taxes put more weight on addressing misoptimization by agents which on which the social welfare function puts more weight.

We can also write the optimal tax formula using the utility-compensated Slutsky matrices \( S^{H,h} \). For this purpose, it is convenient to introduce a different renormalization of the ideal misoptimization corrective tax \( \frac{\gamma^h}{\lambda} \tau^{b,h} \). We then get

\[
0 = \frac{\partial L(\tau)}{\partial \tau_i} = \sum_h \left[ (\lambda - \gamma^h) c_i^h + \lambda (\tau - \tilde{\tau}^{b,h}) \cdot S_{hi}^{C,h} \right].
\]

**Comparison with the traditional model with no behavioral biases** In the traditional model of Diamond (1975) where all agents are rational, only the mechanical and substitution effects are present, yielding

\[
0 = \frac{\partial L(\tau)}{\partial \tau_i} = \sum_h \left[ (\lambda - \gamma^h) c_i^h + \lambda \tau \cdot S_{hi}^{r,h} \right].
\]

Adding behavioral agents introduces the following differences. First, the changes in behavior (income and substitution effects) and the social marginal welfare weights are modified, leading to different values for \( \beta^h, \gamma^h \), and a different Slutsky matrix \( S_{i}^{C,h} \). Second, there is a new effect (the misoptimization effect) leading to a new term \( -\lambda \tilde{\tau}^{b,h} \cdot S_{i}^{C,h} \).

Moreover, in the traditional model without behavioral biases we can use the symmetry of the Slutsky matrix \( S_{i}^{r,h} \) to write \( \tau \cdot S_{i}^{r,h} = \sum_j \tau_j S_{ji}^{r,h} \) as \( \tau \cdot S_{i}^{r,h} = \sum_j \tau_j S_{ij}^{r,h} \). We can then rewrite the optimal tax formula in “discouragement” form as

\[
-\frac{\sum_j \tau_j S_{ij}^{r,h}}{c_i} = 1 - \frac{\bar{\gamma}}{\lambda} - \text{cov}\left(\frac{\gamma^h}{\lambda}, \frac{H c_i^h}{c_i}\right),
\]

The left-hand side is the discouragement index of good \( i \), which loosely captures how much the consumption of good \( i \) is discouraged by the taxes \( \tau_j \) on all the different commodities \( j \). The
right-hand side indicates that in the absence of distributive concerns (homogenous $\gamma^h = \gamma$), all goods should be uniformly discouraged in proportion to the relative intensity $1 - \frac{\gamma^h}{\lambda}$ of the raising revenue objective. With distributive concerns (heterogenous $\gamma^h$), goods that are disproportionately consumed by agents that society tries to redistribute towards (agents with a high $\gamma^h$) should be discouraged less.

With behavioral biases, the optimal tax formula cannot in general be simply written in discouragement form. This is because the Slutsky matrix $S^{C,h}$ is not symmetric in general. But when the the Slutsky matrix $S^{C,h}$ is symmetric, then we can go through the same steps as above and rewrite the optimal tax formula (19) as follows

$$-\sum_j \tau_j S^{C,h}_{ij} \frac{c_i}{c_i} = 1 - \frac{\gamma^h}{\lambda} - \text{cov} \left( \frac{\gamma^h}{\lambda}, \frac{H c_i^h}{c_i} \right) + -\sum_j \tilde{\tau}^{b,h}_j S^{C,h}_{ij} \frac{c_i}{c_i},$$

with a similar interpretation. The difference is that once again that the values for $\beta^h$, $\gamma^h$, and for the Slutsky matrix $S^{C,h}_{ji}$ are different than in the traditional model with no behavioral biases, and that there are new terms $\tilde{\tau}^{b,h}_j$ reflecting misoptimization.

**Lump-sum taxes and the negative income tax** Suppose that in addition to linear commodity taxes, the government can use a lump-sum tax or rebate $T$ identical for all agents (a negative income tax). Then optimal commodity taxes are characterized by the exact same conditions. But there is now an additional optimality condition corresponding to the optimal choice of the lump-sum tax $T$ yielding

$$\tilde{\gamma} = \frac{1}{H} \sum_{h=1}^{H} \gamma^h = \lambda.$$ (21)

Suppose that agents are homogeneous, and that lump-sum taxes are available, so that $\lambda = \gamma^h$. Proposition 6 implies that the optimal tax satisfies $\tau = \tilde{\tau}^{b,h}$. The optimal tax corrects the agent’s internality. If in additional all agents are rational, then we get $\tau = \tilde{\tau}^{b,h} = 0$.

When agents are heterogenous, formula (18) optimal taxes are not zero anymore $\tau \neq 0$. The optimal tax formula then captures a version of the celebrated negative income tax famously proposed by Friedman (1962).

### 3.3 Optimal Taxation with Externalities: Pigou

We now introduce externalities and study the consequences for the optimal design of commodity taxes. The utility of agent $h$ is now $u^h (c^h, \xi)$, where $\xi = \xi \left((c^h)_{h=1...H} \right)$ is a one-dimensional externality (for simplicity) that depends on the consumption vectors of all agents and is therefore
endogenous to the tax system.\textsuperscript{17} All individual functions encoding the behavior and welfare of agents now depend on the externality $\xi$.

The planning problem becomes

$$\max_{\tau} L(\tau),$$

where

$$L(\tau) = W\left(\left(u^h(p + \tau, w, \xi)\right)_{h=1\ldots H}\right) + \lambda \sum_{h} \left[\tau \cdot c^h(p + \tau, w, \xi) - w\right],$$

$$\xi = \xi\left(\left(c^h(p + \tau, w, \xi)\right)_{h=1\ldots H}\right).$$

We define the social marginal value of the externality

$$\Xi = \frac{\sum_{h} \left[\beta^h u^h_w + \lambda \tau \cdot c^h\right]}{1 - \sum_{h} \xi c^h c^h_{w}}.$$

This definition includes all the indirect effects of the externality on consumption and the associated effects on tax revenues (the term $\lambda \tau \cdot c^h$ in the numerator) as the associated multiple round effects on the externality (the “multiplier” term encapsulated in the denominator). With this convention, $\Xi$ is negative for a bad externality, like pollution. We also define the ideal (agent-specific) Pigouvian tax

$$\tau^\xi,h = -\frac{\Xi c^h}{\lambda}.$$ 

It represents the dollar value of the externality created by one more unit of consumption by agent $h$. We finally define the externality-augmented social marginal utility of income

$$\gamma^\xi,h = \gamma^h + \Xi \xi c^h c^h_{w} = \beta^h + \lambda\left(\tau - \tau^\xi,h\right) \cdot c^h_{w}.$$ 

This definition captures the fact that, as one dollar is given to the agent, his direct social utility increases by $\gamma^h$, but the extra dollar changes consumption by $c^h_{w}$, and hence the total externality by $\xi c^h c^h_{w}$, with a welfare impact $\Xi \xi c^h c^h_{w}$. The next proposition generalizes Proposition 6.

**Proposition 7** (Multiperson Pigou, behavioral). If commodity $i$ can be taxed, then at the optimum

$$\frac{\partial L(\tau)}{\partial \tau_i} = 0, \quad \text{with} \quad \frac{\partial L(\tau)}{\partial \tau_i} = \sum_{h} \left[\left(\lambda - \gamma^\xi,h\right) c^h_i + \lambda\left(\tau - \tau^\xi,h - \tilde{\tau}^{h,h}\right) S^{C,h}_i\right]. \quad (22)$$

In the case where $\xi$ depends only on total consumption so that $\xi = \xi(\sum_h c^h)$, this formula extends the additivity result of Sandmo (1975): $\tau^\xi,h = \tau^\xi$ is independent of $h$ and the externality term enters additively in the tax, as $\tau - \tau^\xi$.

\textsuperscript{17}For example, to capture an externality (e.g., second hand smoke) from the consumption of good 1, we could specify $\xi = \frac{\xi}{H} \sum_h c^h_1$ and $u^h(c^h, \xi) = u^h(c^h) - \xi$. 

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in the pure Ramsey case without externalities, but expect that we replace $\tau$ by $\tau - \tau^\xi$. Formally, for given values of $\lambda, \gamma^{C,h}, c^i, \tau^{b,h}$ and $S^{C,h}_i$, we must add the corrective Pigouvian taxes $\tau^\xi$ to the Ramsey taxes that would be computed in the absence of the externality.

### 3.4 Optimal Nudges

In this section, we develop a model of nudges and we derive a formula characterizing optimal nudges. At an abstract level, we assume that a nudge influences consumption but does not enter the budget constraint. This is the key difference between a nudge and a tax. The demand function $c^h(q, w, \chi)$ and it satisfies the budget constraint $q \cdot c^h(q, w, \chi) = w$, where $\chi$ is the nudge vector.

Specializing the general model a bit more, we propose the following concrete model of nudges. In the absence of a nudge, the agent has decision utility $u^{b,h}$ and perceived price $q^{s,h,*}$, which is the perceived price before the nudge. With the nudge,

$$c^h(q, w, \chi) = \arg \max_{c \in B^{s,h}} u^{b,h}(c) \text{ s.t. } q \cdot c \leq w.$$  

That is, his demand $c$ satisfies $u^{b,h}_c(c) = \Lambda^h B^{s,h}_c(q, c, \chi)$ for a constant $\Lambda^h > 0$ pinned down by the budget constraint $q \cdot c = w$. The perceived (potentially nonlinear) budget constraint $B^{s,h}(q, c, \chi) \leq w$ is modified by the nudge. But the true budget constraint is unchanged.

A useful specification is that of a nudge as a (psychological) tax on consumption good $i$, in which case

$$B^{s,h}(q, c, \chi) = q^{s,h,*} + \eta^h c_i,$$  

where $\eta^h \geq 0$ captures the nudgeability of the agent ($\eta^h = 0$ corresponding to a non-nudgeable agent).\(^{18}\) An example of such nudge is a public campaign against cigarettes ($\chi > 0$) or for recycling ($\chi < 0$). Another useful specification is that of a nudge as a (psychological) anchor on a given given consumption of good $i$, in which case

$$B^{s,h}(q, c, \chi) = q^{s,h,*} \cdot c + \eta^h |c_i - \chi|,$$  

so that an extra psychological penalty if the agent deviates from the quantity $\chi$ recommended by the nudge. For instance, the nudge could be a default allocation in a retirement plan (see e.g. Carroll et al. 2009). With the second specification, a number of agents will choose the default.\(^{19}\)

We now characterize optimal nudges.

\(^{18}\)We could generalize to an costly attention away from the nudge along the lines of Section 5, e.g. with $\eta^h(m) \text{ weakly decreasing in } m$, with $m = 1$ being an non-nudgeable agent.

\(^{19}\)The technical condition for the default to be chosen is $|u^{b,h}_c(\chi_i)/\Lambda^h - q^{s,h,*}_i| < \eta^h$.  

24
Proposition 8 (Optimal nudges). Optimal nudges satisfy

\[
\frac{\partial L(\tau, \chi)}{\partial \chi} = 0, \quad \text{with} \quad \frac{\partial L(\tau, \chi)}{\partial \tau} = \sum_h \lambda(\tau - \tau^{\xi,h} - \tilde{\tau}^{b,h}) \cdot c^h. \tag{25}
\]

The optimality conditions for taxes \(\frac{\partial L(\tau, \chi)}{\partial \tau} = 0\) are unchanged.

This formula clarifies how to best use nudges. It has three terms corresponding to three potentially conflicting goals of nudges. The first term \(\lambda \tau \cdot c^h\) captures the fact that the changes in behavior induced by nudges directly change tax revenues. The second term \(-\lambda \tau^{\xi,h} \cdot c^h\) captures the fact that the changes in behavior induced by nudges affect welfare and tax revenues through their effect on externalities. The third term \(-\lambda \tilde{\tau}^{b,h} \cdot c^h\) captures the fact that the changes in behavior induced by nudges affect welfare because agents misoptimize.\(^{20}\)

A nudge may also directly affect agents’ utility \(u^h(c, \chi)\). This could be captured by specifying \(u^h(c, \chi) = u(c) - \nu^h \cdot c_i\) or perhaps \(u^h(c, \chi) = u(c) - \nu^h |c_i - \chi|\) depending on the context. For example, a display of cancerous lungs on a pack of cigarettes not only nudges people away from consuming a cigarette (as captured by \(\eta^h\)), but may also directly lower their utility, as measured by \(\nu^h\). The optimal nudge formula is then modified to incorporate the additional welfare effects of nudges

\[
0 = \frac{\partial L(\tau, \chi)}{\partial \chi} = \sum_h [\lambda(\tau - \tau^{\xi,h} - \tilde{\tau}^{b,h}) \cdot c^h + \beta^h \frac{u^h}{v^h}].
\]

3.5 Examples

In this section, we analyze different specializations of the general model in order to extract concrete insights from Propositions 6, 7 and 8.

3.5.1 Constant Marginal Utility of Wealth and Misperception

For many of our examples, we will use the following particularization of the general model. There is both misperception and decision vs. experienced utility. We make two simplifying assumptions. First, we assume that decision and experienced utility are quasilinear so that the marginal utility of wealth is constant. Second, we assume that misperceptions are constant. Finally, we allow for externalities but assume that they are separable from consumption.

\(^{20}\)At this level of generality, quantity restrictions (e.g. mandates or caps) could be modeled in as nudges, with the vector \(\chi\) representing a vector of quantity restrictions influencing the demand functions \(c^h(q, w, \chi)\). Of course the particular way in which quantity restrictions influence demand differs from nudges, and as a result the implications of these first order conditions are very different for nudges and quantity restrictions. For example, imagine that \(\chi\) indexes a quantity restriction stipulating that the consumption of a certain commodity \(i\) must be equal to \(\chi\). In the context of the specialized model outlined above, this would lead to \(c^h(q, w, \chi) = \text{argmax}_{c_i q^{s,h}} u^h(c, \chi)\) s.t. \(q \cdot c \leq w\) and \(c_i = \chi\). That is, his demand \(c\) satisfies \(c_i = u^h_{c_j}(c)\) and \(c_j = \Lambda^h q^{s,h}\) for all \(j \neq i\), for a constant \(\Lambda^h > 0\) pinned down by the budget constraint \(q \cdot c = w\).
Formally, we decompose consumption $c= (c_0, C)$ where $C$ is of dimension $n$, and we normalize $p_0 = q_0 = 1$. The experienced utility of an agent of type $h$ is quasilinear

$$u^h (c_0, C, \xi) = c_0 + U^h (C) - \xi,$$

where $\xi = \xi((C^h)_{h=1..H})$. Agent $h$ is subject to two sets of biases. First, he maximizes a decision utility

$$u^{b,h} (c_0, C, \xi) = c_0 + U^{b,h} (C) - \xi$$

which differs from his experienced utility, but remains quasilinear. Second, he perceives prices to be $q^{s,h} = p + \tau^{s,h}$ with $\tau^{s,h} = M^h \tau$, so that the misperception of taxes is given by a constant matrix of marginal perceptions $M^h$. The corresponding perception function is

$$q^{s,h} (q) = p + M^h (q - p).$$

The demand $c^h (q, w, \xi) = (c^h_0 (q, w), C^h (q))$ of agent $h$ is such that $C^h (q) = C^{b,h} (q^{s,h} (q))$ and $c^h_0 (q, w) = w - q \cdot C^h (q)$, where $C^{b,h} (q^{s,h}) = \arg \max_C U^{b,h} (C) - q^{s,h} \cdot C$.

We define the rational Slutsky matrix

$$S^{r,h} (q^{s,h}) = \frac{\partial C^{b,h} (q^{s,h})}{\partial q^{s,h}}.$$

This corresponds to the Slutsky matrix of an agent with decision utility $U^{b,h}$ but who perceives taxes correctly. Because decision utility is quasilinear, there are no income effects and we have

$$S^{H,h} (q, w) = S^{C,h} (q, w) = S^{r,h} (q^{s,h} (q)) \cdot M^h.$$

We also define the ideal internality corrective tax $\tau^{I,h}$ and the ideal internality/externality corrective tax $\tau^{X,h}$ as follows:

$$\tau^{I,h} = U^{b,h}_C (C) - U^{h}_C (C) \quad \text{and} \quad \tau^{X,h} = \frac{\beta^h}{\lambda} \tau^{I,h} + \tau^{\xi,h}.$$  

The wedge $\tau^{I,h}$ is closely related to the ideal misoptimization corrective tax $\tau^{b,h}$ according to

$$\tau^{b,h} = \tau^{I,h} + \tau - \tau^{s,h}.$$  

Basically, $\tau^{b,h}$ captures two forms of misoptimization: those arising from the difference between decision and experienced utility ($\tau^{I,h}$), and those arising from the misperception of taxes ($\tau - \tau^{s,h}$). In this example, we find it useful to separate them.

---

21 In all those definitions, we omit the row and columns corresponding to good 0, which has no taxes and no misperceptions.
We now characterize optimal taxes. We decompose them into a Ramsey term \( \tau^{\text{Ramsey}} \) and a Pigou term \( \tau^{\text{Pigou}} \). The Ramsey term captures the revenue-raising and redistributive motives of taxation. The Pigou term captures the corrective motive of taxation, arising both from the desire to alleviate internalities and externalities. The formula features because the social marginal utilities of income \( \gamma_{i,h} \). Because there are no wealth effects in consumption, they are simply given by the social marginal welfare weights \( \gamma_{i,h} = \gamma_{h} = \beta_{h} \).

**Proposition 9** (Optimal tax formula with constant marginal utility of wealth and misperception)

In the constant marginal utility of wealth and misperception specification of the general model, the optimal tax is given by

\[
\tau = \tau^{\text{Ramsey}} + \tau^{\text{Pigou}},
\]

where

\[
\tau^{\text{Ramsey}} = - \left( \sum_{h} M^{ht} S^{r,h}(I - (I - M^{h}) \frac{\gamma_{h}}{\lambda})^{-1} \sum_{h} (1 - \frac{\gamma_{h}}{\lambda}) C^{h} \right) \tag{26}
\]

\[
\tau^{\text{Pigou}} = \left( \sum_{h} M^{ht} S^{r,h}(I - (I - M^{h}) \frac{\gamma_{h}}{\lambda})^{-1} \sum_{h} M^{ht} S^{r,h} \tau^{X,h} \right) \tag{27}
\]

These formulas simplify in the limit of a small (or in the absence of) redistribution or revenue raising motive, i.e. in the limit where \( \varepsilon = \max_{h} \left| \frac{\gamma_{h}}{\lambda} - 1 \right| \) is small. To this end, we define

\[ S^{M,r,h} = M^{ht} S^{r,h} M^{h}. \]

We also define the misperception-adjusted ideal internality and externality corrective tax

\[ \tau^{X,M,h} = (M^{h})^{-1} \tau^{X,h}. \]

Then we have\(^{22}\)

\[
\tau^{\text{Ramsey}} = - \left( \sum_{h} S^{M,r,h})^{-1} \sum_{h} (1 - \frac{\gamma_{h}}{\lambda}) C^{h} + O \left( \varepsilon^{2} \right) \right), \tag{28}
\]

\[
\tau^{\text{Pigou}} = \left( \sum_{h} S^{M,r,h})^{-1} \sum_{h} S^{M,r,h} \tau^{X,M,h} + O \left( \varepsilon \cdot \| \tau^{X,M} \| \right) \right), \tag{29}
\]

where \( \| \tau^{X,M} \| = \sup_{h} \| \tau^{X,M,h} \| \). When externalities are small so that \( \| \tau^{X,M,h} \| = O(\varepsilon) \), then both

\(^{22}\)These formulas coincide with the standard tax formulas in the absence of behavioral biases for some fictitious rational agents with Slutsky matrices \( S^{M,r,h} \) and ideal externality corrective taxes \( \tau^{X,M,h} \). The analogy with fictitious agents is not perfect. Indeed, the sensitivities of consumption to tax changes are given by \( S^{H,h} = S^{r,h} M^{h} \) and not by \( M^{ht} S^{r,h} M^{h} \).

27
the the Pigou and the Ramsey terms are of order $\varepsilon$, and the approximation errors in both equations are order $\varepsilon^2$. We call this the limit of small taxes for short.

### 3.5.2 Correcting Internalities/Externalities: Relaxation of the Principle of Targeting

The classical “principle of targeting” can be stated as follows. If the consumption of a good entails an externality, the optimal policy is to tax it, and not to subsidize substitute goods or tax complement goods. For example, if fuel pollutes, then optimal policy requires taxing fuel but not taxing fuel inefficient cars or subsidizing solar panels (see Salanié (2011) for such an example). Likewise, if fat is bad for consumers, and they suffer from an internality, fat should be taxed, but lean turkey should not be subsidized. We will now see that misperceptions of taxes lead to a reconsideration of this principle of targeting.

We use the specialization of the general model developed in Section 3.5.1. We assume that $\gamma^h = \lambda$, so there is no revenue-raison motive $\tau^\text{Ramsey} = 0$, and the internality/externality is constant across agents $\tau^{X,h} = \tau^X$. We place ourselves in the limit of small taxes. Equation (29) then yields the optimal tax:

$$
\tau = \tau^\text{Pigou} = \left( E \left[ M^h S^T M^h \right] \right)^{-1} E \left[ M^h \right] S^T \tau^X.
$$

We consider the case with $n = 2$ taxed goods (in addition to the untaxed good 0), where the consumption of good 1 features an internality/externality so that $\tau^X = (\xi, 0)$ with $\xi > 0$. This can be generated as follows in the model in in Section 3.5.1. In the externality case, we simply assume that $\xi((C^h)_{h=1}^{H}) = \xi \sum_{h} C^h$. In the internality case, we assume that $U^h (C) = U^{h,h} (C) - \xi C^h$. For example, in the externality case, good 1 could be fuel, and good 2 a solar panel. In the internality example, good 1 could be fatty beef, and good 2 lean turkey. In addition, we assume that the attention matrices are diagonal so that $M^h = \text{diag}(m_1^h, m_2^h)$.

When agents have uniform misperceptions ($M^h = M$), the optimal tax is $\tau = M^{-1} \tau^X$. This implies $\tau_1 = \frac{\xi}{m_1^h} > 0$ and $\tau_2 = 0$. The principle of targeting applies. This is no longer true when misperceptions are not uniform.

**Proposition 10** (Modified Principle of targeting) Suppose that the consumption of good 1 (but not good 2) entails a negative internality/externality and none on good 2. If agents perceive taxes correctly; then good 1 should be taxed, but good 2 should be left untaxed—the classical principle of targeting holds. If agents misperceive the tax on good 1 in heterogeneous ways ($\text{var}(m_1^h) > 0$), and if the perceptions of goods 1 and 2 are only mildly correlated, then, good 2 should be subsidized (respectively taxed) if and only if goods 1 and 2 are substitutes (respectively complements).

Proposition 10 shows\(^{23}\) that if people have heterogeneous attention to a fuel tax, then solar panels should be subsidize (this result is also reminiscent of Allcott, Mullainathan and Taubinsky

\(^{23}\)The technical condition for the mild correlations of the perceptions of goods 1 and 2 is $E \left[ \frac{m_1^h m_2^h}{E[(m_1^h)^2] m_1^h} \right] > 0$. 28
The reason is that the tax on good 1 is an imperfect instrument in the presence of attention heterogeneity. It should therefore be supplemented with a subsidy on substitute goods and a tax on complement goods. A fuel tax should therefore be supplemented with a subsidy on solar panels and tax on fuel inefficient cars. And a fat tax should be supplemented with a subsidy on lean turkey.

A similar logic applies in the traditional model with no behavioral biases, if there is an externality, and this externality is heterogenous. Our result should therefore be interpreted as an additional reason (heterogenous misperceptions of corrective taxes) why the principle of targeting might fail in the presence of behavioral biases.

3.5.3 Cross-Effects of Attention

How does attention to one good affect the optimal tax on another? To answer this question, we use the specialization of the general model developed in Section 3.5.1, assuming a representative consumer (so that we drop the index $h$), no internality/externality so that $\tau^X = 0$, and in the limit of small taxes. Defining $\Lambda = \frac{\lambda}{\gamma} - 1$, we can rewrite formula (28) as

$$\tau = -\Lambda (M' S^r M)^{-1} c.$$ 

This is a generalization of Proposition 1, which assumed a diagonal matrix $S^r$.

To gain intuition, we take $n = 2$ goods, $M = diag (m_1, m_2)$, we normalize prices to $p_1 = p_2 = 1$, and we write the rational Slutsky matrix as $S^r_{ii} = -c_i \psi_i$ for $i = 1, 2$, and $S^r_{12} = S^r_{21} = -\sqrt{c_1 c_2 \psi_1 \psi_2}$. 

**Proposition 11** (Impact of cross-elasticities on optimal taxes with inattentive agents) With two taxed goods, the optimal tax on good 1 is $\tau_1 = \frac{\Lambda m_1^2 \psi_1 c_2}{\sqrt{m_1^2 \psi_1 c_2}}$. When attention to the tax of good 2 falls, the optimal tax on good 1 increases (respectively decreases) if goods 1 and 2 are substitutes (respectively complements).

Suppose for example that the goods are substitutes with $\rho < 0$. When $m_2$ falls, the optimal tax on good 2 increases by the effects in Proposition 1, and optimal taxes on substitute goods also increase.

---

24 Recall that goods 1 and 2 are substitutes (respectively complements) if and only if $S^r_{12} > 0$ (respectively $S^r_{12} < 0$).

25 We have $\rho^2 < 1$ since $S^r$ is a $2 \times 2$ negative definite matrix so that $0 < det S^r = c_1 c_2 \psi_1 \psi_2 (1 - \rho^2)$.

26 Perhaps curiously, we can have $\frac{\partial \tau_1}{\partial m_1} > 0$ with complement goods $\rho > 0$. This happens if and only if $2 < \frac{m_2}{m_1} \rho \sqrt{\frac{\psi_1 c_2}{\psi_2 c_1}}$. That latter condition is quite extreme, and would imply that $\tau_1 < 0$ even though the planner wants to raise revenues. This is because the planner wants to increase consumption of the low elasticity (low $m_2$, $\psi_2$), good 2, he wants to subsidize good 1 if it is a strong complement of good 2.

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3.5.4 Internalities and Redistribution

We next study the interaction between internalities and redistribution. We use the specialization of the general model developed in Section 3.5.1. We treat the social marginal welfare weights \( \beta^h = \gamma^h \) as primitives, corresponding to the weighted Utilitarian welfare function \( W (v^h) = \sum_h \beta^h v^h \). For simplicity, we assume that good 1 is solely consumed by a class of agents, \( h \neq h^\ast \). We also assume that good 1 is separable, \( U^{b,h} (C) = U_1^{b,h} (c_1) + U_{>1}^{b,h} (C_{>1}) \), where \( C_{>1} = (c_i)_{i>1} \) and \( U^{h,h} (C) = U_{>1}^{h,h} (C_{>1}) \) for \( h \neq h^\ast \). We assume that good 1 features a harmful internality \( \tau_1^{I,h^\ast} = \frac{\beta^{h^\ast}}{\lambda} \tau_1^{I,h^\ast} > 0 \), and that all taxes are correctly perceived. Formally, we take \( U^h (C) = U^{b,h} (C) \) for \( h \neq h^\ast \) and \( U^{h^\ast} (C) = U^{b,h^\ast} (C) - \tau_1^{I,h^\ast} c_1 \). As a concrete example, \( h^\ast \) could stand for “poor” and good 1 for “sugary sodas”. This could capture a recent policy proposal considered in New York City to tax sugary sodas.

Proposition 6 yields
\[
\frac{\tau_1}{q_1} = (1 - \frac{\gamma^{h^\ast}}{\lambda}) \frac{1}{\psi_1} + \frac{\gamma^{h^\ast} \tau_1^{I,h^\ast}}{\lambda q_1},
\]
where \( \psi_1 = -\frac{q_1}{\lambda} \psi_{1,1}^{C,h^\ast} \).

The sign is ambiguous because there are two forces at work, corresponding to the two terms on the right-hand side.\(^{27}\) The first term \( (1 - \frac{\gamma^{h^\ast}}{\lambda}) \frac{1}{\psi_1} \) corresponds to the redistributive objective of taxes. It is decreasing in \( \gamma^{h^\ast} \) and negative if \( \gamma^{h^\ast} > \lambda \). This is because good 1 is consumed only by the poor and therefore taxing good 1 redistributes away from the poor. The second term \( \frac{\gamma^{h^\ast} \tau_1^{I,h^\ast}}{\lambda q_1} \) corresponds to the internality-corrective motive of taxes. It is increasing in \( \gamma^{h^\ast} \) positive. This is because good 1 is harmful as it entails a negative internality. As we increase the weight \( \gamma^{h^\ast} \) on the poor, the tax increases if and only if \( \frac{\tau_1^{I,h^\ast}}{q_1} \psi_1 > 1 \), i.e. if the internality-correction motive is stronger than the redistribution motive.

This situation highlights one of the advantages of nudges over corrective taxes: they are a way to correct internalities without mechanical redistributive effects. To capture this idea, imagine the internality can be completely eliminated by an informational nudge (e.g. explaining the bad consequences of sugar) that sets \( \tau_1^{I,h^\ast} = 0 \). Optimal taxes are then only used for redistribution, \( \tau_1 = \frac{\lambda - \gamma^{h^\ast}}{\lambda \psi_1} \). In some cases, quantity restrictions can be used to the same effect, and these considerations may also help rationalize why governments choose to ban high-interest rate loans, rather than tax them, since taxes create an additional burden for the poor.

3.5.5 Optimal Nudges and Interactions with Optimal Taxes

In this section, we propose an example illustrating the optimal determination of nudges and their interaction with taxes. We use the specialization of the general model developed in Section 3.5.1. There is only one taxed good \( n = 1 \). We treat the social marginal welfare weights \( \beta^h = \gamma^h \) as

\(^{27}\)In independent work, Lockwood and Taubinsky (2015b) examine a related problem, in the context of a Mirrleesian income tax.
primitives, corresponding to the weighted Utilitarian welfare function \( W((v^h)_{h=1}^{H}) = \sum_h \beta^h v^h \). We also treat internalities/externalities captured by the constant wedges \( \tau^{X,h} = \beta^h \tau^{I,h} + \tau^{\xi,h} \) as primitives.

We use quadratic utilities as in Section 2.3.2. More formally, in the internality case, we assume that \( U^h(c) = \frac{a^h c - \frac{1}{2} c^2}{\Psi^h} \) and \( \tau^h(c) = \frac{a^h c - \frac{1}{2} c^2 - \tau^{I,h} c}{\Psi} - \xi \), where \( \xi = \frac{\lambda}{\sum_h \beta^h} \sum_h \tau^{\xi,h} c^h \).

We take the nudge as a tax model (23). The demand of a consumer can then be expressed as

\[
e^h(\tau, \chi) = e^h_0 - \Psi (m^h \tau + \eta^h \chi),
\]

where \( \eta^h \) is the sensitivity of agent \( h \) to the nudge.

We start with the case where the nudge is the only instrument. We apply the optimal nudge formula (25). The optimal nudge is given by

\[
\chi = \frac{E[\tau^{X,h} \eta^h]}{E[\eta^h]^2}.
\]

In this simple model the optimal nudge is simply the regression coefficient of \( \tau^{X,h} \) on \( \eta^h \). If all agents have the same sensitivity \( \eta_h = 1 \), the nudge is equal to the the average ideal internality/externality corrective tax \( \chi = E[\tau^{X,h}] \). Heterogeneities in nudgeability determine how well targeted the nudge is to the internality/externality. Controlling for \( E[\tau^{X,h} \eta^h] \), the nudge is weaker if there is more heterogeneity in nudgeability (higher \( E[\eta^h]^2 \)), and controlling for heterogeneity in nudgeability, the nudge is stronger when nudgeability is correlated with the internality/externality (\( E[\tau^{X,h} \eta^h] \) is higher).

We next consider the optimal joint policy using both nudges and taxes. We only highlight a few results. The details can be found in Appendix 12.2.

One can show that

\[
\frac{\partial^2 L}{\partial \tau \partial \chi} = -\frac{1}{\Psi} E \left[ (\lambda - \gamma^h (1 - m^h)) \eta^h \right].
\]

As a result, taxes and nudges are complements if and only if \( E \left[ (\lambda - \gamma^h (1 - m^h)) \eta^h \right] \leq 0 \). Nudges and taxes can be complement if social marginal utility if income \( \gamma^h \) and nudgeability \( \eta^h \) are positively correlated. Loosely speaking, if poor agents (with a high \( \gamma^h \)) are highly nudgeable, then taxes and nudges can become complements, because in that case, nudges reduces the consumption of poor, nudged agents, and the tax can then be increased more without much adverse redistributive effects. If \( \gamma^h = \lambda \) so that there are no revenue raising or redistributive motives, then taxes and nudges are

\[\text{The intermediate steps are as follows. Using } e^h_\chi = -\Psi \eta^h, \tau = 0, \tau^{b,h} = \tau^{X,h} - \chi \eta^h, \text{ we get } \frac{\partial^2 L}{\partial \chi} (\tau, \chi) = \quad E \sum_h [\lambda \tau - \lambda \tau^{\xi,h} - \beta^h \tau^{b,h}] \cdot \quad e^h_\xi = \lambda E \sum_h [0 - \tau^{X,h} + \chi \eta^h] \cdot \Psi \eta^h, \quad \]
substitutes. Nudges are taxes are then given by the following formulas:

\[
\tau = \frac{E[(\eta^h)^2] E[\tau^{X,h} m^h] - E[\eta^h m^h] E[\tau^{X,h} \eta^h]}{E[(\eta^h)^2] E[(m^h)^2] - (E[\eta^h m^h])^2},
\]

\[
\chi = \frac{E[\tau^{X,h} \eta^h] E[(m^h)^2] - E[\tau^{X,h} m^h] E[\eta^h m^h]}{E[(\eta^h)^2] E[(m^h)^2] - (E[\eta^h m^h])^2}.
\]

The more powerful the nudge is for high-internality agents (the higher is \(E[\tau^{X,h} \eta^h]\), keeping all other moments constant), the more optimal policy relies on the nudge and the less it relies on the tax (the higher is \(\chi\), the lower is \(\tau\)). Symmetrically, if the better perceived is the tax by high-internality people (the higher is \(E[\tau^{X,h} m^h]\), the more optimal policy relies on the tax and the less it relies on the nudge.

The more heterogeneity there is in the perception of taxes (the higher is \(E[(m^h)^2]\), holding all other moments constant), the less targeted the tax is to the internality/externality, and as a result, the lower is the optimal tax \(\tau\) is lower, and uncertain certain conditions, the higher the optimal nudge \(\chi\). Similarly, the more heterogeneity there is in nudgeability (the higher is \(E[(\eta^h)^2]\), holding all other moments constant), then lower is the optimal nudge \(\chi\) decreases, and under similar conditions, the higher is the optimal tax \(\tau\).

### 3.5.6 Aversive Nudges vs. Taxes

How do things change when nudges are aversive? To address this question, we augment the example of Section 3.5.4 with aversive nudges. We use the same quadratic utility functions as in Section 3.5.5. We use the nudge as a tax model developed in Section 3.4. For concreteness, we interpret the harmful good (good 1) as cigarettes. We extend the model to account for the possibility that the nudge may directly create an aversive reaction (perhaps via a disgusting image of a cancerous lung), which we capture as a separable utility cost \(i^h \chi c_i\) so that utility is now

\[
u^{b,h}(c, \chi) = u^{b,h}(c) - i^h \chi c_i,
\]

where \(i^h \chi c_i\) is the nudge aversion term.

The next proposition formalizes how nudge aversion changes the relative attractiveness of nudges

\[\tau = \frac{E[\gamma_h \eta^h] E[\lambda \tau^{X,h} m_h - \sigma_{\gamma,c}] - E[\gamma_h \eta_h m_h] E[\lambda \tau^{X,h} \eta_h]}{E[\gamma_h \eta^h] E[\gamma_h m^2_h - \sigma_{\gamma,m}] - E[\gamma_h \eta_h m_h] E[\gamma_h \eta_h m_h - \sigma_{\gamma,n}]},\]

\[\chi = \frac{E[\gamma \tau^{X,h} \eta_h] E[\gamma_h \eta^2_h - \sigma_{\gamma,m}] - E[\gamma \tau^{X,h} m_h - \sigma_{\gamma,c}] E[\gamma \eta_h m_h - \sigma_{\gamma,n}]}{E[\gamma \eta^2_h] E[\gamma_h m^2_h - \sigma_{\gamma,m}] - E[\gamma \eta_h m_h] E[\gamma \eta_h m_h - \sigma_{\gamma,n}]}.
\]

The condition is \(E[\tau^{X,h} m_h] E[\eta^h] \geq E[\tau^{X,h} \eta_h] E[\eta_h m_h]\). It is verified if \(\eta_h, m_h, \tau^{X,h}\) are independent.
and taxes. For simplicity, we consider a special case with one type of agent, and where the planner can to use only one of two instruments to discourage cigarette consumption: a weakly positive tax \((\tau \geq 0)\), or an aversive nudge \((\chi \geq 0)\).

**Proposition 12** ("Nudge the poor, tax the rich") We consider a good with a “bad” internality (e.g. cigarettes). We suppose that at most one of two instruments (nudges and nonnegative taxes) can be used to correct this internality. Then, an optimal tax is superior to an optimal nudge if and only if

\[
\frac{\lambda - \gamma^h}{m_h^*} > -\theta^h \gamma^h. \tag{30}
\]

This proposition captures a new interesting trade-off between taxes and nudges. Both taxes and nudges correct internalities, but taxes also raise revenues on the agents consuming the good under consideration (which may or may not be desirable) while nudges do not and instead directly reduce utility. Taxes dominate nudges when the revenue raising motive on agents consuming the good associated with the internality is strong \((\lambda - \gamma^h \text{ is high})\), and when these agents are attentive to the tax \((m^h \text{ is high})\). Nudges dominate taxes when nudge aversion is low \((\theta^h \text{ is low})\) and when agents are easily nudged \((\eta^h \text{ is high})\).

### 3.5.7 Do More Mistakes by the Poor Lead to More Redistribution?

In this example, we consider the consequences for income taxation of the hypothesis that richer agents make fewer mistakes. We deviate from the above setup with quasilinear utility. There are two goods with prices normalized to one. The decision and experienced utility of agent \(h\) are given by

\[
u^{b,h}(c_1,c_2) = \frac{c_1^{b,h}}{\alpha_1^{b,h}} \frac{c_2^{b,h}}{\alpha_2^{b,h}},
\]

and

\[
u^{h}(c_1,c_2) = \frac{c_1^{b,h}}{\alpha_1^{b,h}} + \frac{c_2^{b,h}}{\alpha_2^{b,h}},
\]

with \(\alpha_1^{b,h} + \alpha_2^{b,h} = \alpha_1 + \alpha_2 = 1\). The indirect utility of agent \(h\) with (post-tax) income \(z\) is then given by

\[
v^h(z) = A^h z, \quad A^h = \left(\frac{\alpha_1^{b,h}}{\alpha_1 b,h} \right)^{\alpha_1} \left(\frac{\alpha_2^{b,h}}{\alpha_2 b,h} \right)^{\alpha_2} \leq 1.
\]

The stronger the behavioral bias of agent \(h\), the lower his marginal utility of income \(A^h\). This is because a marginal unit of income is spent inefficiently.

We focus on a negative income tax: a linear income tax \(\tau^z\) and a lump sum rebate. The unique purpose of the tax is to redistribute. The pre-tax and post-tax income of agent \(h\) are denoted by \(z^h\) and \(z^h + \tau^z(z^h - \bar{z})\), where \(\bar{z}\) is average income defined by \(\sum_h(z^h - \bar{z}) = 0\). We assume that the social welfare function is given by \(\sum_h \left(\frac{\nu^h}{1-\sigma}\right)^{1-\sigma}\) with \(\sigma > 0\).
The planning problem is then
\[
\max_{\tau_z} \, L(\tau_z; \{A^h\}),
\]
with
\[
L (\tau_z, \{A^h\}) = \sum_h \frac{(A^h)^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} \left( z^h + \tau_z \,(\bar{z} - z^h) \right)^{1-\sigma}.
\]

**Proposition 13** If the preference for redistribution is strong (\(\sigma > 1\)), larger behavioral biases (reductions in \(A^h\)) for the poor (agents with \(z^h < \bar{z}\)) lead to more redistribution (higher taxes \(\tau_z\)). Conversely, if the preference for redistribution is weak (\(\sigma < 1\)), larger behavioral biases for the poor lead to less redistribution.

The intuition for these results is the following. The key question is the impact of behavioral biases on the social marginal utility of income \(\gamma^h = (A^h z)^{-\sigma} A^h\). Indeed, the marginal benefit \(\frac{\partial L}{\partial \tau_z}\) of increased redistribution (a higher tax \(\tau_z\)) is inversely related to the covariance between the social marginal utility of income and income \(\frac{\partial L}{\partial \tau_z} = \sum_h \gamma^h (\bar{z} - z^h) = -\text{cov} (\gamma^h, z^h)\).

Larger behavioral biases for agent \(h\) increase its weight \((A^h z)^{-\sigma}\) in social welfare, but reduce his marginal utility of income \(A^h\). The resulting effect on the social marginal utility of income \(\gamma^h\) depends of the relative strength of these two effects. When \(\sigma > 1\), the former effect dominates and larger behavioral biases lead to higher \(\gamma^h\). The opposite occurs when \(\sigma < 1\). When \(\sigma = 1\), the two effects exactly cancel out so that \(\gamma^h\) is independent of \(A^h\).

### 3.6 Optimality of Simple Taxes

We now state a general result on the optimality of simple (e.g., uniform) tax systems. For simplicity, we go back to the model without Pigouvian externalities. We assume that people pay disproportionate attention to the maximum tax. To generalize the idea, we assume that they also pay attention to other quantiles of taxes, for instance the median tax. Because we think that perceptions are formed in percentage (“ad valorem”) form, we normalize here \(p_i = 1\). Formally, we suppose that the perceived tax can be expressed:

\[
\tau^q(\tau, \theta) = f \left( \tau^{(r_1)} \ldots \tau^{(r_Q)}, \tau, \theta \right)
\]

for some function \(f\) that is \(C^1\). Here \(\tau^{(r)}\) is the \(r\)-th quantile of taxes, for instance \(\tau^{(1)}\) is the maximum tax and \(\tau^{(1/2)}\) is the median tax.\(^{31}\) Hence, people pay special attention to \(Q\) quantiles of taxes. We assume that people do pay attention to the maximum tax (the quantile 1, i.e. 100\%): this is \(r_1 = 1\) and one of the quantiles considered.

\(^{31}\)Formally, \(\tau^{(r)} = \inf \left\{ \tau \text{ s.t. } \# \{ \tau^i \geq \tau \} \geq (1-r)n \right\}\). This tilts the quantiles towards the higher values, for instance with that definition, the median of \(\{1, 2, 3, 4\}\) is 3.
Here \( \theta \) smoothly parametrizes the attention function. We also consider a parameter \( \theta_0 \), such that \( f(\tau^{(r_1)}...\tau^{(r_Q)}, \tau, \theta_0) \) does not depend on \( \tau \). This means that when \( \theta = \theta_0 \), agents just pay attention to the quantile taxes (e.g., just to the maximum tax), but not to other taxes. When \( \theta \) is close to \( \theta_0 \), the agent pays a lot of attention to the quantile taxes and little to the other taxes.

One concrete example of this is: \( \tau^*_i(\tau, \theta) = (1 - m_i) \tau^d + m_i \tau_1, \tau^d = \sum_{k=1}^{Q} \alpha_k \tau^{(r_k)} + \beta \tau, \) with a positive weight on \( \tau_{\text{max}} \), i.e. \( \alpha_1 > 0 \). Here \( \theta = (m, \omega, \alpha) \), and, for example, \( \theta_0 = (0, 0, \alpha) \) ensures \( f(\tau^{(r_1)}...\tau^{(r_Q)}, \tau, \theta_0) \) is independent of \( \tau \).

With \( H \) types of agents, each agent \( h \) has her own perception function \( f^h \). We assume that the same parameter \( \theta_0 \) implies \( f^h(\tau^{(r_1)}, ..., \tau^{(r_Q)}, \tau, \theta_0) \) independent of \( \tau \) for all \( h \).

**Proposition 14** (Simple taxes – multiperson Ramsey) We suppose that at \( \theta_0 \), there is an interior optimum tax system, which features \( \sum_h (\lambda - \gamma^h) c^h_i \neq 0 \) for all \( i \). Then, generically, if \( \theta \) is near \( \theta_0 \), the optimal tax system is simple, i.e. has at most \( Q \) different tax rates.

The term \( \sum_h (\lambda - \gamma^h) c^h_i \) represents the mechanical effect on the government’s objective function of a marginal increase in the tax \( \tau_i \) (i.e. ignoring substitution effects). In many cases it is natural to expect that \( \sum_h (\lambda - \gamma^h) c^h_i > 0 \). For example, this is the case if there is just one type of agent \( h \), no lump-sum taxes, and the government wants to raise revenues (\( \lambda > \gamma^h \)). Similarly, with several types of agents and a lump-sum tax, condition (21) holds, then \( \sum_h (\lambda - \gamma^h) c^h_i = \text{cov}(\lambda - \gamma^h, c^h_i) \), and \( \text{cov}(\lambda - \gamma^h, c^h_i) > 0 \) if the government seeks to redistribute from rich to poor, as long as the rich (low \( \gamma^h \)) consume more of good \( i \) than the poor (high \( \gamma^h \)).

Proposition 14 can easily be extended in a variety of ways. For instance, if there is also a small fraction of rational consumers, while the other agents are as in the rest of the paper, the result goes through too (see also Proposition 23). The assumption that people put weights on quantiles in forming their perceptions is important for the result. Replacing them by averages does not generally give rise to simple tax systems.

**Extension: Model with categories of goods** We can easily extend the model to the case where taxes are perceived category-by-category. We partition the set of goods \( \{0, ..., n\} \) into \( K \) “natural” categories \( (\mathcal{I}^k)_{k=1,...,K} \): \( \{0, ..., n\} = \mathcal{I}^1 \cup ... \cup \mathcal{I}^K \). We call \( \mathcal{I}(i) \in \{\mathcal{I}^1, ..., \mathcal{I}^K\} \) the natural category of each good \( i \). For instance, if \( i \) is an apple, \( \mathcal{I}(i) \) may be the category of food items. We assume perceived rate is formed as in (31), but the quantiles are taken simply within each category. For instance, we could have \( \tau^*_i(\tau, \theta_0) = (1 - m_i) \tau^d_{\mathcal{I}(i)} + m_i \tau_1 \), where \( \tau^d_{\mathcal{I}} \) is formed base on statics within category \( \tau^d_{\mathcal{I}} \), e.g. \( \tau^d_{\mathcal{I}} = \max_{j \in \mathcal{I}} \tau_j \). Categories are the same for all agents.

**Corollary 2** We suppose that agents partition the goods in \( K \) categories, as described above. Under the assumptions of Proposition 14, for \( \theta \) near \( \theta_0 \), the optimal tax system is still simple, consisting of at most \( KQ \) different tax rates.
For instance, if there are two categories of goods (food and non-food items) and agents use the maximum taxes as a salient tax in each category, then there will be at the optimum two different uniform tax rates, one for food, one for non-food items.

4 Nonlinear Income Taxation: Mirrlees Problem

4.1 Setup

Agent’s behavior  There is a continuum of agents indexed by skill $n$ with density $f(n)$ (we use $n$ rather than $h$, the conventional index in that literature). Agent $n$ has a utility function $u^n(c, z)$, where $c$ is his one-dimensional consumption, $z$ is his pre-tax income, and $u_z \leq 0$.\footnote{If the agent’s pre-tax wage is $n$, $L$ is his labor supply, and utility is $U^n(c, L)$, then $u^n(c, z) = U(c, \frac{z}{n})$. Note that this assumes that the wage is constant (normalized to one). We discuss the impact of relaxing this assumption in Sections 6.1.2 and 12.8.}

The total income tax for income $z$ is $T(z)$, so that disposable income is $R(z) = z - T(z)$. We call $q(z) = R'(z) = 1 - T'(z)$ the local marginal “retention rate”, $Q = (q(z))_{z \geq 0}$ the ambient vector of all marginal retention rates, and $r_0 = R(0)$ the transfer given by the government to an agent earning zero income. We define the “virtual income” to be $r(z) = R(z) - z q(z)$. Equivalently $R(z) = q(z) z + r(z)$, so that $q(z)$ is the local slope of the budget constraint, and $r(z)$ its intercept.

We use a general behavioral model in a similar spirit to Section 3. The primitives is the income function $z^n(q, Q, r_0, r)$ which depends on the local marginal retention rate $q$, the ambient vector of all marginal retention rates $Q$, and the virtual income $r$. In the traditional model without behavioral biases we have $z^n(q, Q, r_0, r) = \arg\max_z u^n(qz + r, z)$ so that $z^n$ does not depend on $Q$ and $r_0$. With behavioral biases, this is no longer true in general. The income function is associated with the indirect utility function $v^n(q, Q, r_0, r) = u^n(qz + r, z)|_{z = z^n(q, Q, r_0, r)}$. The earnings $z(n)$ of agent $n$ facing retention schedule $R(z)$ is then the solution of the fixed point $z = z^n(q(z), Q, r(z))$, his consumption is $c(n) = R(z(n))$ and his utility is $v(n) = u^n(c(n), z(n))$.

Planning problem  The objective of the planner is to design the tax schedule $T(z)$ in order to maximize the following objective function

$$\int_0^\infty W(v(n)) f(n) dn + \lambda \int_0^\infty (z(n) - c(n)) f(n) dn.$$

Like Saez (2001), we normalize $\lambda = 1$. We call $g(n) = W'(v(n)) v^n(q(z(n)), Q, r(z(n)))$ the marginal utility of income. This is the analogue of $\beta^b$ in the Ramsey problem of Section 3. And we identify agents with their income level $z(n)$ instead of their skill $n$. Most of the time we leave implicit the dependence on $n(z)$ on $z$ to avoid cluttering the notations. We now derive a behavioral version of the optimal tax formula in Saez (2001).
4.2 Saez Income Tax Formula with Behavioral Agents

4.2.1 Elasticity Concepts

Recall that the marginal retention rate is $q(z) = 1 - T'(z)$. Given an income function $z(q, Q, r_0, r)$, we introduce the following definitions. We define the income elasticity of earnings

$$\eta = q_z (q, Q, r_0, r).$$

We also define the uncompensated elasticity of labor (or earnings) supply with respect to the actual marginal retention rate

$$\zeta^u = z_q (q, Q, r_0, r).$$

Finally we define the compensated elasticity of labor supply with respect to the actual marginal retention rate

$$\zeta^c = \zeta^u - \eta.$$

We also introduce two other elasticities which are zero in the traditional model without behavioral biases. We define the compensated elasticity of labor supply at $z$ with respect to the marginal retention rate $q(z^*)$ at a point $z^*$ different from $z$:

$$\zeta^c_{Q,z^*} = z_q (q, Q, r_0, r).$$

We also define the earnings sensitivity to the lump-sum rebate at zero income\(^{33}\)

$$\zeta^c_{r_0} = z_r (q, Q, r_0, r).$$

In the traditional model with no behavioral biases, $\zeta^c_{Q,z^*} = \zeta^c_{r_0} = 0$. But this is no longer true with behavioral agents.\(^{34,35}\) All these elasticities a priori depend the agent at earnings $z$. As mentioned above, we leave this dependence implicit most of the time.

Just like in the Ramsey model, we define the “ideal misoptimization corrective tax”

$$\tau^b(q, Q, r_0, r) = -\frac{q u_c(c, z) + u_z(c, z)}{v_r(q, Q, r_0, r)} \bigg|_{z = z(q, Q, r_0, r), c = qz + r}.$$ 

---

\(^{33}\)Formulas would be cleaner without the multiplication by $q$ in those elasticities, but here we follow the public economics tradition.

\(^{34}\)For instance, in the misperception model, in general, the marginal tax rate at $z^*$ affects the default tax rate and therefore the perceived tax rate at earnings $z$.

\(^{35}\)In the language of Section 3.1, we use income-compensation based notion of elasticity, $S^C$, rather than the utility-compensation based notion $S^H$. 

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We also define the renormalized ideal misoptimization corrective tax

$$\tilde{\tau}^b(z) = g(z) \tau^b(z).$$

In the traditional model with no behavioral biases, we have $\tau^b(q, Q, r_0, r) = \tilde{\tau}^b(z) = 0$. But this is no longer true with behavioral agents.

We have the following behavioral version of the Roy identity (proven in the appendix, section 13):

$$\frac{v_q}{v_w} = z - \frac{\tau^b z}{q} \zeta_c, \quad \frac{v_{Q, z}}{v_w} = -\frac{\tau^b z}{q} \zeta_{Q, z}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (32)

As in Section 3, the general model can be particularized to a decision vs. experienced utility model, or to a misperception model.

Misperception model The agent may misperceive the tax schedule, including her marginal tax rate. We call $T^{s, n}(q, Q, r_0)(z)$ the perceived tax schedule, $R^{s, n}(z) = z - T^{s, n}(q, Q, r_0)(z)$ the perceived retention schedule, and $q^{s, n}(q, Q, r_0)(z) = \frac{dR^{s, n}(q, Q, r_0)(z)}{dz}$ the perceived marginal retention rate. Faced with this tax schedule, the behavior of the agent can be represented by the following problem

$$\max_{c, z} u^n(c, z) \text{ s.t. } c = R(z).$$

This formulation implies that the agent’s choice $(c, z)$ satisfies $c = R(z)$ and

$$q^{s, n}(z) u^n_c(c, z) + u^n_z(c, z) = 0,$$

instead of the traditional condition $q(z) u^n_c(c, z) + u^n_z(c, z) = 0$. This means that the agent correctly perceives consumption and income $(c, z)$, but misperceives his marginal retention rate $q^{s, n}(z)$. Together with $c = R(z)$, this characterizes the behavior of the agent.\footnote{This is a sparse max problem with a non-linear budget constraint, which generalizes the sparse max with a linear budget constraint we analyzed in section 2.1. The true constraint is $c = R(z)$, but the perceived constraint is $c = R^{s, n}(q, Q, r_0)(z)$.}

Accordingly, we define $z^n(q, q^s, r)$ to be the solution of $q^n u^n_c(c, z) + u^n_z(c, z) = 0$ with $c = qz + r$.\footnote{If there are several solutions, we choose the one yield the greatest utility.}

The income $z(n)$ of agent $n$ is then the solution of the fixed point equation

$$z = z^n(q(z), q^{n, s}(q, Q, r_0)(z), r(z)).$$

his consumption is $c(n) = R(z(n))$ and his utility is $v(n) = u^n(c(n), z(n))$.

Summing up, in the misperception model, the primitives are a utility function $u$ and a perception function $q^n(q, Q, r_0)(z)$. This yields an income function $z(q, q^s, r)$. The general function $z(q, Q, r_0, r)$ is then $z(q(z'), Q, r_0, r) = z(q(z'), q^s(q, Q, r_0)(z'), r)$ for any earnings $z'$.\footnote{If there are several solutions, we choose the one yield the greatest utility.}
One concrete example of misperception is $q^{s,n}(q, \mathbf{Q}, r_0) = q^s(q, \mathbf{Q}, r_0)$ with

$$q^s(q, \mathbf{Q}, r_0)(z) = mq(z) + (1 - m) [\alpha q^d(\mathbf{Q}) + (1 - \alpha) \frac{r_0 + \int_0^z q(z') \, dz'}{z}],$$

where $m \in [0, 1]$ is the attention to the true tax (hence retention) rate, $\frac{r_0 + \int_0^z q(z') \, dz'}{z}$ is the average retention rate (as in Liebman and Zeckhauser (2004)), and $\alpha \in [0, 1]$. The default perceived retention rate might be a weighted average of marginal rates, e.g. $q^d(\mathbf{Q}) = \int q(z) \, \omega(z) \, dz$ for some weights $\omega(z)$.

As in the Ramsey case, it is useful to express behavioral elasticities as a function of an agent without behavioral biases. Call $z^r(q^s, r') = \arg \max_z u(q^s z + r', z)$ the earnings of a rational agent facing marginal tax rate $q^s$ and extra non-labor income $r'$. Then, $z(q, q^s, r) = z^r(q^s, r')$ where $r'$ solves $r' + q^s z^r(q^s, r') = r + q z^r(q^s, r')$. We call $S^r(q^s, r') = \frac{\partial z^r}{\partial q^s} (q^s, r') - \frac{\partial z^r}{\partial r'} (q^s, r') z^r(q^s, r')$ the rational compensated sensitivity of labor supply (it is just a scalar). We also define $\zeta^{cr} = \frac{\partial S^r}{\partial z}$ as the compensated elasticity of labor supply of the agent if he were rational.

We define $m_{zz} = q^s_q(q, \mathbf{Q}, r_0)(z)$ as the attention to the own marginal retention rate, and $m_{zz^*} = q^s_{Qz^*}(q, \mathbf{Q}, r_0)(z)$ as the marginal impact on the perceived marginal retention rate at $z$ of an increase in the marginal retention rate at $z^*$. Then, we have the following concrete values for the elasticities of the general model (the derivation is in Section 13 of the appendix):

$$\zeta^c = \left(1 - \eta \frac{\tau - \tau^s}{q}\right) \zeta^{cr} m_{zz}, \quad \zeta^{c\tau}_{Qz^*} = \left(1 - \eta \frac{\tau - \tau^s}{q}\right) \zeta^{cr} m_{zz^*},$$

$$\tau^b = \frac{\tau - \tau^s}{1 - \eta \frac{\tau - \tau^s}{q}}.$$

If the behavioral agent overestimates the tax rate ($\tau - \tau^s < 0$), the term $\tau^b$ is negative. Loosely, we can think of $\tau^b$ as indexing an “underperception” of the marginal tax rate. In the traditional model without behavioral biases, $m_{zz^*} = 1_{z = z^*}$, $\tau^s = \tau$ and $\tau^b = 0$.

**Decision vs. experienced utility model** In the decision vs. experienced utility model, behavior is represented by the maximization of a decision utility $u^b(c, z)$ subject to the budget constraint $c = R(z)$. We then have $\zeta^c_{Qz^*} = 0$, and $\zeta^c$ and $\eta$ are the elasticities associated with decision utility $u^b$. The ideal misoptimization corrective tax is

$$\tau^b = \frac{u^b c u^b_{c} - u_z}{u^b_{r}},$$

**Other useful concepts and notations** We next study the impact of the above changes on welfare. Following Saez (2001), we call $h(z)$ the density of agents with earnings $z$ at the optimum, and $H(z) = \int_0^z h(z') \, dz'$. We also introduce the virtual density $h^v(z) = \frac{q(z)}{q(z) - \zeta^c z R^r(z)} h(z)$. 

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We define the social marginal utility of income

$$\gamma (z) = g(z) + \frac{\eta(z)}{1 - T'(z)} \left[ \tilde{\tau}^b (z) + (T'(z) - \tilde{\tau}^b (z)) \frac{h^* (z)}{h(z)} \right]. \quad (35)$$

This definition is the analogue of the corresponding definition (16) in the Ramsey model. It is motivated by Lemma 6 in the online appendix, which shows that if the government transfers a lump-sum $\delta K$ to an agent previously earning $z$, the objective function of the government increases by $\delta L(z) = (\gamma (z) - 1) \delta K$. The term $\gamma (z)$ comprises a direct effect of that transfer to the agent’s welfare ($g(z)$) and effect on labor supply captured by the term in $\eta(z)$: to the leading order as the agent receives $\delta K$, his labor supply changes by $\frac{\eta(z)}{1 - T'(z)} \delta K$, which impacts tax revenues by $\frac{\eta(z)}{1 - T'(z)} T'(z) \delta K$. The terms $\frac{h^*(z)}{h(z)}$ (in practice often close to 1) capture the fact that the agent’s marginal tax rate changes, and $\tilde{\tau}^b (z)$ capture the associated extra welfare consequences due to misoptimization.

4.2.2 Optimal Income Tax Formula

We next present the optimal income tax formula. The online appendix (section 12.3) presents the intermediary steps used in the derivation of this formula.

**Proposition 15** Optimal taxes satisfy the following formulas (for all $z^*$)

$$\frac{T'(z^*) - \tilde{\tau}^b (z^*)}{1 - T'(z^*)} = \frac{1}{\zeta(z^*)} \frac{1 - H(z^*)}{z^*_h^* (z^*)} \int_{z^*}^{\infty} (1 - \gamma(z)) \frac{h(z)}{1 - H(z^*)} dz - \int_{0}^{\infty} \frac{\zeta_{Q^*} (z)}{\zeta(z^*)} \frac{T'(z) - \tilde{\tau}^b (z)}{1 - T'(z)} \frac{zh^* (z)}{z^*_h^* (z^*)} dz. \quad (36)$$

This formula can also be expressed as a modification of the Saez (2001) formula:

$$\frac{T'(z^*) - \tilde{\tau}^b (z^*)}{1 - T'(z^*)} + \int_{0}^{\infty} \omega(z^*, z) \frac{T'(z) - \tilde{\tau}^b (z)}{1 - T'(z)} dz = \frac{1}{\zeta(z^*)} \frac{1 - H(z^*)}{z^*_h^* (z^*)} \int_{z^*}^{\infty} e^{-J^*_z \rho(s)ds} \left( 1 - g(z) - \eta \frac{\tilde{\tau}^b (z)}{1 - T'(z)} \right) \frac{h(z)}{1 - H(z^*)} dz$$

where $\rho(z) = \frac{\eta(z)}{\zeta(z)} \frac{1}{z}$ and

$$\omega(z^*, z) = \left( \frac{\zeta_{Q^*} (z)}{\zeta(z^*)} - \int_{z^*}^{\infty} e^{-J^*_z \rho(s)ds} \frac{\zeta_{Q^*} (z)}{\zeta(z^*)} dz' \right) \frac{zh^* (z)}{z^*_h^* (z^*)}.$$

The intuition for formula (36) is as follows. The first term on the right-hand side (the one ending in $\int_{z^*}^{\infty} (1 - \gamma(z)) \frac{h(z)}{1 - H(z^*)} dz$) is a simple reformulation of Saez’s formula, using the concept of social marginal utility of income $\gamma(z)$ rather than the marginal social welfare weight.
The link between the two is in equation (35)). The second term on the right-hand side
\[- \frac{1}{z} \int_0^\infty \frac{\phi^c(z)}{c^c(z)} T^c(z) - \frac{T^c(z)}{1 - T^c(z)} h^c(z) dz \] is new, and captures a misoptimization effect together with the
term \( - \frac{T^b(z)}{1 - T^c(z)} \) on the left-hand side. First, increasing the marginal tax rate at \( z^* \) leads the agents at
another income \( z \) to perceive higher taxes on average (if \( \zeta_{Q^c_*}^c(z) > 0 \)), which leads them to decrease
their labor supply and reduces tax revenues (as captured by \( \zeta_{Q^c_*}^c(z) \frac{T^c(z)}{1 - T^c(z)} \)). Ceteris paribus, this
consideration pushes towards a lower tax rate, compared to the Saez optimal tax formula. Second,
suppose for concreteness that the agent at \( z \) overestimates the tax (so \( \tilde{T}^b(z) < 0 \)): increasing the
marginal tax rate at \( z^* \) leads the agent to overestimate the tax even more, which worsens the agent’s
welfare. This, again, pushes towards a lower tax rate.

The modified Saez formula (37) uses the concept \( g(z) \) rather than \( \gamma(z) \) and is easily obtained
from formula (36) using equation (35). When there are no income effects (\( \eta = \rho(z) = 0 \)), the
optimal tax formula (36) and the modified Saez formula (37) coincide. It also coincides with the
traditional Saez formula when there are no behavioral biases (\( \zeta_{Q^c_*}^c(z) = \omega(z^*, z) = \tilde{T}^b(z) = 0 \)).
In this case, the left-hand side of (37) is simply \( \frac{T^c(z^*)}{1 - T^c(z^*)} \) so that the formula solves for the optimal
marginal tax rate \( T^c(z^*) \) at \( z^* \). Of course, the formula is expressed in terms of endogenous objects
or “sufficient statistics”: welfare weights \( g \), elasticities of substitution \( \zeta^c(z) \), income elasticities \( \eta(z) \)
and income distribution \( h(z) \) and \( h^c(z) \). With behavioral agents, there are two differences. First,
there are two additional sufficient statistic, namely the ideal misoptimization corrective tax \( \tilde{T}^b(z) \)
and the behavioral cross-influences \( \zeta_{Q^c_*}^c(z) \). Second, it is not possible to solve-out the optimal
marginal tax rate in closed form. Instead, the modified Saez formula (37) at different values of \( z^* \)
form a system of linear equations in the optimal marginal tax rates \( T^c(z) \) for all \( z \).

In the case where behavioral biases can be represented by a decision vs. experienced utility
model, the modified Saez formula takes a particular simple form since in this case \( \omega(z^*, z) = 0 \) and
\( \tilde{T}^b(z) = g(z) \frac{u^b u^b}{u^r u^r} \), and there is no linear system to invert.

### 4.2.3 Marginal Tax Rate for Top Incomes

We now derive a formula for the marginal rate at very high incomes. In proves convenient to take
a (high) \( z_0 \) above which we consider that incomes are “top incomes”, and the marginal rate is
constant. We consider a tax system with constant marginal rates for \( z \geq z_0 \). We assume that
\( g(z) = \bar{g} \) for \( z > z_0 \). We call \( \zeta^c_Q(z) := \int_{z_0}^\infty \zeta^c_{Q^c_*}(z) dz \), the sensitivity to the asymptotic tax rate.
This is the elasticity of earnings of an individual at earnings \( z < z_0 \) to an increase to the top rate –
perhaps because of a misperception of the tax environment.

We call \( \bar{\eta}, \bar{g}, \bar{\zeta} \) the asymptotic values for large incomes, and \( \pi \) the Pareto exponent of the
earnings distribution (when \( z \) is large, \( 1 - H(z) \propto z^{-\pi} \)). We define the weighted means:
\( E^c[\phi(z)] = \frac{\int \phi(z) h(z) dz}{\int \phi(z) dz} \) and \( E^*[\zeta^c_Q] := \frac{\int \zeta^c_Q \phi^c(z) h^c(z) dz}{\int \frac{T^c(z)}{1 - T^c(z)} h^c(z) dz} \).
Proposition 16 (Optimal tax rate for top incomes) The optimal marginal rate $\tau$ for top incomes is

$$
\tau = \frac{1 - \bar{g} - \beta + \zeta^c \pi \bar{g} \tau^b}{1 - \bar{g} - \beta + \zeta^c \pi + \eta}
$$

(38)

where

$$
\beta = E^z \left[ T'(z) - \bar{h}(z) \right] \pi \frac{E[z]}{E[z_{1+z \geq z_0}]} E^* \left[ \zeta^c \right].
$$

This generalizes the Saez (2001) formula, which had $\beta = \tau^b = 0$ as it did not have behavioral elements. The intuition is as follows.

The $\beta$ term reflects that the top marginal tax rate affects not only top earners, but also the tax perceived by agents at all points of the income distribution (hence the corresponding tax revenues, after multiplication by $T'(z)$). If the increasing the top tax rate lower all incomes more (i.e. when $\zeta^c(z)$ is higher), the optimal top rate is lower. Concretely, if France increases the top rate to 75%, this contaminate the perception earners even below the top incomes. The term $\beta$ is positive, so that this force reduces the optimal top tax rate.

The $\tau^b$ term is positive (resp. negative) when top earners overperceive (resp. underperceive) the marginal benefits of effort or underperceive (resp. overperceive) taxes. Then, this term can increase (or decrease) optimal top rates compared to the Saez formula.

Take the typical Saez calibration with $\zeta^c(\infty) = 0.2$, $\eta = 0$ and $\pi = 2$. If the typical tax is $T'(z) \simeq \frac{1}{3}$ so that $E^z \left[ \frac{T'(z)}{1-T'(z)} \right] \simeq \frac{1}{2}$, we take $z_0$ to be at the top 1% quantile of the income distribution. Piketty and Saez (2003, updated 2015) report that in the income share of the top 1% is 20%, so that $E[z_{1+z \geq z_0}] = \frac{1}{0.2}$. That implies $\beta = E^z \left[ \frac{T'(z)-\bar{h}(z)}{1-T'(z)} \right] \pi \frac{E[z]}{E[z_{1+z \geq z_0}]} E^* \left[ \zeta^c \right] = \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{1}{0.2} \cdot 2.5 \cdot 1 = 0.067$. This at least gives an interpretable benchmark that we now use.

The average cross-influence $E^* \left[ \zeta^c \right]$ does not appear to have ever been measured – indeed, it is assumed to be 0 in the traditional model. We propose the following thought experiment to gauge its potential magnitude. Suppose that increasing the top rate by 10% will decrease earnings outside the top bracket by 1%. Then, $E^* \left[ \zeta^c \right] = (1 - T'(z)) \frac{z_{1+z}}{z} = (1 - \frac{1}{3}) 0.1 = 0.067$. This at least gives an interpretable benchmark that we now use.

Take first the case $\bar{g} = 0$, i.e. no welfare weight is put on top earners. With rational agents the traditional rate is $\tau = 71\%$. If $E^* \left[ \zeta^c \right] = 0.067$, $\tau = 62\%$, and if we double the influence of top earners, $\tau = 45\%$. When the weight on top earnings is higher, say $\bar{g} = 0.2$, the corresponding numbers for the top rate are: 67%, 53% and 25%. This illustrates the potentially large importance of the behavioral cross-impact of the top tax rate, a sufficient statistic that is assumed to be zero in the traditional analysis.

The internality $\tau^b$ does not affect the optimal tax rate when $\bar{g} = 0$. When $\bar{g} = 0.5$, it increases the optimal top rate from 56% to 67% when the internality goes from $\tau^b = 0$ to $\tau^b = 0.5$.

We also revisit the classic result that if the income distribution is bounded at $z_{\max}$, then the top marginal income tax rate should be zero. In our model, this need not be the case. One simple
way to see that is to consider the case of decision vs. experienced utility. Tax formula (36) then prescribes \( T' (z_{\text{max}}) = \tilde{\tau}^b (z_{\text{max}}) \) which is positive or negative depending on whether top earners over or under perceive the benefits of work (under or over perceive the costs of work).

### 4.2.4 Possibility of Negative Marginal Income Tax Rates

In the traditional model with no behavioral biases, negative marginal income tax rates can never arise at the optimum. With behavioral biases negative marginal income tax rates are possible at the optimum. To see this, consider for example the decision vs. experienced utility model with decision utility \( u^b \) and assume that \( u^b \) is quasilinear so that there are no income effects \( u^b (c, z) = c - \phi (z) \). We take experienced utility to be \( u (c, z) = \theta c - \phi (z) \). Then the modified Saez formula (37) becomes

\[
\frac{T' (z^*) - \tilde{\tau}^b (z^*)}{1 - T' (z^*)} = \frac{1}{\zeta (z^*)} \frac{1 - H (z^*)}{z^* h^* (z^*)} \int_{z^*}^{\infty} (1 - g (z)) \frac{h (z)}{1 - H (z^*)} dz,
\]

where \( \tilde{\tau}^b (z) = - g (z) \phi' (z) \frac{\theta - 1}{\theta} \) by (34). When \( \theta > 1 \), we have \( \tilde{\tau}^b (z^*) < 0 \) and it is possible for this formula to yield \( T' (z^*) < 0 \). This occurs if agents undervalue the benefits or overvalue the costs from higher labor supply. For example, it could be the case that working more leads to higher human capital accumulation and higher future wages, but that these benefits are underperceived by agents, which could be captured in reduced form as \( \theta > 1 \). Such biases could be particularly relevant at the bottom of the income distribution (see Chetty and Saez (2013) for a review of the evidence). If these biases are strong enough, the modified Saez formula could predict negative marginal income tax rates at the bottom of the income distribution. This could provide a behavioral rationale for the EITC program. In independent work, Lockwood and Taubinsky (2015) derive a modified Saez formula in the context of decision vs. experienced utility model. They zoom in the EITC insight and provide an empirical analysis and calibration.

This differs from alternative rationales for negative marginal income tax rates that have been put forth in the traditional literature. For example Saez (2002) shows that if the Mirrlees model is extended to allow for an extensive margin of labor supply, then negative marginal income tax rates can arise at the optimum. We refer the reader to the online appendix (section 12.7) for a behavioral treatment of the Saez (2002) extensive margin of labor supply model.

### 4.3 Optimality of Simple Income Taxes

We use the notations and concepts from the treatment of simple taxes for the multi-person Ramsey case, Section 3.6. We suppose that people pay disproportionate attention to the maximum tax and, possibly, other quantiles of taxes. Formally, we suppose that the perceived tax can be expressed:

\[ q^s (q, Q, r_0, \theta) = f \left( q^{(r_1)}, \ldots, q^{(r_Q)}, q, Q, r_0, \theta \right) \]
for some function $f$ that is $C^1$. We assume that people do pay attention to the maximum tax (the quantile 1, i.e. 100%): this is $r_1 = 1$ is one of the quantile considered. As before, $\theta$ parametrizes the attention function. We also consider a parameter $\theta_0$ such that $f(q^{(r_1)}..., q^{(r_2)}, q, Q, r_0, \theta_0)$ does not depend on $(q, Q, r_0)$, i.e. where the agent solely pays attention to the quantiles $q^{(r_k)}$. One concrete example of this is: $q^*(q, Q, r_0, \theta) = (1 - m) q^d + mq$ with $q^d = \sum_{k=1}^Q \alpha_k q^{(r_k)} + \beta q_\omega$, with $\alpha_1 > 0$. Then, $\theta = (m, \beta, \alpha)$ and $\theta_0 = (0, 0, \alpha)$.

Suppose that $\theta = \theta_0$ and define $\Gamma(z^*) = \int_{z^*}^{\infty} (1 - \gamma(z)) h(z) dz$.

**Proposition 17** (Simple taxes – income tax). We suppose that at $\theta_0$, there is a well-defined optimum tax system, which features: $\Gamma(z^*) \neq 0$ for almost all $z^* > 0$. Then, generically, if $\theta$ is near $\theta_0$, the optimal tax system is simple, i.e. has at most $Q$ different marginal rates.

The condition $\Gamma(z^*) \neq 0$ when $\theta = \theta_0$ is arguably quite weak.\footnote{Indeed, it is natural to expect that $\Gamma(z^*) > 0$ for $z^* > 0$. To see this, suppose that $\theta = \theta_0$. Then, Lemma 7 in the online appendix gives have $\Gamma(0) = 0$. Take also the case $\eta = 0$, $\gamma(z) = g(z)$. As the social welfare weight $g(z)$ is decreasing in $z$, and $\Gamma(0) = 0$, we will have $\Gamma(z^*) > 0$ for all $z^* > 0$.}

5 Endogenous Attention and Salience

We now allow for endogenous attention to taxes and analyze its impact on optimal taxes. We also discuss tax salience as a policy choice in the design of the optimal tax system. We illustrate the discussion in the context of the general analysis of Section 3.

5.1 Attention and Welfare

**Modeling attention as a good** To capture attention and its costs, we propose the following reinterpretation of the general framework. We imagine that we have the decomposition $c = (C, m)$, where $C$ is the vector of traditional goods (champagne, leisure), and $m$ is the vector of attention (e.g. $m_i$ is attention to good $i$). We call $I^C$ (respectively $I^m$) the set of indices corresponding to traditional goods (respectively attention). Then, all the analysis and propositions apply without modification. We here summarize the essentials, while Section 10.3 in the appendix gives more details.

This flexible modeling strategy allows to capture many potential interesting features of attention. The framework allows (but does not require), attention to be chosen and to react endogenously to incentives in a general way (optimally or not). It also allows (but does not require) attention to be produced, purchased, and taxed.

We find it most natural to consider the case where attention is not produced, cannot be purchased, and cannot be taxed. This case can be captured in the model by imposing that $(p_i = \tau_i = 0$ for $i \in I^m)$.
It is useful to consider two benchmarks. The first benchmark is “optimally allocated attention”, which we capture as follows. We suppose that there is a primitive choice function \( C(q, w, m) \) for traditional goods that depends on attention \( m = (m_1, \ldots, m_A) \) so that \( c(q, w, m) = (C(q, w, m), m) \).

Attention \( m = m(q, w) \) is then chosen to maximize \( u(C(q, w, m), m) \). This generates a function \( c(q, w) = (C(q, w, m(q, w)), m(q, w)) \). In that benchmark, attention costs are incorporated in welfare. For instance we might a separable utility function \( u(C, m) = U(C) - g(m) \) for some cost function \( g(m) \). A non-separable \( u \) might capture that attention is affected by consumption (e.g., of coffee) and attention affects consumption (by needing aspirin).

The second benchmark is “no attention cost in welfare”, where attention is endogenous (given by a function \( m(q, w) \)) but its cost is assumed not to directly affect welfare so that \( u(C, m) = U(C) \). For instance, as a decision vs. experienced utility generalization of the example of the previous paragraph, we could have \( m(q, w) = \arg \max m u^b(C(q, w, m), m) \), where \( u^b(C, m) = U(C) - g(m) \), but still \( u(C, m) = U(C) \). In that view, people use decisions heuristics, that can respond to incentives, but the cost of those decision heuristics is not counted in the utility function. In practice, this is largely because that cost of attention is hard to measure. In that benchmark, \( \tau^b_i = 0 \) for \( i \in I^m \).

**Optimal taxation with endogenous attention** The tax formula (19) has a term \((\tau - \tau^{b,h}) \cdot S^{C,h}_i = \sum_{k \in I^c} (\tau_k - \tau^{b,h}_k) S^{C,h}_{ki} \), a sum that includes the “attention” goods \( k \in I^m \). As attention is assume to have zero tax, we have \( \tau_k = 0 \) for \( k \in I^m \). To think about \( \tau^{b,h}_k \) requires no special treatment in general: this term can account for “misoptimization” terms in attention. However, two polar cases are worth considering, that simplify the calculations.

First, consider the “no attention cost in welfare” case. In this case we saw that \( \tau^{b,h}_k = 0 \) for \( k \in I^m \). Together with \( \tau_k = 0 \) for \( k \in I^m \), this implies that \((\tau - \tau^{b,h}) \cdot S^{C,h}_i = \sum_{k \in I^C} (\tau_k - \tau^{b,h}_k) S^{C,h}_{ki} \) is the sum restricted to commodities.

Second, consider the “optimally allocated attention” case. Proposition 30 indicates that

\[
(\tau - \tau^{b,h}) \cdot S^{C,h}_i = \sum_{k \in I^C} (\tau_k S^{C,h}_{ki} - \tau^{b,h}_k S^{C,h}_{ki|m})
\]

(39)

where \( S^{C,h}_{ki|m} \) is a Slutsky matrix holding attention constant, which is in general different from \( S^{C,h}_{ki} \). The reason is that for welfare, it is enough to consider constant attention by the envelope theorem. For tax revenues, the full Slutsky matrix, including changes in attention matters (the term \( \tau_k S^{C,h}_{ki|m} \)). However, for welfare, when attention is assumed to be optimally allocated, it is the Slutsky matrix

---

39. For instance, in a misperception model, attention operates by changing the perceived price \( q^*(q, w, m) \) which in turn changes consumption as \( C(q, w, m) = C(q, q^*(q, w, m), w) \).

40. The first order condition characterizing the optimal allocation of attention can be written as \( \tau^b \cdot c_{m,j}(q, w, m) = 0 \) for all \( j \in \{1, \ldots, A\} \). This condition can be re-expressed more conveniently by introducing the following notation: we call \( k(i) \) the index \( k \in I^m \) corresponding to dimension \( i \in \{1, \ldots, A\} \) of attention. We then get \( \sum_{i \in I^C} \tau^b_i C_{m,j}(q, w, m) + \tau^b_{k(j)} = 0 \) for all \( j \in \{1, \ldots, A\} \).
holding attention constant that matters (the term $\tau_k^b, h_{C, h}^{k|m}$). This is a version of the envelope theorem.

**Illustration in the basic Ramsey case** We illustrate those notions in the basic Ramsey case of section 2 with just one taxed good (good 1, whose index we drop, and whose pre-tax price is 1) and $\tau^d = 0$ and small taxes $\tau$. We go back to a very elementary presentation, as this provides a clear intuition for the economic forces at work. Given attention $m(\tau)$, the perceived tax is $\tau^a(\tau) = \tau m(\tau)$, and demand is $c(\tau) = y(1 - \psi m(\tau) \tau)$. We assume that attention comes from an optimal cost-benefit analysis:

$$m(\tau) = \arg \max_m -\frac{1}{2} \psi y \tau^2 (1 - m)^2 - g(m)$$

The first term represents the private costs costs of mis-understanding taxes, $-\frac{1}{2} \psi y (\tau - \tau^*)^2$ while the term $-g(m)$ is the psychic cost of attention, $g(m)$ (see Gabaix (2014)). The planner’s problem is $\max_{\tau} L(\tau)$ with

$$L(\tau) = -\frac{1}{2} \psi y m^2(\tau) \tau^2 - Ag(m(\tau)) + \Lambda \tau y$$

where $A = 1$ in the “optimal chosen attention” case and $A = 0$ in the “no attention cost in welfare” case. In the “fixed attention” case, $m(\tau)$ is fixed, and $g(m) = 0$. Then, the optimal tax satisfies:

$$L'(\tau) = -\psi y m(\tau) \tau (m(\tau) + \tau m'(\tau)) - Ag'(m(\tau)) m'(\tau) + \Lambda y = 0.$$  

In the “optimal chosen attention” case, we use the agent’s first order condition $g'(m(\tau)) = \psi y \tau^2 (1 - m(\tau))$ and $A = 1$ and the optimal tax is:

$$\tau^{m,*} = \frac{\Lambda/\psi}{m(\tau)^2 + \tau m'(\tau)}$$  \hspace{1cm} (40)

In the “no attention cost in welfare case”, $A = 0$, the optimal tax is

$$\tau^{m,0} = \frac{\Lambda/\psi}{m(\tau)^2 + \tau m(\tau) m'(\tau)}$$  \hspace{1cm} (41)

When attention is fixed, the optimal tax is: $\tau^{m,F} = \frac{\Lambda/\psi}{m(\tau)^2}$ when $m'(\tau) = 0$.

**Proposition 18** In the interior region where attention has an increasing cost ($\tau m(\tau) m'(\tau) > 0$), the optimal tax is lowest with attention is chosen optimally and its cost are taken into account in welfare; intermediate in the “no attention cost in welfare”; and largest with fixed attention: $\tau^{m,*} < \tau^{m,0} < \tau^{m,F}$.

When attention’s cost is taken into account, the planner chooses lower taxes $\tau^{m,*} < \tau^{m,0}$, to
minimize both consumption distortions and attention costs. Plainly, the tax is higher with when attention is variable than when attention is fixed: this is basically because demand is more elastic then \((-\frac{\partial c}{\partial \tau} = -\psi (m (\tau) + \tau m' (\tau)))\).

5.2 Salience as a Policy Choice

Governments have a variety of ways of making a particular tax more or less salient. For example, Chetty, Kroft and Looney (2009) present evidence that sales taxes that are included in the posted prices that consumers see when shopping have larger effects on demand. It is therefore not unreasonable to think of salience as a characteristic of the tax system that can be chosen or at least influenced by the government. This begs the natural question of the optimal salience of the tax system.

We investigate this question in the context of two simple examples. We start with the basic Ramsey model developed in Section 2 with \(d = 0\). Imagine that the government can choose between two tax systems with different degrees of salience \(m\) and \(m'\) with \(m' > m\) for all \(i\). Then it is optimal for the government to choose the lowest degree of salience. We denote by \(L\) (respectively \(L'\)) the value of the objective of the government with optimal taxes conditional on salience \(m\) (respectively \(m'\)). The gain from decreased salience can be written as \(L - L' = \Delta L\) with \(\Delta L = \frac{1}{2}\sum_{i=1}^{n} \left( \frac{1}{m_i} - \frac{1}{m_i'} \right) \frac{\lambda_i^2}{\psi_i} y_i > 0\). In this basic Ramsey model where taxes are used only to raise tax revenues, less salient taxes are preferable. The reason is that less salient taxes are less distortionary because the associated elasticities are lower \(m_i \psi_i < m'_i \psi_i\).

The result that less salience is desirable is not general. We choose to make this point in the context of the basic Pigou model developed in Proposition 5. We suppose that all agents have the same utility \(U^h = U\) and the same associated externality/internality \(\xi^h = \xi\), but that their perceptions are different \(m^h \neq m'^h\). Now imagine that the government can choose between two tax systems with different degrees of salience \(m^h\) and \(m'^h\) for every agent \(h\). We want to capture the idea that more salience increases average attention for all agents but also decreases the heterogeneity in perceptions. We formalize this comparative static with the following two requirements \(E[m^h] < E[m'^h]\) and \(\frac{\text{Var}[m^h]}{E[m^h]^2} < \frac{\text{Var}[m'^h]}{E[m'^h]^2}\). The gain from the decreased salience is given by \(L - L' = \Delta L\) with \(\Delta L = -\frac{1}{2} \Psi H \xi^2 \left( \frac{\text{Var}[m^h]}{E[m^h]} - \frac{\text{Var}[m'^h]}{E[m'^h]} \right) < 0\). In this basic Pigou model where taxes are used only to correct a homogenous externality/internality, more salient taxes are preferable. This is because more salient taxes are perceived more homogeneously, and can therefore better correct for the underlying externality/internality.

\(^{41}\) The example allows to appreciate the Slutsky matrix with or without constant attention. In addition, the Slutsky matrix with constant \(m\) has \(S_{11}^{C} = \frac{\partial c (1+\tau,m)}{\partial \tau} = -\psi c m\), while the Slutsky matrix with variable \(m\) has \(S_{11}^{C} = \frac{dc (1+\tau,m(\tau))}{\partial \tau} = -\psi c (m + \tau m' (\tau))\). The online appendix (section 12.5) provides other illustrations.

\(^{42}\) Note that we are excluding taxes from directly affecting experienced utility: taxes affect utility only through their impact on the chosen consumption bundle. In the terminology of Bernheim and Rangel (2009), we treat tax salience as an ancillary condition.
In general the key observation is that the relevant Slutsky matrix $S_{i}^{C,h}$ that appears in the optimal tax formula depends on the salience of the tax system. It could also be interesting to allow the government to combine different tax instruments with the same tax base but different degrees of salience. Our general model could be extended to allow for this possibility. We would start with a function $c(w, p, \tau^1, \tau^2, \ldots, \tau^K)$, where $\tau^\kappa$ are tax vectors with different degrees of salience. To each tax instrument $\kappa$ corresponds a Slutsky matrix $S_{ij}^{C,\kappa}$ which depends on the tax instrument indexed by $\kappa$. The optimal tax formula can then be written as \[
abla L(\tau) = 0 \] where \[
abla L(\tau) = \sum_h \left[ (\lambda - \gamma) c_i^h + \lambda (\bar{\tau} - \tau^{b,h}) \cdot S_{i}^{C,\kappa,h} \right], \] with $\bar{\tau} = \sum_{\kappa=1}^{K} \tau^\kappa$. The intuition for this formula is that the different tax instruments lead to different substitution effects captured by different Slutsky matrices $S_{ij}^{C,\kappa}$. Note that the substitution effect associated with one tax instrument $\kappa$ affects the common tax base of the other tax instruments $\kappa'$, which explains why the formula features the total $\bar{\tau}$ rather than the individual tax $\tau^\kappa$.

6 Revisiting Diamond-Mirrlees and Atkinson-Stiglitz

In this section we revisit two classical public finance results: the Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) production efficiency result, and the associated result that supply elasticities do not enter in optimal tax formulas, as well as the Atkinson and Stiglitz (1972) uniform commodity taxation result.

6.1 Diamond-Mirrlees (1971)

6.1.1 Supply Elasticities: Optimal taxes with Efficient Production

So far, we have assumed a perfectly elastic production function (constant production prices $p$). In traditional, non-behavioral models this is without loss of generality. Indeed, with a complete set of commodity taxes, optimal tax formulas depend only on production prices but not on production

\[ 0 = (\lambda - \gamma) c + [\lambda \tau + \gamma (\bar{\tau} - \tau)] mS^\tau, \quad 0 = (\lambda - \gamma) c + [\lambda \tau + \gamma (\bar{\tau} - \tau)] m'S^\tau, \]

where $\bar{\tau}$ is the total perceived tax arising from the joint perception of the two tax instruments. This requires $\lambda = \gamma$ and with $\bar{\tau} = 0$. In other words, the solution is the first best. This is because a planner can replicate a lump sum tax by combining a tax $\tau$ with low salience $m$ and a tax $-\tau m$ with high salience $m' > m$, generating tax revenues $\tau m - m$ per unit of consumption of the taxed good with no associated distortion. This is an extreme result, already derived by Goldin (2012). In general, with more than one agent and heterogeneities in the misperceptions of the two taxes, the first best might not be achievable.

43As an extreme example, consider again the basic Ramsey example outlined above, and assume that the two tax systems with salience $m$ and $m'$ can be used jointly. Consider the case where there is only one agent and only one (taxed) good. With $m' > m$, we get

\[ 0 = (\lambda - \gamma) c + [\lambda \tau + \gamma (\bar{\tau} - \tau)] mS^\tau, \quad 0 = (\lambda - \gamma) c + [\lambda \tau + \gamma (\bar{\tau} - \tau)] m'S^\tau, \]

where $\bar{\tau}$ is the total perceived tax arising from the joint perception of the two tax instruments. This requires $\lambda = \gamma$ and with $\bar{\tau} = 0$. In other words, the solution is the first best. This is because a planner can replicate a lump sum tax by combining a tax $\tau$ with low salience $m$ and a tax $-\tau m$ with high salience $m' > m$, generating tax revenues $\tau m - m$ per unit of consumption of the taxed good with no associated distortion. This is an extreme result, already derived by Goldin (2012). In general, with more than one agent and heterogeneities in the misperceptions of the two taxes, the first best might not be achievable.
elasticities $\tau$. In behavioral models, this result must be qualified. This section therefore generalizes
the model to imperfectly elastic production function (non-constant prices $p$).

In behavioral models, prices $p$ and taxes $\tau$ might affect behavior differently. We introduce
a distinction between taxes $\tau^p$ that affect behavior like prices and taxes $\tau^c$ that affect behavior
differently from prices. For example $\tau^p$ could represent taxes that included in listed prices $p + \tau^p$
(either because they are levied on producers or because they are levied on consumers but the listed
prices are inclusive of the tax) and taxes $\tau^c$ that are not included in listed prices. An agent’s demand
function can then be written as $c^h (p + \tau^p, \tau^c, w)$. This distinction will prove to be important for
the generalization of our results to imperfectly elastic production functions.

We denote by $v^h (p + \tau^p, \tau^c, w)$ the associated indirect utility function and by $S^H,p,h$ and $S^H,c,h$
the Slutsky matrices corresponding to $\tau^p$ (or $p$) and $\tau^c$ respectively. We allow for the possibility
(but we do not impose it) that these Slutsky matrices do not coincide.

We assume that government must finances a vector of government consumption $g$ and that profits
are fully taxed (we allow for decreasing returns to scale and nonzero profits). The production set is
expressed as $\{y \text{ s.t. } F(y) \leq 0\}$. Perfect competition imposes that $F(y) = 0$ and $p = F'(y)$, where
$y$ is the equilibrium production. Market clearing requires that $g + \sum_h c^h (p + \tau^p, \tau^c, w) = y$. We
denote by $\bar{\tau} = \tau^c + \tau^p$ the sum of the tax vectors.

We can write the planning problem as

$$\max_{p,\tau^p,\tau^c} W \left( \left( v^h (p + \tau^p, \tau^c, w) \right)_{h=1...H} \right)$$

subject to the resource constraint

$$F \left( g + \sum_h c^h (p + \tau^p, \tau^c, w) \right) = 0,$$

and the competitive pricing condition

$$p = F' \left( g + \sum_h c^h (p + \tau^p, \tau^c, w) \right).$$

The competitive pricing equation is a fixed point in $p$. We denote the solution by $p (\tau^p, \tau^c, w)$. The
derivatives of this function $p$ encapsulate the incidence of taxes depending on the demand and
supply elasticities. We define the price derivative matrix defined by $\varepsilon^p_{ij} = \frac{\partial p_i}{\partial \tau^p_j}$, the derivative of
the prices $p_i$ of commodity $i$ with respect to the tax $\tau^p_j$ with $\kappa \in \{p,c\}$. We also define the supply
elasticity matrix $\varepsilon_S$ by $\varepsilon_{S,ij} = \frac{p_i}{y_i} (F'' - 1)_{ij}$ and the demand elasticities $\varepsilon_D$ by $\varepsilon^c_{D,ij} = -\frac{1}{y_i} \sum_h p_j c^h_i \tau^c_j$. Finally we define the matrix $\text{diag} (p)$ as the diagonal matrix with $i$-th element given by $p_i$. Then an
application of the implicit function theorem to the competitive pricing condition, we obtain after
some manipulations that the matrix of price derivatives \( \varepsilon^\kappa \) is given by

\[
\varepsilon^\kappa = -\text{diag}(p)(\varepsilon_S + \varepsilon^p_D)^{-1}\varepsilon^\kappa_D\text{diag}(p)^{-1}.
\]  

(42)

so that the \( \varepsilon^\kappa \) reflects both demand and supply elasticities. This formula is the behavioral extension of the standard incidence calculations determining how the burden of taxes is shared between consumers and producers. Compared with the traditional model without behavioral biases, the difference is that \( \varepsilon^\kappa_D \) depends on the salience of the tax instrument \( \kappa \). Incidence \( \varepsilon^\kappa \) therefore depends on salience (and more generally on how taxes are perceived). This conceptual point already appears in Chetty, Looney and Kroft (2009). Our incidence formula only generalizes it to many goods and arbitrary preferences.

We replace \( p \) in the objective function and the resources constraint and we put a multiplier \( \lambda \) on the resource constraint. We form the Lagrangian

\[
L (\tau^p, \tau^c) = W \left( (v^h(p(\tau^p, \tau^c, w) + \tau^p, \tau^c, w))_{h=1...H} \right) - \lambda F \left( g + \sum_h c^h(p(\tau^p, \tau^c, w) + \tau^p, \tau^c, w) \right).
\]

The optimal tax formulas can be written as \( L_{\tau^\kappa} = 0 \) for \( \kappa \in \{p, c\} \) if tax \( \tau^\kappa \) is available.

**Proposition 19** With an imperfectly elastic production function, the following results hold. If there is a full set of commodity taxes \( \tau^p \) then the optimal tax formulas can be written as

\[
0 = \sum_h [(\lambda - \gamma^h) c^h_i + \lambda(\tau - \tau^b_i) \cdot S^{i,H,\kappa,h}_i]
\]

are independent of production elasticities and coincide with those of Section 3 if taxes are restricted to be of the \( \tau^p \) type or with those of Section 5.2 if taxes can be both of the \( \tau^p \) type and the \( \tau^c \) type. Second, when there is a restricted set of commodity taxes \( \tau^p \), then the optimal tax formulas can be written as

\[
0 = \sum_h [(\lambda - \gamma^h) c^h_i + \lambda(\tau - \tau^b_i) \cdot S^{i,H,\kappa,h}_i] + \sum_h \sum_j [(\lambda - \gamma^h) c^h_j + \lambda(\bar{\tau} - \bar{\tau}^{b,h}) \cdot S^{j,H,p,h}_{ji}]\varepsilon^\kappa_{ji}
\]

depend on production elasticities, and do not coincide with those of Sections 3 and 5.2.

With a full set of commodity taxes \( \tau^p \), we can rewrite the objective function and the resource constraint in the planning problem as a function of \( q = p + \tau^p \). We can then relax the planning problem by dropping the competitive pricing equation, which is slack: this equation can then simply be used to find \( \tau^p \) given the desired value of \( q \). As a result, only the first derivatives of the production function \( p = F' \) enter the optimal tax formulas and not the second derivatives \( F'' \) (and hence do not depend on supply elasticities). With a restricted set of commodity taxes \( \tau^p \), this relaxation of the planning problem fails, the competitive pricing equation cannot be dropped, and the optimal
tax formulas depend on the second derivatives $F''$ (and hence depend on supply elasticities).

Therefore, with behavioral agents, the principle from traditional models that supply elasticities do not enter in optimal tax formulas as long as there is a full set of commodity taxes extends if taxes are understood to be of the $\tau^p$ form. The difference is that even with a full set of commodity taxes of the $\tau^c$ (which would be enough to guarantee that optimal tax formulas do not depend on supply elasticities in the traditional model), optimal tax formulas do depend on supply elasticities if there is only a restricted set of commodity taxes of the $\tau^p$ form.

A similar result holds in the Mirrlees case. Hence, in the traditional analysis, the supply elasticity doesn’t appear in the optimal tax formula. This is not true any more with a behavioral model, which is developed in Proposition 40 of the online appendix.

To illustrate Proposition 19, consider the separable case $u(c) = c_0 + u(c_1)$ in the misperception case with $\tau_i^s = \tau_i^p + m_1 \tau_i^1$, with $0 \leq m_1 \leq 1$ and $\tau_i^p$ is exogenous (perhaps set to 0).

We represent the production function as follows: it takes $C(y_1)$ units of good 0 to produce $y_1$ units of good 1. We define supply and demand to be $S(p_1) = C'(p_1)$ and $D(p_1 + \tau_i^p + m_1 \tau_i^1) = u'^{-1}(p_1 + \tau_i^p + m_1 \tau_i^1)$. We denote by $\varepsilon_S > 0$ and $\varepsilon_D > 0$ the corresponding supply and demand elasticities (corresponding to a fully perceived change in $p_1$). Differentiating the equilibrium condition $S(p_1) = D(p_1 + \tau_i^p + m_1 \tau_i^1)$ yields

$$\varepsilon_{11}^c = -\frac{\varepsilon_D}{\varepsilon_S + \varepsilon_D} m_1.$$  

Compared to the traditional incidence analysis, because consumers are not fully attentive to the tax on good 1 ($m_1 < 1$), the burden of the tax is shifted to the consumer. This echoes a result in Chetty, Looney and Kroft (2009).

We now turn to optimal taxes. We work in the limit of small taxes when $\lambda = \lambda - 1$ is close to 0 as in Section 2. Then, the optimal tax $\tau_i^c$ satisfies

$$0 = \left(\Lambda c_1 - \frac{\tau_i^s \psi_1}{p_1} c_1 m_1\right) + \left(\Lambda c_1 - \frac{\tau_i^s \psi_1}{p_1} c_1\right) \varepsilon_{11}^c,$$

which we can rewrite as

$$\frac{\Lambda}{\psi_1} = \frac{\tau_i^p + m_1 \tau_i^c}{p_1} m_1 + \varepsilon_{11}^c \frac{1}{1 + \varepsilon_{11}^c}.$$  

As long as $m_1 < 1$, the higher is the supply elasticity $\varepsilon_S$, the more the burden of the tax is shifted to the consumer, the higher is $\varepsilon_{11}^c < 0$, the lower is the optimal tax.\textsuperscript{44}

\textsuperscript{44}Another way to see this is as follows. Consider the optimal tax with infinitely elastic supply $\varepsilon_S = \infty$ (a constant price $p_1$). It satisfies $\left(\Lambda c_1 - \frac{\tau_i^s \psi_1}{p_1} c_1 m_1\right) = 0$. Now imagine that $\varepsilon_S < \infty$. Then at this tax $\left(\Lambda c_1 - \frac{\tau_i^s \psi_1}{p_1} c_1\right) < 0$ so that $\left(\Lambda c_1 - \frac{\tau_i^s \psi_1}{p_1} c_1\right) \varepsilon_{11}^c > 0$ and by implication $\left(\Lambda c_1 - \frac{\tau_i^s \psi_1}{p_1} c_1 m_1\right) + \left(\Lambda c_1 - \frac{\tau_i^s \psi_1}{p_1} c_1\right) \varepsilon_{11}^c > 0$ This implies that increasing the tax improves welfare.
6.1.2 Productive Inefficiency at the Optimum

A canonical result in public finance (Diamond and Mirrlees 1971) shows that there is production efficiency at the optimum if there is a complete set of commodity taxes and either constant returns or fully taxed profits. We show that this result can fail even when the planner has a full set of commodity taxes of the $\tau^c$ type (which would be enough to guaranty production efficiency in the traditional model), as long as there is not a full set of commodity taxes of the $\tau^p$ type.

We start by considering the case where there is a full set of commodity taxes of the $\tau^p$ type and show that production efficiency holds under some extra conditions. We denote by $q = p + \tau^p$. We follow Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) and establish that production efficiency holds by assuming that the planner can control production, showing that the planner chooses an optimum on the frontier of the production possibility set. The corresponding planning problem is $\max_{q,\tau^c} W \left( (v^h(q,\tau^c, w))_{h=1...H} \right)$ subject to the resource constraint $F \left( g + \sum_h c^h(q,\tau^c, w) \right) \leq 0$.

**Proposition 20** With a full set of commodity taxes $\tau^p$, production efficiency holds if either: (i) there are lump sum taxes and for all $q, \tau^c$ and $w$, $v^h_w(q, \tau^c, w) \geq 0$ for all $h$ with a strict inequality for some $h$; or (ii) for all $q, \tau^c$ and $w$, there exists a good $i$ with $v^h_{q_i}(q, \tau^c, w) \leq 0$ for all $h$ with a strict inequality for some $h$.

The proof is almost identical to the original proof of Diamond and Mirrlees (1971). Note however that the conditions $v^h_w(q, \tau^c, w) > 0$ or $v^h_{q_i}(q, \tau^c, w) < 0$ can more easily be violated than in the traditional model without behavioral biases. Indeed, when agents misoptimize, it is entirely possible that the marginal utility of income be negative $v^h_{w}(q, \tau^c, w) < 0$. Loosely speaking, this happens if mistakes get worse as income increases. Similarly, it is entirely possible that $v^h_{q_i}(q, \tau^c, w) > 0$ for all $i$ since Roy’s identity does not hold ($\frac{v^h_{w}}{v^h_{c_i}} \neq -c_i$). Failures of production efficiency could then arise even with a full set of commodity taxes $\tau^p$. In the interest of space, we do not explore these conditions any further.

We now show that production efficiency can fail with a restricted set of commodity taxes $\tau^p$, even if there is a full set of commodity taxes $\tau^c$. Consider the following example. There are two consumptions goods, 0 and 1, two types of labor, $a$ and $b$, a representative agent with decision utility $u^b(c_0, c_1, l_a, l_b) = c_0 + U^b(c_1) - l_a - l_b$, and experienced utility $u^b(c_0, c_1, l_a, l_b) = u(c_0, c_1, l_a, l_b) - \xi_c c_1$, where $\xi_c > 0$ indicates an internality. For instance, $c_1$ could be cigarette consumption. Hence, the government would like to discourage consumption of good 1.

The production function for good $i$ is: $y_i = \left( \frac{l_a}{\alpha_i} \right)^{\alpha_i} \left( \frac{l_b}{1-\alpha_i} \right)^{1-\alpha_i}$, with $\alpha_i \in (0, 1)$. As before, 0 is the untaxed good, $\tau_0 = 0$. The government can set taxes $\tau_1$, $\tau_a$ and $\tau_b$ on good 1, labor of type $a$ and labor of type $b$, and tax the employment of type $a$ labor in sector 1. We assume that the consumer perfectly perceives taxes $\tau_a, \tau_b$, and prices $p_0, p_1, p_a, p_b$ (the latter being the price of labor of type $a, b$). In addition, the government can set a tax $\tau_{1a}$ for the use of input $a$ in the production of good 1. Note that production efficiency is equivalent to $\tau_{1a} = 0$. 

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Proposition 21 If the consumer is fully inattentive to the tax $\tau_1$, then the optimal tax system features production inefficiency: $\tau_{1a} > 0$. If the consumer is fully attentive to the tax $\tau_1$, then the optimal tax system features production efficiency: $\tau_{1a} = 0$.

The essence is the following. The government would like to lower consumption of good 1, which has a negative internality. However, agents do not pay attention to the tax $\tau_1$ on good 1, hence a tax on good 1 will not be effective. We assume that the government cannot use producer taxes. Hence, the government uses a tax $\tau_{1a} > 0$ on the input use in the production of good 1 (lowering production efficiency) to discourage the production of good 1, increase its price, and discourage its consumption.

6.2 Atkinson-Stiglitz (1972)

Atkinson and Stiglitz (1972) show uniform commodity taxation is optimal if preferences have the form $u^b(c_0, \phi(C))$, with $C = (c_1, \ldots, c_n)$, $\phi$ homogeneous of degree 1, and $c_0$ (the untaxed good) might be leisure. We now investigate how to generalize this result with behavioral agents.

Proposition 22 Consider the decision vs. experienced utility model. Assume that decision utility is of the form $u^{b,h}(c_0, \phi^b(C))$ and that experienced utility is of the form $u^h(c_0, \phi(C))$ with $\phi^b$ and $\phi$ homogeneous of degree 1. Then if $\phi^b = \phi$, uniform ad valorem commodity taxes are optimal (even though decision and experienced utility represent different preference orderings), but if $\phi^b \neq \phi$, uniform ad valorem commodity taxes are not optimal in general.

The bottom line is that with behavioral biases, it is no longer sufficient to establish empirically that expenditure elasticities for $(c_1, \ldots, c_n)$ are unitary.

Another relevant consideration has to do with time horizons. Consider a tax reform and assume away any link between periods for simplicity (say because agents do not have access to asset markets). Imagine a situation where in the long-run, choices can be represented by a decision utility $u^{b,h}(c_0, \phi^b(C))$ and welfare can be evaluated with an experienced utility $u^h(c_0, \phi(C))$ with $\phi = \phi^b$. But in the short-run as the tax code changes, agents misperceive taxes and hence make different choices. Then optimal time-varying taxes might be uniform in the long run, but not in the short run. Likewise, if agents pay differential attention to taxes (at least in the short run), the Atkinson-Stiglitz (1972) neutrality result will fail.

7 Discussion

7.1 Novel Sufficient Statistics

Operationalizing our optimal tax formulas (19) and (37) requires taking a stand on the relevant sufficient statistics: social marginal value of public funds, social marginal utilities of income, elas-
ticities, internalities and externalities. For example in the general Ramsey model, the optimal tax formula features the social marginal value of public funds $\lambda$, the social marginal utilities of income $\gamma^h$, consumption vectors $e^h$, Slutsky matrices $S^{C,h}$, and marginal internalities as measured by the ideal misoptimization corrective taxes $\tilde{\tau}^{b,h}$. All these sufficient statistics are present in the optimal tax formula of the traditional model with no behavioral biases, with the exception of marginal internalities $\tilde{\tau}^{b,h}$. They are routinely measured by empiricists. They can be estimated with rich enough data on observed choices. The fact that agents are behavioral influences their value, but does not change the way they should be estimated.

The marginal internalities $\tilde{\tau}^{b,h}$, which summarize the effects of behavioral biases at the margin are arguably harder to measure. This poses a problem similar to the more traditional problem of estimating marginal externalities $\tau^{e,h}$ to calibrate corrective Pigouvian taxes in the traditional with no behavioral biases. The common challenge is that these statistics are not easily recoverable from observations of private choices. In both cases, it is possible to use a structural model, but more reduced-form approaches are also feasible in the case of internalities.

Indeed, a common strategy involves comparing choices in environments where behavioral biases are attenuated and environments resembling those of the tax system under consideration. Choices in environments where behavioral biases are attenuated can be thought of as rational, allowing the recovery of experienced utility $u^h$ as a utility representation of these choices, with associated indirect utility function $v^h$. Differences in choices in environments where behavioral biases are present would then allow to measure the marginal internalities $\tau^{h,h} = q - \frac{u^h}{v^h}$. For example, if the biases arise from the misperception of taxes so that $\tau^{h,h} = \tau - \tau^{s,h}$, then perceived taxes $\tau^{s,h}$ could be estimated by comparing the environment under consideration to an environment where taxes are very salient or more generally where the environment is clearly understood by agents. If the biases arise because of temptation, then standard choices would reveal decision utility $u^{b,h}$. To the extent that agents are sophisticated and understand that they are subject to these biases, experienced utility $u^h$ could be recovered by confronting agents with the possibility of restricting their later choice sets. In the terminology of Bernheim and Rangel (2009), this strategy uses refinements to uncover true preferences.

Another strategy (see e.g. Chetty, Kroft and Looney (2009) and Allcott, Mullainathan and Taubinsky (2012)) to establish and isolate behavioral biases is to find violations of the conditions imposed by rational choice (for example showing that a demand elasticity depends on the salience of the tax). Yet another strategy if behavioral biases arise from misperception is to use surveys to directly elicit perceived taxes $\tau^{s,h}$ (see e.g. Liebman and Zeckhauser (2004) and Slemrod (2006)).

Similarly, in the Mirrlees model, our optimal tax formula (37) features the distribution of income $h(z)$ and $h^*(z)$, the social marginal utilities of income $\gamma(z)$, the elasticities $\zeta^c(z)$ and $\zeta^c_{Q^*}(z)$ as well as $\tilde{\tau}^b(z^*)$. All these sufficient statistics are present in the optimal tax formula of the traditional model with no behavioral biases, with the exception of $\zeta^c_{Q^*}(z)$ and $\tilde{\tau}^b(z)$. Even though measuring $\zeta^c_{Q^*}(z)$ is typically neglected (because $\zeta^c_{Q^*}(z) = 0$ in the traditional model with no behavioral biases),...
biases), measuring the elasticity $\zeta_{Q_{z^*}}(z)$ poses no conceptual difficulty as it can be recovered from observation of private choices.\footnote{That might help bridge the gap between micro and macro elasticities, as people are both influenced by their “local-micro” tax ($q(z)$) and the “ambient” tax rates ($q^d$, perhaps the average tax rate).} As for $\tilde{\gamma}^b(z)$, the same strategies that were discussed for $\tilde{\gamma}^{b,h}$ in the context of the Ramsey model above can be employed in this Mirrlees context as well.

In the misperception model, another, complementary approach is possible by using surveys (see e.g. De Bartolome 1995, Liebman and Zeckhauser 2004 and the references therein) to directly measure perceptions (in our model, this is the matrix $M_{ij} = \frac{\partial q_i^e(q,w)}{\partial q_j}$).

Finally, we have argued that the conditions (on the richness of the set of tax instruments) for the supply elasticities not to enter direction in the optimal tax formulas are more stringent when agents are behavioral than in the traditional model. In some sense, supply elasticities and their empirical measurement are therefore more central to the behavioral approach than to the traditional approach.

It would be interesting to study if the condition for the optimality of simple taxes is verified in practice, and to see for example if the maximum tax has an important influence on behavior. The same idea holds for marginal tax rates. Is the top tax particularly salient? This kind of consideration is present in the policy debate (under headings like “business-friendliness” of the environment) but it would be desirable to bring rigorous empirical evidence to bear on this question.

7.2 Robustness to Learning?

Arguably, our results are not just short-run effects. First, there seems to be a persistence of confusion. Slemrod (2006) argues that Americans overestimate on average the odds their inheritance will be taxed. People seem to perceive average for marginal tax rates (Liebman and Zeckhauser 2004); people may overestimate the odds they’ll move to a higher tax bracket (Benabou and Ok 2001). Second, our framework applies to situations where consumers do not maximize experienced utility. There, learning may be quite slow. For instance, people may persistently smoke too much, perhaps because of hyperbolic discounting (Laibson 1997).

In addition, we also provide an analytical justification in the context of a simple explicit learning model. Suppose that taxes $\tau$ at set once and for all time 0. Agents start by being inattentive for an an amount of time $1 - M$, and then become attentive for an amount of time $M$ (this could be the “discounted” amount of time, so that it takes $T$ years to learn, then $M = \int_T^\infty re^{-rt}dt = e^{-rT}$). Welfare is then given by $L(\tau) = -\frac{1}{2} \sum_i [(1 - M)(\tau_i^*)^2 + M\tau_i^2] \psi_iy_i + \lambda \sum_i \tau_iy_i$. This is exactly like a one-period model with a fraction $M$ of fully attentive agents. The setup is similar to Proposition 2. We use $\tau_i^* = \tau_{\text{max}}$ to make the point.

**Proposition 23** (Simple tax scheme from bounded rationality with learning) *If learning is slow enough, the optimal tax system is to have simple taxes forever.*
The online appendix (Section 12.6) also develops a model where the government can continuously update the tax system, where the conclusion is qualitatively the same. The idea is that complex taxes have short-run costs (people make mistakes) and long-run benefits (the system is closer to the Ramsey ideal once agents have learned). It is optimal to keep taxes simple if agents learn slowly.

8 Conclusion

We wrote a behavioral version of the main results from the traditional static theory of optimal taxation. A natural extension is to dynamic settings and to more general contracting environments. We plan to develop this issue in future work.

References


9 Appendix: Notations

General notations

c: consumption vector
h: index for household type h
L: government’s objective function.
m, M: attention vector, matrix
p: pre-tax price
p*: perceived price
q = p + τ: after-tax price
S_j, S_j^c, S_j^H: Column of the Slutsky matrix when price j changes.
u(c): true utility
u^b(c): perceived utility
v(p, w): true indirect utility
w: personal income
W: social utility
λ, Λ = λ − 1: weight on revenue raised in planner’s objective
ψ_i: demand elasticity for good i
τ: tax
τ*: perceived tax
ξ: externality

Multiperson Ramsey
T: tax schedule (e.g. T = {τ, r_0}, where r_0 is a lump-sum transfer).
Q: number of quantiles agents pay attention to
γ^h (resp. γ^ξ,h): marginal social utility of income (resp. adjusted for externalities)
\( \theta \): parametrization of perception functions
\( \tau^b \): ideal corrective tax for misoptimization
\( \chi \): nudge parameter

**Nonlinear income tax**

\( g(z) \): social welfare weight
\( h(z) \) (resp. \( h^*(z) \)): density (resp. virtual density) of earnings \( z \)
\( H(z) \): cumulative distribution function of earnings

\( n \): agent’s wage, also the index of his type
\( q(z) = R'(z) \): marginal retention rate, locally perceived
\( Q = (g(z))_{z \geq 0} \): vector of marginal retention rates
\( r_0 \): tax rebate at 0 income
\( r(z) \): virtual income
\( R(z) = z - T(z) \): retained earnings
\( T(z) \): tax given earnings \( z \)
\( z \): pre-tax earnings
\( \gamma(z) \): marginal social utility of income
\( \eta \): income elasticity of earnings
\( \pi \): Pareto exponent of the earnings distribution
\( \zeta^c \): compensated elasticity of earnings
\( \zeta^c_{Qz^*}(z) \): compensated elasticity of earnings when the tax rate at \( z^* \) changes.
\( \zeta^u \): uncompensated elasticity of earnings

### 10 Appendix: Behavioral Consumer Theory

Here we develop behavioral consumer theory with nonlinear budget. The agent faces a problem:

\[
\max_c u(c) \text{ s.t. } B(p, c) \leq w.
\]

When the budget constraint is linear, \( B(p, c) = p \cdot c \),

\[
B_{p_j} = c_j, B_{c_j} = p_j \text{ with a linear budget}
\]

In general (e.g. in Mirrlees), the budget constraint \( B(p, c) \) could be non-linear.

The agent, whose utility is \( u(c) \), may not completely maximize. Instead, his policy is described by \( c(p, w) \), which exhausts his budget: \( B(c(p, w), p) = w \). Though this puts very little structure on the problem, some basic relations can be derived. We then propose specific behavioral models and an application to welfare with inattention.
10.1 Abstract general framework

The indirect utility is defined as \( v(p, w) = u(c(p, w)) \), and the expenditure function as \( e(p, \hat{u}) = \min_c B(c, p) \) s.t. \( u(c, p) \geq \hat{u} \). This implies: \( v(p, e(p, \hat{u})) = \hat{u} \) (with \( \hat{u} \) a real number). Differentiating with respect to \( p_j \), this implies

\[
\frac{v_{p_j}}{v_w} = -e_{p_j}.
\]

We define the compensated-demand based Slutsky matrix, defined as:

\[
S_C^{j}(p, w) := c_{p_j}(p, w) + c_{w}(p, w) B_{p_j}(c, p),
\]

The Hicksian demand is: \( h(p, \hat{u}) = c(p, e(p, \hat{u})) \), and the Hicksian-demand based Slutsky matrix is defined as: \( S_H^{j}(p, \hat{u}) := h_{p_j}(p, \hat{u}) \).

The Slutsky matrices represent how the demand changes when prices change by a small amount, and the budget is compensated to make the previous basket available, or to make the previous utility available: \( S_C^{j}(p, w) = \partial_x c(p + x, B(c(p, w), p + x)) \) and \( S_H^{j}(p, w) = \partial_x c(p + x, e(p + x, v(p, w))) \), i.e., using (43),

\[
S_H^{j}(p, w) = c_{p_j}(p, w) - c_{w}(p, w) \frac{v_{p_j}(p, w)}{v_w(p, w)}
\]

In the traditional model, \( S_C = S_H \), but we shall see that this won’t be the case in general. \(^{46}\)

We have the following elementary facts (with \( c(p, w), v(p, w) \) unless otherwise noted).

\[
B_c \cdot c_w = 1, \quad B_c \cdot c_{p_i} = -B_{p_i}, \quad u_c c_w = v_w
\]

The first two come from differentiating \( B(c(p, w), p) = w \). The third one comes from differentiating \( v(p, w) = u(c(p, w)) \) with respect to \( w \).

**Proposition 24** (Behavioral Roy’s identity) With \( v(p, w) \), we have

\[
\frac{v_{p_j}}{v_w} = -B_{p_j}(c(p, w), p) + D_j
\]

where

\[
D_j(p, w) := -\tau^b(p, w) \cdot c_{p_j}(p, w) = -\tau^b \cdot S_H^{j} = -\tau^b \cdot S_C^{j}
\]

and the ideal misoptimization corrective tax is defined to be:

\[
\tau^b(p, w) := B_c(c(p, w), p) - \frac{u_c(c(p, w))}{v_w(p, w)}
\]

When the agent is the traditional rational agent, \( \tau^b = 0 \). In general, \( \tau^b \cdot c_w(p, w) = 0 \).

\(^{46}\)See Aguiar and Serrano (2015) for a recent study of Slutsky matrices with behavioral models.
Proof: Relations (46) imply: \( \tau_b \cdot c_w = \left( B_c - \frac{u_c}{v_w} \right) c_w = 1 - 1 = 0 \). Next, we differentiate \( v(p, w) = u(c(p, w)) \)

\[
v_{p_i} = \frac{u_c c_{p_i}}{v_w} = \frac{(u_c - v_w B_c + v_w B_c) c_{p_i}}{v_w} = \frac{(u_c - v_w B_c) c_{p_i} - B_{p_i}}{v_w} \text{ as } B_c \cdot c_{p_i} = -B_{p_i} \text{ from (46)}
\]

\[
= -\tau^b \cdot c_{p_i} - B_{p_i}
\]

(50)

Next,

\[
D_j = -\tau^b \cdot c_{p_j} = -\tau^b \cdot \left( S^H_j + c_w (p, w) \frac{v_{p_j}(p, w)}{v_w(p, w)} \right) \text{ by (45)}
\]

\[
= -\tau^b \cdot S^H_j \text{ as } \tau^b \cdot c_w = 0
\]

(51)

Likewise, (44) gives, using again \( \tau^b \cdot c_w = 0 \)

\[
D_j = -\tau^b \cdot c_{p_j} = -\tau^b \cdot \left( S^C_j - c_w B_{p_j} \right) = -\tau^b \cdot S^C_j
\]

\[\square\]

Proposition 25 (Slutsky relation modified) With \( c(p, w) \) we have

\[
\begin{align*}
c_{p_j} &= -c_w B_{p_j} + S^H_j + c_w D_j = -c_w B_{p_j} - c_w \left( \tau^b \cdot S^H_j \right) + S^H_j \\
c_{p_j} &= -c_w B_{p_j} + S^C_j
\end{align*}
\]

and

\[
S^C_j - S^H_j = c_w D_j = -c_w \left( \tau^b \cdot S^H_j \right)
\]

(52)

Proof.

\[
c_{p_j} = c_w \frac{v_{p_j}(p, w)}{v_w(p, w)} + S^H_j \text{ by (45)}
\]

\[
= c_w \left( -B_{p_j} + D_j \right) + S^H_j \text{ by Proposition 24}
\]

Also, (44) gives: \( c_{p_j} = -c_w B_{p_j} + S^C_j \).\[\square\]

Lemma 3 We have

\[
B_c \cdot S^C_j = 0, \quad B_c \cdot S^H_j = -D_j.
\]

(53)

Proof Relations (46) imply \( B_c \cdot S^C_j = B_c \cdot (c_{p_j} + c_w B_{p_j}) = -B_{p_j} + B_{p_j} = 0 \). Also, \( B_c \cdot S^H_j = B_c \cdot (S^C_j - c_w D_j) = -D_j \). \[\square\]
10.2 Application in Specific Behavioral Models

10.2.1 Misperception model

To illustrate this framework, we take the misperception model (i.e., the sparse max agent). It comprises a perception function \( p^s(p, w) \) (which itself can be endogenized, something we consider later). The demand satisfies:

\[
c(p, w) = h^r(p^s(p, w), v(p, w))
\]  

(54)

where \( h^r(p^*, u) \) is the Hicksian demand of a rational agent would perceived prices \( p^s(p, w) \).

**Proposition 26** Take the misperception model. Then, with \( S^r(p, w) = h^r(p^s(p, w), v(p, w)) \) the Slutsky matrix of the underlying rational agent, we have:

\[
S^H_j(p, w) = S^r(p, w) \cdot p^s_j(p, w)
\]

(55)

i.e. \( S^H_{ij} = \sum_k S^r_{ik} \frac{\partial p^s_k(p, w)}{\partial p_j} \), where \( \frac{\partial p^s_k(p, w)}{\partial p_j} \) is the matrix of perception impacts. Also

\[
\tau^b = B_c(c, p) - \frac{B_c(c, p^s)}{B_c(c, p^s) \cdot c_w}
\]

Given \( B_c(p^s, c) \cdot S^H_j = 0 \), we have:

\[
D_j = (B_c(p, c) - B_c(p^s, c)) \cdot S^H_j = B_c(p, c) \cdot S^H_j
\]

(56)

so that

\[
D_j = \overline{\tau} \cdot S^H_j \text{ with } \overline{\tau} := B_c(p, c) - B_c(p^s, c)
\]

This implies that in welfare formulas we can take \( \tau^b = B_c(p, c) - B_c(p^s, c) \) rather than the more cumbersome \( \tau^b = B_c(c, p) - \frac{B_c(c, p^s)}{B_c(c, p^s) \cdot c_w} \).

**Proof** Given \( c(p, w) = h^r(p^s(p, w), v(p, w)) \), we have \( c_w = h^r_u v_w \). Then,

\[
S^H_j = c_{p_j}(p, w) - c_w(p, w) \frac{v_{p_j}(p, w)}{v_w(p, w)} = h^r_{p_j} p^s_j(p, w) + h^r_u v_{p_j} - c_w \frac{v_{p_j}}{v_w}
\]

\[
= S^r p^s_j(p, w) + h^r_u v_{p_j} - h^r_u v_w \frac{v_{p_j}}{v_w} \text{ as } c_w = h^r_u v_w
\]

\[
= S^r p^s_j(p, w)
\]

Next, observe that the demand satisfies \( u_c(p, w) = \Lambda B_c(p^s, c) \) for some Lagrange multiplier \( \Lambda \), and that \( B_c(p^s, c) \cdot S^r = 0 \) for a rational agent (see equation (53) applied to that agent). So,
\[ B_c(p^s, c) \cdot S^H = 0. \]

\[ -D_j(p, w) = \tau^b \cdot S_j^H = \left( B_c - \frac{u_c}{v_w} \right) \cdot S^r p^s_{pj}(p, w) = \left( B_c - \frac{\Lambda B_c(p^s, c)}{v_w(p, w)} \right) \cdot S^r p^s_{pj}(p, w) \]

\[ = B_c \cdot S^r p^s_{pj}(p, w) = (B_c - B_c(p^s, c)) \cdot S^r p^s_{pj}(p, w) \]

Finally, we have \( \frac{u_c}{v_w} = \Lambda B_c(c, p^s) \) for some scalar \( \Lambda > 0 \). Given (46) \( \frac{u_c(c(p, w))}{v_w(p, w)} = \frac{u_c}{u_c(c_w)} = \frac{B_c(c, p^s)}{B_c(c, p^s) c_w} \) (indeed, both are equal to \( \frac{u_c}{u_c(c_w)} \)).

We note that \( u_c \cdot S^H = 0 \) in the (static) misperception model (this is because \( u_c = \Lambda B_c(c, p^s) \) for some scalar \( \Lambda \), and \( B_c(c, p^s) \cdot S^H = 0 \) from Proposition 27). This is not true in the decision-utility model.

**Representation lemma** The following Lemma means that the demand function of a general abstract consumer can be represented as that of a misperceiving consumer with perceived prices \( p^s(p, w) \).

**Lemma 4 (Representing an abstract demand by a misperception).** Given an abstract demand \( c(p, w) \), and a utility function \( u(c) \), we can define the function:

\[ p^s(p, w) := \frac{u_c(c(p, w))}{v_w(p, w)} \quad (57) \]

Then, the demand function can be represented as that of a sparse agent with perceived prices \( p^s(p, w) \).

\[ c(p, w) = c^s(p, p^s(p, w), w). \quad (58) \]

**Proof** The demand of a sparse agent \( c^s(p, p^s, w) \) is characterized by \( u_c(c^s(p, p^s, w)) = \lambda p^s \) for some \( \lambda \), and \( p \cdot c = w \). By construction, we have \( u_c(c^s(p, p^s, w)) = \lambda p^s \) for \( p^s = \overline{p}^s(p, w) \). Hence, the representation is valid. We make a mild assumption, namely that given a \( c = c(p, w) \), there’s no other \( c' \) with \( p \cdot c' = w \), \( u_c(c') = u_c(c) \), and \( u(c') > u(c) \). Otherwise, we would need to consider another “branch” of the sparse max, namely a solution \( u_c(c^s) = \lambda p^s \) with \( c^s \cdot p = w \) with \( \lambda \) not necessarily the lowest value possible.\( \square \)

We note that for any \( p^s(p, w) := ku_c(c(p, w)) \) for some \( k > 0 \), we have \( \frac{u_c(c(p, w))}{v_w(p, w)} = \frac{p^s}{p^s c_w} \) (indeed, both are equal to \( \frac{u_c}{u_c c_w} \)).

**10.2.2 Decision-utility model**

In the decision-utility model there is a “true” utility function \( u(c) \), and a perceived utility function \( u^b(c) \). Demand is \( c(p, w) = \arg \max_c u^b(c, p) \) s.t. \( B(p, c) \leq w \).
Consider the “parallel” agent who’s rational with utility $u^b$. We call $v^b(p, w) = u^b(c(p, w))$ his utility. For that parallel agent, rational agent, call $S^b_{r}(p, w) = c_p(p, w) + c_w(p, w)'c$ his Slutsky matrix.

**Proposition 27** In the decision-utility model, $S^C_j = S^b_{r}$ is the Slutsky matrix of a rational agent with utility $u^b(c)$. The ideal misoptimization corrective tax is:

$$\tau^b = \frac{u^b_c(c(p, w))}{v^b_w(p, w)} - \frac{u_c(c(p, w))}{v_w(p, w)}.$$

### 10.2.3 Hybrid Model: Agent maximizing the wrong utility function with the wrong prices

Suppose now an agent with true problem $\max_c u(c)$ s.t. $B(p, c) \leq w$, but who maximizes $\max_{c|p} u^b(c)$ s.t. $B(p, c) \leq w$ with both the wrong utility and the wrong prices. This is hybrid of the two previous models.

In terms of decision (if not welfare), the agent is a misperceiving agent with utility $u^b$ and perceived prices $p^s$. Call $v^b(p, w) = u^b(c(p, w))$ and $h^{rb}(p^s, \tilde{u}) = \arg \min_c B(p^s, c)$ s.t. $u^b(c) \geq \tilde{u}$ the indirect utility function (of that misperceiving agent) and the rational compensated demand of that agent with utility $u^b$. Then, our agent has demand:

$$c(p, w) = h^{rb}(p^s(p, w), v^b(p, w)). \tag{59}$$

**Proposition 28** (Agent misperceiving both utility and prices) Take the model of an agent maximizing the wrong utility function $u^b(c)$, with the wrong perceived prices $p^s$. Call $S^{rb}_{r}(p, w) = h^{rb}(p^s(p, w), v^b(p, w))$ the Slutsky matrix of the underlying rational agent who has utility $u^b$, and define

$$S^b_j(p, w) := S^{rb}_{r}(p, w) \cdot p^s_j(p, w) \tag{60}$$

i.e. $S^b_{ij} = \sum_k S^{rb}_{ik} \frac{\partial r^s_i(p, w)}{\partial p_j}$, where $\frac{\partial r^s_i(p, w)}{\partial p_j}$ is the matrix of marginal perception. Then,

$$S^C_j(p, w) = S^b_j(p, w) + c_w\left(\frac{v^b_{pj}}{v^b_w} + B_{pj}\right)$$

$$S^H_j(p, w) = S^b_j + c_w\left(\frac{v^b_{pj}}{v^b_w} - \frac{v_{pj}}{v_w}\right)$$

$$S^b_j(p, w) = c_{pj} - c_w\frac{v^b_{pj}}{v^b_w}$$

We can write

$$-D_j = \tau^b \cdot S^b_j.$$
with:
\[
\pi^b := (B_c(c, p) - B_c(p^s, c)) + \left( \frac{u^b_c}{v^b_w} - \frac{u^c_c}{v^c_w} \right)
\]  

Finally, \( B_c(p^s, c) \cdot S^b_j = 0 \).

This tax \( \pi^b \) is the sum of two gaps: between the prices \( (B_c(c, p) - B_c(p^s, c)) \) and perceived prices, and between true utility and perceived utility \( \left( \frac{u^b_c}{v^b_w} - \frac{u^c_c}{v^c_w} \right) \).

**Proof.** So, with \( M_j = \frac{\partial p^j(p, w)}{\partial p^j} \), and use \( c(p, w) = h^{r,b}(p^s, v^b(p, w)) \):
\[
c_w(p, w) = h^{r,b}_w v^b_w
\]
\[
c_p(p, w) = h^{r,b}_p \cdot M_j + h^{r,b}_w v^b_j = S^b_j + c_w \frac{v^b_j}{v^b_w}
\]

Using (44) and (45) gives:
\[
S^C_j = c_p(p, w) + c_w(p, w) B_p(c, p) = S^b_j + c_w \left( \frac{v^b_j}{v^b_w} + B_p \right)
\]
\[
S^H_j = c_p(p, w) - c_w(p, w) v^b_j v^b_w(p, w) = S^b_j + c_w \left( \frac{v^b_j}{v^b_w} - v^b_j(p, w) \right)
\]

We have
\[
B_c(p^s, c) \cdot S^b_j = B_c(p^s, c) \cdot h^r(p^s, v^b) \cdot M_j = 0 \text{ as } B_c(p^s, c) \cdot h^r(p^s, v^b) = 0
\]

Recall also that \( \frac{v^b_j}{v^b_w} = \Lambda B_c(p^s, c) \) as the agent maximizes with perceived prices \( p^s \). Hence,
\[
-D_j = \left( B_c(c, p) - \frac{u^c_c}{v^c_w} \right) S^b_j
\]
\[
= \left( (B_c(c, p) - B_c(p^s, c)) + \left( \frac{u^c_c}{v^c_w} - \Lambda B_c(p^s, c) \right) \right) S^b_j \text{ as } B_c(p^s, c) \cdot S^b_j = 0
\]
\[
= \left( (B_c(c, p) - B_c(p^s, c)) - \left( \frac{u^c_c}{v^c_w} - \frac{u^b_c}{v^b_w} \right) \right) \cdot S^b_j = \pi_b \cdot S^H_j
\]

\( \Box \)

### 10.3 Attention as a good

#### 10.3.1 Interpreting attention as a good

We propose a simple abstract way to think about attention, including its potentially suboptimal allocation. Call \( c = (C, m) \) the “meta-good” made of both regular commodities \( C \) and attention
have the demand \( c(p, w) \). We can think that attention has market price 0 (it could have a non-zero price, for instance if \( m \) is the amount of computer power one uses to optimize).

The concrete example of misperception framework is worth keeping in mind for concreteness. We have the demand \( C^o(p, p^*, w, m) = \text{arg max}_{C_m \in \mathbb{R}} u(C, m) \) s.t. \( p \cdot (C, m) \leq w \), which depends on perceived prices \( p^* \). Then, given \( p^*(p, w, m) \), demand is \( C(p, w, m) = C^o(p, p^*(p, m), w, m) \). If \( m \) is optimally allocated, \( m(p, w) = \text{arg max}_m u(C(p, w, m), m) \). In general (even with non-optimal attention), given an attention policy \( m(p, w) \), demand is \( C(p, w) = C(p, w, m(p, w)) \).

**Characterizing optimal allocation of attention** Suppose that we have a constraint: \( c(p, w) = c(p, w, \theta) \) for some parameter \( \theta \). For instance, suppose that \( c(p, w, \theta) = (C(p, w, m(\theta)), m(\theta)) \); when \( m(\theta) = \theta \), we’re considering the potentially optimal allocation of attention, as attention affects directly the choice of goods. If \( m = (m_1, m_2, m_3) = (\theta_1, \theta_2, \theta_2) \), we captures that the attention to goods 2 and 3 have to be the same.47

**Proposition 29** (Characterizing optimal allocation of attention) The first order condition for the optimal allocation of parameter \( \theta \) (i.e., \( \theta (p, w) = \text{arg max}_\theta u(c(p, w, \theta)) \)) is:

\[
\tau^b \cdot c_\theta(p, w, \theta) = 0
\] (62)

**Proof** The FOC is \( u_c c_\theta = 0 \). We note that \( B_c \cdot c_\theta = 0 \) by budget constraint: \( B(c(p, w, \theta)) = w \). So,

\[
\tau^{b,c} \cdot c_\theta = \left( \frac{u_c(c, p)}{v_w(p, w)} - B_c \right) \cdot c_\theta = \frac{u_c(c, p) \cdot c_\theta}{v_w(p, w)}
\]

so that \( \tau^b \cdot c_\theta = 0 \) if and only if \( u_c \cdot c_\theta = 0 \). □

**Proposition 30** (Value of \( D_j \) when attention is optimal). When attention is of the form \( c(p, w, \theta) = (C(p, w, m(\theta)), m(\theta)) \), and is optimally chosen, then

\[
-D_j = \tau^b_C \cdot C_{pj}(p, w, m)_{m=m(\theta(p,w))}
= \tau^b_C \cdot S^H_{jm}(p, w, m)_{m=m(\theta(p,w))} = \tau^b_C \cdot S^C_{jm}(p, w, m)_{m=m(\theta(p,w))}
\]

where \( \tau^b_C = B_C(C, p) - \frac{u_c(C, m)}{v_w(p, w)} \) is the ideal tax restricted to goods consumption, and \( S^H_{jm} \) and \( S^C_{jm} \) are the Slutsky matrices \( S^H_{jm} \) and \( S^C_{jm} \) holding attention constant, i.e. associated to decision \( C(p, w, m) \) with constant \( m = m(\theta(p, w)) \).

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47 In a model of noisy decision-making à la Sims (2003), the same logic exactly applies, except that quantities are generally stochastic. The consumption is a random variable \( c(p, w, \tilde{\varepsilon}) \), where \( \tilde{\varepsilon} \) indexes noise, rather than a deterministic function. Then, utility is \( U(c(p, w)) := E[u(c(p, w, \tilde{\varepsilon}))] \). \( S^H(p, w) \) is likewise a random variable. We do not pursue this framework further here, at it is hard to solve beyond linear-quadratic settings, e.g. with Gaussian distribution of prices – which in turn generates potentially negative prices.
Proof \[ -D_j = \tau^b \cdot c_{p_j}(p, w, \theta) = \tau^b \cdot \left[ (C_{p_j}(p, w, m), 0) + c_{\theta}(p, w, \theta) \theta_{p_j}(p, w) \right] \]
\[ = \tau^b \cdot (C_{p_j}(p, w, m), 0) \quad \text{as} \quad \tau^b \cdot c_{\theta} = 0 \]
\[ = (\tau^b_{c}, \tau^b_{m}) \cdot (C_{p_j}(p, w, m), 0) = \tau^b_{c} \cdot C_{p_j}(p, w, m) \cdot = \tau^b_{c} \cdot S^C_{j,m} = \tau^b_{c} \cdot S^H_{j|m} \]

"No attention cost in welfare" benchmark Another benchmark is the "no attention cost in welfare", i.e. the cost of attention is not taken into account in the welfare analysis. Suppose that attention \( m \) just moves with prices, but as an automatic process whose "cost" is not counted: this is, \( u(C, m) = u(C) \) and attention has 0 price, \( p_m = 0 \). This is the way it is often done in behavioral economic (see however Bernheim and Rangel 2009): people choose using heuristics, but the "cognitive cost" associated with a decision procedure isn’t taken into account in the agent’s welfare (largely, because it is very hard to measure, and that revealed preference techniques do not apply).

Proposition 31 (Value of \( D_j \) in the case of fixed attention, and the case of “No attention cost in welfare”). In the “fixed attention” and the “No attention cost in welfare”
\[ -D_j = (\tau^b_{C}, 0) \cdot S^H_j(p, w) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \tau^b_{C,i} S^H_{ij} = (\tau^b_{C}, 0) \cdot S^C_j(p, w) = (\tau^b_{C}, 0) \cdot c_j(p, w) \]

This is, only the components of \( \tau^b \) and the Slutsky matrix linked to commodities matter.

Proof \[ \text{We have } \tau^b = (\tau^b_{C}, \tau^b_{m}) = (\tau^b_{C}, 0) \text{ as } u_{m} = 0. \text{ So, } -D_j = \tau^b \cdot S^H_j(p, w) = \tau^b_{C} \cdot S^H_{C,j}. \]

Misperception example In the misperception model with attention policy \( m(p, w) \), we have:
\[ c(p, w) = (C^s[p, p^s(p, w, m(p, w)), v(p, w)], m(p, w)) \]

When attention is optimally chosen, we can apply Proposition 30 with \( m(\theta) = \theta \). This gives:
\[ -D_j = \tau^b_{C} \cdot S^H_{C,j,m} \text{ with} \]
\[ S^H_{C,j|m} = S^s p^b_{p_j}(p, w, m) \quad (63) \]
\[ \text{i.e. the Slutsky matrix has the the sensitivity with fixed attention. Hence, we have both } -D_j = \tau^b_{C} \cdot S^H_{C,j,m} \text{ when attention is optimal.} \]

In the “no attention cost in welfare” case, \( \tau^b_{m} = 0 \) and
\[ -D_j = \tau^b_{C} \cdot S^H_{C,j} \]

When attention is not necessarily optimal, we also have (from (56)), using again decomposition
\( \tau^b = (\tau^b_c, \tau^b_m) : \)

\[-D_j = \tau^b \cdot S_j = \tau^b_c \cdot S^H_{Cj} + \tau^b_m \frac{\partial m}{\partial p_j} \]

where \( S^H_{Cj} = S^r \cdot p^*_{ij} (p, w) \), where now the total derivative matters, including the variable attention.

The online appendix (section 12.5) presents more examples.

## 11 Appendix: Proofs

The online appendix contains further proofs.

### Proof of Proposition 2

Consider first the case \( \alpha = 1, \beta = 0 \). We always have \( \tau^s_i \leq \tau_{\text{max}} \). Consider the marginal impact of increasing all taxes by \( \varepsilon \). All \( \tau_i \) and \( \tau^s_i \) increase by \( \varepsilon \), and using \( \nu = (1, ..., 1)' \),

\[
0 = \frac{dL(\boldsymbol{\tau} + \varepsilon \boldsymbol{\nu})}{d\varepsilon} = \sum_i -\tau^s_i \psi_i y_i + \Lambda \sum_i y_i \geq \sum_i -\tau_{\text{max}} \psi_i y_i + \Lambda \sum_i y_i
\]

so \( \tau_{\text{max}} \geq \tau^s := \frac{\Lambda}{\psi} \). Also, if the tax is uniform, it should be at the rate \( \tau^s = \frac{\Lambda}{\psi} \).

Suppose by contradiction that there is a good \( i \) such that \( \tau_i < \tau_{\text{max}} \). Then, (as \( \frac{\partial \tau^s(\tau)}{\partial \tau_i} = 0 \) locally), \( \tau^s_i = \frac{\Lambda}{\psi} > \frac{\Lambda}{\psi} = \tau^s \) by the assumption in the Proposition. Also, if a good has \( \tau_i = \tau_{\text{max}} \), it satisfies \( \tau^s_i \geq \tau^s \) as \( \tau_{\text{max}} \geq \tau^s \). Hence, for all goods, \( \tau^s_i \geq \tau^s \), and \( \tau^s_i > \tau^s \) for at least one good. Now, revisit:

\[
0 = \frac{dL(\boldsymbol{\tau} + \varepsilon \boldsymbol{\nu})}{d\varepsilon} = \sum_i -\tau^s_i \psi_i y_i + \Lambda \sum_i y_i < \sum_i -\tau^s \psi_i y_i + \Lambda \sum_i y_i = 0.
\]

We have reached the desired contradiction.

In the case \( \beta \) and \( m \) sufficiently small. Loosely speaking the reasoning holds by continuity. A rigorous proof is in Proposition 14 and Proposition 32 of the online appendix.

### Proof of Proposition 7

We observe that a tax \( \tau_i \) modifies the externality as:

\[
\frac{d\xi}{d\tau_i} = \sum_h \xi_{ch} \left[ c^h_{qi}(q, w, \xi) + c^h_{ch} \frac{d\xi}{d\tau_i} \right]
\]

so \( \frac{d\xi}{d\tau_i} = \frac{\sum_h \xi_{ch} c^h_{ch}}{1 - \sum_h \xi_{ch} c^h_{ch}} \). The term \( \frac{1}{1 - \sum_h \xi_{ch} c^h_{ch}} \) represents the “multiplier” effect of one unit of pollution on consumption, then on more pollution. So, calling \( \frac{\partial L^{\text{no \xi}}}{\partial \tau_i} \) the value of \( \frac{\partial L}{\partial \tau_i} \) without the externality.
\[
\frac{\partial L}{\partial \tau_i} - \frac{\partial L^{u0}}{\partial \tau_i} = \frac{d \xi}{d \tau_i} \left\{ \sum_h W_{\tau_i} v_h w_{\tau_i} v_h + \lambda \sum_h \tau \cdot c_i^h (q, w, \xi) \right\} = \frac{d \xi}{d \tau_i} \sum_h \left[ \beta^h v_h + \lambda \tau \cdot c_i^h \right]
\]

\[
= \frac{\sum_h \xi c_i^h}{\sum_h \xi c_i^h} \sum_h \left[ \beta^h v_h + \lambda \tau \cdot c_i^h \right] = \sum_h \xi c_i^h
\]

Using Proposition 6,

\[
\frac{\partial L}{\partial \tau_i} = \sum_h \left[ (\lambda - \gamma^h) c_i^h + \lambda \tau \cdot S_i^{C,h} - \beta^h \tau^h \cdot S_i^{C,h} + \xi c_i^h \cdot (\lambda - \gamma^h) - S_i^{C,h} \right]
\]

\[
= \sum_h \left[ (\lambda - \gamma^h - \xi c_i^h) c_i^h + \lambda(\tau + \xi c_i^h) \cdot S_i^{C,h} - \beta^h \tau^h \cdot S_i^{C,h} \right].
\]

**Proof of Proposition 8**

\[
\frac{\partial L}{\partial \chi} = \sum_h \left[ W_{\tau_i} v_h w_{\tau_i} v_h + \lambda(\tau - \tau^h) \right] c_i^h = \sum_h \left[ \beta^h \left( \frac{u_h}{v_h^h} - q + q \right) + \lambda(\tau - \tau^h) \right] c_i^h
\]

\[
= \sum_h \left[ \beta^h \left( \frac{u_h}{v_h^h} - q \right) + \lambda \tau \right] c_i^h \text{ as } q \cdot c(q, w, \chi) = w \text{ implies } q \cdot c = 0
\]

**Proof of Proposition 14**

We call \( T = \{ \tau, w \} \) the tax system, made of the schedule of tax rates \( \tau = (\tau_i)_{i=1,\ldots,n} \), and the potential lump-sum transfer \( w \), which could be optimized or not (then \( w \) is just a fixed value, perhaps 0). From Proposition 6, define:

\[
L_i(T, \theta) := \sum_h \left( \lambda - \gamma^h \right) c_i^h + \sum_h \left[ \gamma^h \tau^h + (\lambda - \gamma^h) \right] \cdot S_i^{H,h} \quad S_i^{H,h} = \sum_j S_j^{r,h} M_{ji}.
\]

Define \( T := \{ \tau^{(r1)}, \ldots, \tau^{(rQ)} \} \) the set of quantiles at the optimum. The reader is encouraged to think of the central case where consumer think about just one quantile, the maximum, so \( T = \{ \tau_{\max} \} \). Here \( L_i(T, \theta) = \frac{\partial L}{\partial \tau_i} (T, \theta) \) whenever \( \tau_i \) is not one of the quantile taxes, i.e. \( \tau_i \notin T \).

Case \( \theta = \theta_0 \). We suppose by contradiction that there is an \( i \) with \( \tau_i \notin T \). Given \( M = 0 \), \( S_i^{H,h} = 0 \), so that \( L_i(T, \theta_0) = \sum_h (\lambda - \gamma^h) c_i^h \neq 0 \). We have \( L_i(T, \theta_0) \neq 0 \) whenever \( \tau_i \notin T \). This implies that \( \tau \) can’t be an optimum. This proves that any tax \( \tau_i \) must have a value in \( T \), which has at most \( Q \) elements. In short, simple taxes are optimum when \( \theta = \theta_0 \).

Case \( \theta \) close to \( \theta_0 \). We call \( T^* \) the optimal tax system when \( \theta = \theta_0 \). We reason for \( (\tau, \theta) \) in small neighborhood \( K \) of \( (T^*, \theta_0) \). Because \( L_i(T^*, \theta_0) \neq 0 \), we know that, perhaps by reducing \( K \), we have \( L_i(\tau, \theta) \neq 0 \) for all \( (\tau, \theta) \in K \).

It is clear that for a generic economy, for \( \theta \) close enough to \( \theta_0 \), the optimum tax \( T^*(\theta) \) is unique and continuous in \( \theta \). So, for \( \theta \) close enough to \( \theta_0 \), \( (T^*(\theta), \theta) \) will be in \( K \). This implies
$L_i(T^*(\theta), \theta) \neq 0$ for all $i$. Hence, if we had $\tau_i \notin T$, we’d have $\frac{\partial L}{\partial \tau_i}(T^*(\theta), \theta) = L_i(T^*(\theta), \theta) \neq 0$, a contradiction with the optimality of $\tau_i$. Hence, we must have $\tau_i \in T$. As in the case $\theta = \theta_0$, this means that all taxes have one of the $Q$ values in $T$: the tax system is simple.