This paper explores the neglected theory of entrepreneurial profit proposed by Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk. Although historians of thought often dismiss Böhm-Bawerk’s writings on this topic, we argue that he did develop a coherent theory of entrepreneurial decision making and profit distinct from his theory of interest. We first discuss Böhm-Bawerk’s ideas about futurity, uncertainty, and expectations in his theory of goods, which help form the foundation of his theory of entrepreneurship. Further, we connect his notion of uncertainty with his thoughts on money. We then turn to several of Böhm-Bawerk’s ideas about entrepreneurial profit. Entrepreneurs purchase and allocate factors of production; these decisions are speculative because production takes time, and therefore entrepreneurs bear the uncertainty of the market. Their judgment thus yields profits or losses based upon the ability to anticipate the future state of consumer demand. Finally, we discuss the views of several of Böhm-Bawerk’s contemporaries, in order to place his theory in historical context.

I. INTRODUCTION

Despite tremendous erudition in the field of economic theory, Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk never dealt at great length with the theory of the entrepreneur, although his work on the theory of interest, and consequently on the separation of the different components of income, was closely related. This has led both historians of thought and entrepreneurial theorists to neglect his writings on the subject. For instance, contemporary surveys of Böhm-Bawerk’s work tend not to say much on this subject (Garrison 1999; QA}
Hennings 1987, 1997), and other examples are abundant. Frederick Hawley (1892) bases his criticism of Böhm-Bawerk’s interest theory on the claim that interest cannot be explained without also explaining profit, which Hawley claims Böhm-Bawerk did not do. Frank Knight’s survey of contemporary (at the time) profit theories in the Mengerian tradition does not even mention Böhm-Bawerk (Knight 1933, pp. 28–30). Robert Hébert and Albert Link comment that Böhm-Bawerk largely neglected the entrepreneur, but do note that he briefly considered the problem of the determination of profit (Hébert and Link 1988, p. 69). Karl Pribram likewise maintains that “Böhm-Bawerk did not advance a theory of profit strictly speaking” (1983, p. 330). Jack Hirshleifer (1967) claims Böhm-Bawerk falsely homogenized the entrepreneur and capitalist, combining the separate categories of entrepreneurial profit and interest, a criticism shared by Hawley (1892).  

1 Joseph Schumpeter is more ambiguous, in one place considering Böhm-Bawerk’s approach unsatisfactory because it combines classical with neoclassical insights (1954, p. 893n2). Yet, elsewhere, he remarks that Böhm-Bawerk was, to Schumpeter’s knowledge, the first to advance an uncertainty-bearing, entrepreneurial-judgment approach to profit (1989, p. 257).

The general view, then, is that Böhm-Bawerk’s writings do not contain significant insights into the theory of entrepreneurship, due either to his simple error or to his complete neglect of the subject. These views, though intuitively plausible, warrant scrutiny from historians of thought. The purpose of this paper is to show that, in fact, Böhm-Bawerk’s approach, though not developed systematically, is more nuanced and coherent than is typically thought, and is deserving of more attention than the one or two sentences typically devoted to it. We begin by analyzing Böhm-Bawerk’s view of futurity, uncertainty, and expectations, and how these concepts underlie his approach to capital theory (and, implicitly, entrepreneurship). We also briefly discuss the connection in Böhm-Bawerk’s work between money and uncertainty. Following this foundational analysis, we gather together Böhm-Bawerk’s scattered discussions of entrepreneurship and profit in order to show, first, that he clearly differentiated between profit and interest payments, and, second, that he did have a distinct theory of entrepreneurial profit. Furthermore, Böhm-Bawerk represents part of a tradition in entrepreneurial thinking hearkening back at least to Richard Cantillon, and continuing through the work of Frank Fetter and Frank Knight. To emphasize this point, we conclude with a brief discussion of the similarities between Fetter and Böhm-Bawerk.

II. BÖHM-BAWERK ON UNCERTAINTY AND EXPECTATIONS

Before we address Böhm-Bawerk’s theory of entrepreneurship proper, it is important to briefly describe his views on uncertainty and expectations. This is important for two reasons. First, as we argue below, for Böhm-Bawerk, speculative anticipations of uncertain future market conditions are the essence of entrepreneurship and the source of profit and loss. Second, some modern Austrian economists have characterized  

1 Other contemporaries of Böhm-Bawerk—e.g., S. MacVane (1890) and Charles Mixter (1902)—may also take this view, but an explication of their views is difficult because terms such as “profit” and “interest” are often used inconsistently or ambiguously.
Bohm-Bawerk as an “incomplete subjectivist” and a “Ricardian” on capital theory, who took insufficient account of relative price variations. This widely accepted portrayal tends to deflect attention away from the fact that Bohm-Bawerk emphasized the subjectivity and futurity that are embodied in what he called “economic foresight,” or the “‘forward-looking’ manner of considering our economizing” exercised by all economic agents (1962, pp. 87–88), but especially entrepreneurs, as we shall see. In particular, this caricature of Bohm-Bawerk’s views obscures his insight that agents use the “anticipatory method of computation,” reckoning their wealth in the face of uncertain developments in future market conditions.

Bohm-Bawerk’s views on uncertainty, expectations, and wealth estimation were spelled out in his first publication, Rechte und Verhältnisse vom Standpunkte der volkswirtschaftlichen Güterlehre. Kritische Studie, a monograph that appeared in 1881, which was based on his Habilitation thesis submitted to the University of Vienna near the end of 1879 (Hennings 1997, p. 10). The work was not translated into English until 1962, under the misleading title Whether Legal Rights and Relationships Are Economic Goods. A more accurate idea of the contents of the work is provided by the literal translation of the German title: Rights and Relationships from the Standpoint of the Economic Theory of Goods: Critical Studies. The work is, in effect, a critical treatise on the theory of goods, which had been the starting point of German economic theory for almost the entire nineteenth century. Menger himself devoted the first two chapters (totaling sixty-four pages) of his Principles, which constitutes almost a quarter of the book, to the theory of goods.

In his preface to the monograph, Bohm-Bawerk contended that the “basic economic doctrine of the theory of goods … was in need of correction in several respects, or at least of such revision as to make it truly comprehensive and universally valid” (1962, p. 30; emphasis in original). Such revision was required because goods theory embodied “concepts and truths fundamental to every economic train of thought.” Bohm-Bawerk then re-emphasized the importance of the theory of goods in his introductory chapter, where he wrote that goods “constitute the primary material with which economic science makes it its business to deal” (1962, p. 32).

What Bohm-Bawerk found lacking in goods theory is a clear and unambiguous answer to the question of whether legal rights and contractual relationships were to be classified as “goods” from the point of view of economic science (1962, pp. 32–33).

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2 For example, Ludwig Lachmann refers to Bohm-Bawerk as a “Ricardian capital theorist,” and argues that Carl Menger rejected Bohm-Bawerk’s theory on the same grounds that he rejected Walras’s system of general equilibrium; neither accounted for “the diversity of the world” (1977, pp. 253, 264). Israel Kirzner writes about the “nonsubjective, technical and empirical garb” that cloaked Bohm-Bawerk’s basic ideas, and implies that, in comparison to Menger’s capital theory, Bohm-Bawerk’s theory is backward-looking (1979, pp. 79, 82). Kirzner also describes the “Bohm-Bawerkian concept of the capital structure of an economy” as pointing towards “an incomplete subjectivism” (1996, p. 11).

3 Menger was one of the readers of the thesis and apparently actively campaigned for its acceptance, which was only grudgingly given by its other reader, Lorenz von Stein (1815–1890). The thesis was officially accepted in early 1880 (Hennings 1997, pp. 10–11). Von Stein, a conservative or corporate state socialist, was influenced by Louis Blanc and other French Utopian socialists (Mai 1975, p. 215).

4 We are indebted to Guido Hülsmann for this translation.

5 On the importance of the theory of goods in nineteenth-century German economic theory, see Erich Streissler (1990).
Most important for our purposes, his interest in addressing this issue was motivated by his ongoing research into the theory of capital and interest. Having recognized the crucial role of time in this theory, Böhm-Bawerk was intent on elaborating and clarifying the central concept of economizing by incorporating into it the phenomena of foresight, intertemporal valuations, uncertainty, causality, and “wealth computation” (i.e., monetary calculation).

Böhm-Bawerk made some of his most significant contributions in this area when he addressed the question of whether “rights to the future yield of goods,” or what we might today broadly refer to as “financial assets,” constitute a separate category of goods. In the case of a “payments-claim,” the legal right to demand repayment of a debt, which Böhm-Bawerk considered to be theoretically the most important of this group of rights (1962, pp. 83–85), the “true goods” are “the objects themselves that constitute the matter of the debt.” These are the anticipated “renditions of service” that the creditor is entitled to claim at some definite time in the future. The “payments-claim” thus endows its owner with power of future disposal over a real thing. Hence, it is not a good per se, but merely one precondition of “future goods-quality,” in the same way that a property right in a thing is one of the preconditions of “an already present goods-quality.” Although the resolution of this issue was apparently straightforward, Böhm-Bawerk recognized that futurity was an inherent element of economizing activity and that it raised serious problems that had not previously been addressed by the theory of goods. Thus, he initiated a profound investigation into the implications of futurity for the theory of economizing.

Böhm-Bawerk pointed out that “economic science is not concerned only with today,” because human beings develop “economic foresight” as soon as they begin to strive after the “objective means” for ensuring future well-being (1962, p. 87; emphasis in original). Once this occurs, “the future has gained a sure and important place in our economizing,” and we evaluate our anticipated wants and availability of goods against our existing wants and goods. Accordingly, “our economic behavior in the present” is “governed by the prospective presence of future needs just as if they were already upon us in the present.” In this way, Böhm-Bawerk introduces the concept of an intertemporal scale of valuations.

As Böhm-Bawerk crucially notes, however, “nothing that is future is for us absolutely certain” (1962, p. 90; emphasis in original). Therefore, when dealing with

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6 Böhm-Bawerk had begun working out his ideas on capital and interest, with his characteristic emphasis on time and futurity, as early as 1876, when, as a student, he presented an (unpublished) essay on A. R. J. Turgot to Karl Knies’s seminar in Heidelberg. For a discussion of the essay, see Hennings (1997, pp. 56–60). The essay was written well before the publication of the first of Böhm-Bawerk's three volumes on capital and interest theory in 1884.

7 Of course, Menger had dealt with all of these topics, but in a cursory and less methodical fashion (Salerno 1999).

8 For Böhm-Bawerk, “renditions of service” denotes the flow of unit services yielded by a material good, each of which was capable of satisfying a concrete human want. It is the concrete rendition of service that is directly valued by the human agent, and not the good itself. Böhm-Bawerk explains that “the concrete renditions of service are means for the satisfaction of want in a more real sense than are goods themselves… [T]he goods [are] not goods but . . . the renditions of service that emanate from those goods which constitute the smallest independent units of our economy and that the former (i.e., goods) constitute only complexes of the latter, that goods are therefore a secondary category” (1962, p. 77).
claims to future renditions of service—whether these be in the nature of a debt claim or the ownership of a durable good such as a house—neither the actual disposal over these future goods nor, *a fortiori*, their value is assured. Rather, our objective power to utilize them, as well as their subjective value to us, is subject to “probabilities of an infinite number of degrees of probability which will range from something bordering on complete certainty” to “mere doubtfulness” and on to “an almost disappearing possibility” (1962, pp. 90–91). Nonetheless, the very nature of economizing dictates that such uncertain future advantages are taken account of and valued in some manner. Anticipating Frank Knight’s famous distinction between “uncertainty” and “risk,” Böhm-Bawerk did not believe that the expected values of uncertain future goods could be objectively calculated and summed up. According to Böhm-Bawerk, therefore, we cannot differentiate ‘sure dollars’ from ‘probable dollars’ and again from ‘possible dollars’ and … if we could, we should not arrive at a final uniform total, any more than we arrive at a sum resulting from adding apples, pears and plums. Consequently, we can do no more than transfer the gradation in the degree of probability from the area where it exists but cannot be expressed, *the degree of probability*, to an area where it does not exist but where it can be expressed, namely, the magnitude of the prospective advantage. That is to say we modify *the magnitude of the prospective advantage* or modify the estimation of value we place upon it. (1962, pp. 91–92; emphases in original)

In other words, appraising the value of a claim to a future good involves an individual’s qualitative and subjective understanding or forecast of the unfolding of the unique events relating to the good’s coming into being, and the transformation of this qualitative forecast into a quantitative uncertainty discount in objective and certain present dollars. Thus, for example, legal title to a house of given durability and quality built near the San Andreas fault may be appraised at a lower value by an individual than title to a house of the same durability and quality built elsewhere, because the power of disposal over its future renditions of service is less probable in the first case. Unfortunately, Böhm-Bawerk goes astray by comparing this subjective process of appraising uncertainty discounts for future goods to the very different case of objectively calculating the expected value of a lottery ticket. While correctly perceiving that its “true” expected value never equals the actual *ex post* value of any individual lottery ticket, Böhm-Bawerk leaps to an erroneous inference: “Objectively considered, this manner of computing wealth (except for the case of complete certainty) *always* leads to a result that is wrong” (1962, p. 92; emphasis in original). In fact, the appraisement of a future good or of an individual’s overall wealth, *while always fallible*, is *not always wrong*, because the calculation is always instrumental to economizing or action. If the act of production or exchange that the calculation informs results in a surplus of utility gained over utility surrendered, then it is “correct.” But this is a minor flaw in Böhm-Bawerk’s original analysis of the fundamental futurity and uncertainty that characterize all valuations and choices.

<sup>9</sup>Böhm-Bawerk’s novel approach to probability reflects implicit awareness of the gist of the criticism later leveled by Ludwig von Mises against modern probability theory: “The problem of probable inference is much bigger than those problems which constitute the field of the calculus of probability. Only preoccupation with the mathematical treatment could result in the prejudice that probability always means frequency” (1998, p. 107).
By clarifying the nature of future goods and the method of their evaluation in the present, Böhm-Bawerk was preparing the ground for his foundational explication of the nature and productivity of capital goods. He begins by adopting Menger’s conception of “orders of goods,” and identifying as a class of future goods the present possession of goods of “more remote order”—the term he preferred to Menger’s “higher order.” This subclass of future goods was of “paramount importance” because “to it belongs the entire mass of goods which constitute the capital of our economy” (Böhm-Bawerk 1962, pp. 100–107).

The theoretical construction of “a serial structure, or succession of orders of goods” embodies the idea of causality, which is intrinsic to the goods concept. For Böhm-Bawerk, then, his theory of capital was nothing more than the elaboration of the logical implications of German goods theory: “All goods, by the very terms of the concept ‘good’ itself have one feature in common. That feature is that they are capable of constituting a link in the chain of cause and effect—the causal chain … between human needs and the satisfaction of those needs” (1962, p. 100). Although the value of goods of remoter orders is a “derived value,” it is also “prospective in nature” and “anticipates the facts.” The reason for the “anticipatory” or forward-looking character of the value of remoter-order goods is precisely that they must be transformed through time-consuming processes into goods of progressively less remote orders before they can finally release their future utility.

According to Böhm-Bawerk, moreover, the present value placed on goods of remoter order and on future goods in general is the result of an individual and uncertain process of “wealth computation” (1962, p. 95). This process is “an operation replete with subjective interpretations and insinuations.” It is a mental operation that is designed to give the economizing individual more than a mere listing of “the things comprising [his] wealth”; rather, it is designed to provide “some estimation of their significance, their economic importance … their value, in order that we may add them up and compare them with other accumulations of wealth” (1962, p. 86; emphasis added). The uncertain, subjective, and fluctuating “capital values” that are summed up into an individual’s wealth are thus distinct from his objective possession of presently existing, concrete goods of remoter orders that constitute “capital.”

Böhm-Bawerk characterized the relationship between capital value and capital in the following manner:

All capital value is an anticipation of the value of the prospective consumptible end-product. Production, of which capital is the tool and the material (e.g., machines and raw materials) is the condition, the justification and the materialization of the value which has temporarily been ascribed to capital goods; it is the process by virtue of which the future value of a capital good is transmuted into the present worth of the matured consumptible end-product, the process which leads to capital’s fulfillment and justification. (1962, p. 105; emphasis in original)

10 Elsewhere, Böhm-Bawerk differentiates “the materials of wealth” from the “forms of wealth” (1962, p. 97). The former, which include, in addition to concrete capital goods, both durable and stored consumer goods, “are patently identical with the genuine goods which in actual fact lend support to our life and our well-being.” The latter are the appraised values of our diverse rights and relationships that bear some probability of the promise of future renditions of service, and are “mere creatures of our subjective interpretations.”
Böhm-Bawerk does not here address the issue of how monetary calculation of capital values guides entrepreneurs in allocating concrete capital goods. Nevertheless, his clear distinction between “capital good” and “capital value” is a seminal contribution to economic science and a crucial step forward on the road to the development of a theory of entrepreneurship.

III. BÖHM-BAWERK ON MONEY AND UNCERTAINTY

Before we leave this topic, it is instructive to briefly explore the extent to which Böhm-Bawerk’s emphasis on the role of time and economic foresight in the process of economizing infused his views on money. Böhm-Bawerk wrote very little on money and is generally not credited with any contribution to monetary theory. For example, Böhm-Bawerk does not rate even a reference in Howard Ellis’s definitive work, *German Monetary Theory*, nor is he mentioned in Arthur Marget’s magisterial two-volume *The Theory of Prices*. Nonetheless, the Dutch economist Tjardus Greidanus (1932, p. 137) discovered in Böhm-Bawerk’s “comparatively scanty remarks on money” the seeds of a more sophisticated version of the income theory of money pioneered by Friedrich von Wieser and given its most modern formulation by the French economist Albert Aftalion (1927). In these remarks are to be found the conception of money’s function as a store of value, as well as brief reference to the precautionary motive underlying that role.

The income theory of money essentially ascribed the subjective value of money to the marginal utility of the commodities it could command in exchange, in conjunction with the “ability to pay” determined by the income and wealth of the agent. Thus, money was conceived strictly as a medium of exchange. While Böhm-Bawerk basically subscribed to this theory, he did so with an important qualification. In discussing the factors underlying the demand schedule of an individual buyer, Böhm-Bawerk wrote:

> The prevailing doctrine names 1. the value of the economic good for the individual desiring it, and 2. his ability to pay. The latter is explained as the possession of the means for the purchase of the good, which in turn is based on the would-be buyers’ situation of wealth and income…. [T]he first factor is quite correct, the latter basically fallacious. Instead of ‘ability to pay’ it should be ‘the value of the medium of exchange for the would-be buyer.’ (2005, pp. 152–153; emphasis in original)

As Greidanus points out, by revising the second condition, Böhm-Bawerk deviated from “the original and most primitive form of the income theory” (1932, p. 138). By focusing on the subjective use value that the buyer attaches to money rather than the objective quantity that he possessed as a determinant of its marginal utility vis-a-vis that of commodities, Böhm-Bawerk was able to incorporate uncertainty

11Although he does not discuss the theory of money, Böhm-Bawerk’s work is nevertheless macroeconomic in several respects (Garrison 1999). Fillieule (2013) builds on Böhm-Bawerk’s macroeconomic insights to construct a model of his equilibrium and growth theory.
and expectations into his analysis. This is apparent in the example he gave to illustrate his argument:

For instance, in a country with paper money a buyer fears or anticipates that the paper money will soon be devalued. His desire to quickly dispose of the endangered notes may lead him to a higher money bid for a piece of land or a house. The reason for this higher bidding obviously does not lie in the value of the house or lot, nor in his ability to pay, but simply in the lower value he attaches to the medium of exchange, the paper money. (2005, p. 153)

Böhm-Bawerk, however, regarded paper money as an exceptional case and still considered “ability to pay” or “individual affluence” as the “preponderant” albeit “not the only determinant of the valuation of money” (2005, p. 154). Furthermore, he did not recognize in these passages that money also functions as a store of value that may be held for precautionary reasons. It was only in a later work that Böhm-Bawerk (1959b) perceived that money’s role as a medium of exchange went hand-in-hand with its subsidiary role as a store of value that may be held as a precaution against the eventuality of undesirable future events. Böhm-Bawerk’s brief remarks on this topic once again occur within the context of an analysis of the factors that influence demand and supply schedules for commodities.

When discussing the three factors affecting the demand side of the market, under the third factor heading “The subjective value of the good of exchange [i.e. money] for the buyers,” Böhm-Bawerk wrote that “the urgent necessity of making important payments makes cold cash more precious. Even the richest merchant, confronted by the necessity for meeting pressing obligations when his till is depleted, will certainly practice retrenchment in the matter of luxuries …” (1959b, p. 243).

Under the third factor affecting supply, “The subjective value of the good of exchange for the seller,” Böhm-Bawerk elaborated this insight further:

There are times when manufacturers or merchants are obliged to meet very pressing monetary obligations, or indeed are tottering on the verge of bankruptcy. At such moments they place a specially high value on the medium of exchange, money, and for that reason are compelled to reconcile themselves to accepting small amounts of money for the commodities they offer for sale. Herein lies part of the explanation of the inordinately low prices which obtain at a forced sale or prevail generally in a panic. (1959b, p. 247)

The reduction of expenditures in the face of impending financial embarrassment of defaulting on debts and the “scramble for liquidity” that typically occurs during a panic to ward off insolvency both reflect motives for acquiring and holding cash balances that cannot be categorized under the transactions motive. In the last two quoted passages, Böhm-Bawerk thus seemed to strongly suggest the existence of a precautionary motive for holding money as a store of value.12 Greidanus seems to have agreed with

12 As John Maynard Keynes described the precautionary motive: “To provide for contingencies requiring sudden expenditure and for unforeseen opportunities of advantageous purchases, and also to hold an asset of which the value is fixed in terms of money to meet a subsequent liability fixed in terms of money, are further motives for holding cash” (1964, p. 196; emphasis added).
our assessment, although, writing before John Maynard Keynes, he does not invoke the term “precautionary motive.” In discussing the same two passages as above, Greidanus wrote:

Here von Böhm adduces the valuation of money for the designed payment of debts. This is, in fact, a factor of an entirely different character…. [A] person who has to pay a debt does not offer his money in exchange for goods, but keeps it to discharge his debt, and a person who has no money at his disposal when the debt falls due must offer goods in exchange for money; if need be on very disadvantageous terms, in order to meet his obligations, and it may be, even to avoid failure. (1932, p. 142)  

We conclude that Böhm-Bawerk did recognize money’s role as a store of value, valued and held by users for purposes besides merely facilitating exchanges of goods. Nonetheless, perhaps because he wrote so little on money, it is clear that time and economic foresight did not suffuse his analysis of money as pervasively as it did the rest of his economic investigations.

IV. BÖHM-BAWERK’S THEORY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP

In addition to the comments mentioned in the introduction, it is helpful to provide additional background by mentioning a criticism of Böhm-Bawerk by his contemporary, Frederick B. Hawley. Hawley’s general contributions to entrepreneurial theory are discussed in Hébert and Link (1988, pp. 87–90), but we wish to focus on his criticism of Böhm-Bawerk, which inspired much of his other writing on the subject. Hawley’s assessment of Böhm-Bawerk’s approach to profit is fairly typical. He claims that it is evident that profit is … looked upon as simply the wages of management … and the undertaker as no more than the manager of the industry. The fact that he enjoys the sole control of the capital engaged is regarded as a mere incident of the personal efforts he expends in conducting the business. This view of the undertaker necessitates classing him among laborers. (Hawley 1892, p. 282)

Hawley intends with this critique to emphasize his own position that profit is a composite income reflecting returns to several functions. From this claim, Hawley derives a number of other objections we mention throughout this paper. We will show that such views of Böhm-Bawerk misrepresent his position: profit is, for him, more than a wage, and is, in fact, a distinct branch of income. In his university lectures, for example, he referred to entrepreneurial profit as a special subcategory of wages, and even claimed that although it is often described as a subcategory of wage (1987, p. 83), it should be considered a fourth type of income along with wages, interest, and rent (1987, p. 74).  

13In light of the foregoing discussion, the judgment of Hennings that Böhm-Bawerk, in contrast to Menger, “disregarded even the precautionary motive” seems a bit harsh, although he is certainly correct that Böhm-Bawerk granted “money at most a temporary influence on the rate of interest” (1997, p. 126n17).  
14Böhm-Bawerk claims, “Original income is always a compensation for one of these three factors, thus the name rent [Grundrente], capital rent [Rente], and wage, of which entrepreneurial profit is a subcategory. Actually, it is a 4th kind [of income]” (1987, p. 74).
At the beginning of his treatise on capital and interest, Böhm-Bawerk makes it clear that the problem of interest is his principal concern, to the exclusion of the problem of entrepreneurial profit:

The difficulties which surround our subject, the problem of interest, are so great that I can have no desire to increase them by introducing the complication of a second difficult problem. I shall therefore refrain from investigating or deciding the problem of the entrepreneur’s profit…. The question of whether the so-called entrepreneur’s profit is or is not income on capital I shall intentionally leave open. (1959a, p. 7)

This claim, however, belies later arguments made by Böhm-Bawerk regarding the essence of entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial profit. It is possible that the above remarks are meant only to anticipate the discussions in the first volume of Böhm-Bawerk’s treatise, and that they are to be relaxed in later volumes after the problem of interest has been addressed. Whatever the case, by carefully discussing the boundaries of interest theory, at the very least Böhm-Bawerk opened the way for a theory of the entrepreneur. The above passage also indicates in passing that Böhm-Bawerk did think of the problems of entrepreneurial profit and interest as distinct, even if it is the case that both are tied to the theory of capital. His exact thoughts in this regard are the subject of this paper.

In the opening pages of the first volume of his treatise, Böhm-Bawerk describes the scope of the problem of entrepreneurship, and speaks favorably of a theory that treats of a distinct entrepreneurial function capable of yielding profit. He appears to have several specific ideas in mind when he describes the entrepreneurial function:

[I]t is not at all unreasonable to doubt whether the entire excess of proceeds over costs that is realized by an entrepreneur from a process of production should be credited to his capital. Certainly it should not be, if the entrepreneur simultaneously occupies the position of a worker in his own enterprise, for work performed. But even if he does not personally participate in the labor of production, he contributes a certain measure of personal effort, either by reason of the intellectual effort represented by his supervision, or by his formulating policies for the business to follow, or at the very least because of the act of will by which he determines that his means of production shall be enlisted in the service of that particular enterprise. One component would be the result of contributing capital—the originary interest, as it were, and the other the result of the entrepreneur’s effort. (1959a, p. 6)

Even if the entrepreneur were simply a wage earner in his own enterprise, his income would still be distinct from interest payments. But Böhm-Bawerk goes further, describing the “personal effort” of the entrepreneur, which extends beyond simple wages: a personal judgment that the entrepreneur exercises that is peculiar to him, his “supervision.” The judgment in question concerns the choice to allocate capital goods to competing processes of production. The entrepreneur is, then, a capitalist–entrepreneur; entrepreneurs exercise control over capital goods that are used in production. Control by entrepreneurs over the capital structure is identified as a primary difference between capitalist and socialist societies (1959b, p. 112). Böhm-Bawerk does not dwell on any possible differences between the capitalist and entrepreneur other than to note the two distinct returns earned by the capitalist–entrepreneur: an originary interest payment, and a return to an entrepreneurial decision-making
function. The element of time is not discussed here, but, as we shall see below, does
play a role in this theory of entrepreneurship, as we would indeed expect from his
erlier work on the theory of goods.

Böhm-Bawerk proceeds from this discussion to mention the practical difficulty in
this theory in separating exactly the returns to capital and entrepreneurial decision
making. He gives a simple numerical example, which portrays entrepreneurial profit
as an income flowing to the entrepreneur (again, explicitly differentiated from interest
on capital) as a return to successful investment decisions (1959a, pp. 6–7). In his illus-
tration, profit is determined by subtracting the prevailing interest rate from gross
profits. Böhm-Bawerk describes all this as the “problem of no small difficulty” of
separating entrepreneurial profit from interest, and explicitly avoids further exploring
the issue (1959a, p. 7).

In the second volume, the Positive Theory of Capital, Böhm-Bawerk returns to the
subject of entrepreneurial profit in more detail, in connection with the law of costs. In
this section, he more completely defines entrepreneurial profit, which, in its simplest
form, is merely a differential between market prices and costs of production:

If at any time the price does rise considerably above cost, then the production of that
article becomes exceptionally profitable for the entrepreneurs. That not only supplies
an incentive for them to expand their flourishing establishments, but it also encourages
new entrepreneurs to enter this profitable line of business. The quantity of that partic-
ular product that is offered on the market is thereby increased, with the ultimate result
that, in conformity with the law of supply and demand, the price begins to fall.
Conversely, if at any time the market price falls below cost, continuation of the pro-
duction of the good becomes a losing proposition and consequently the entrepreneurs
abandon or restrict its production. (1959b, p. 248)

The question as to what causes this differential remains to be answered. It is clear
from the quotation that Böhm-Bawerk views entrepreneurs as actively directing pro-
duction so as to increase or decrease production. Entrepreneurs, therefore, control the
means of production and, furthermore, bear the uncertainties of the market, because it
is they who reap the benefits of “flourishing establishments,” or who suffer when pro-
duction “becomes a losing proposition.” The incentive to earn profits (or avoid losses)
mentioned in this passage is what pushes prices in the direction of costs of production,
and also influences the direction of production itself. Consumer preferences are
revealed through real-world market prices, which confirm or conflict with the entre-
preneur’s previous production choices. As one commentator puts it, “Böhm-Bawerk
indicates that in a market economy it is the entrepreneurs who bring about such struc-
tural changes, and that their efforts are guided by changes in the relative prices of
capital goods” (Garrison 1999, p. 119). It is apparent that this tendency is a distinctly
entrepreneurial problem, to be solved by the careful adjustment of production by those
who bear the weight of past errors in judgment regarding the state of the market. Jean
Magnan de Bornier (2008) points out that in Böhm-Bawerk’s capital market, entrepre-
neurs seem to be responding mechanically to price incentives. We should add, how-
ever, that this does not imply entrepreneurs do not provide a specific service of directing

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production that goes beyond simply responding to price changes. It is true that entrepre-
neurs use real-world market prices to assess their success and adjust their expectations.
But the need to anticipate uncertain future conditions demonstrates that knowledge of
current market prices is not enough to solve the problems of arranging the capital
structure.

In Böhm-Bawerk’s view, the person of the entrepreneur may combine more than
one economic function, and, therefore, more than one form of income can accrue to the
same individual.16 There are not, therefore, distinct laborers, entrepreneurs, and capi-
talists, earning wages, profits, and interest, respectively. An individual specializing in
being an entrepreneur may earn all of these, although they are each subsumed under
gross income.17 However, analytically—if not in practice—the entrepreneur’s profit
can be separated from interest payments and wages by explaining the functional con-
tribution of entrepreneurship to the economic process. In practice, successfully mea-
suring this contribution would not separate the entrepreneur’s roles as simple laborer and
capitalist. Hébert and Link (1988, p. 69) and Murray Rothbard (1985), therefore, are
correct when they observe that Böhm-Bawerk combined the entrepreneur and capi-
talist, in the sense that both functions are performed by the same person, although
conceptually the two functions can be separated.

Böhm-Bawerk does not much discuss whether the entrepreneur owns or merely
borrows capital. He appears to favor the former possibility, though. The entrepreneur
exercises ultimate control over capital, and it is because the entrepreneur represents
residual control that profit and loss fall to him at the last. The entrepreneur is, thus, the de
facto owner of the capital used in production. The entrepreneurial process is designed,
of course, to meet the demands of consumers. Böhm-Bawerk stresses the notion of
consumer sovereignty in guiding entrepreneurial decision making, remarking that
“everything depends on what Mr. Public wants to spend his income for” (1959b, p. 112).

Böhm-Bawerk uses the example of a fictional iron market to clarify his approach to
prices and costs, and, in doing so, further explores the role of the entrepreneur. In
explaining the demand for iron, he implies much about the entrepreneurial function:

Each manufacturer will want to buy just so much iron as he needs for producing
such quantity of his commodity as he anticipates he can sell to his own customers …
obviously no manufacturer will pay more for a hundredweight of iron than he can
realize from it … in the purchase price that his customers will pay him. (1959b, p. 249;
emphasized)

This passage implies several important ideas regarding the entrepreneurial function.
The producer–entrepreneur in this example is buying iron as a higher-order good that
will eventually be transformed into a consumer good. The price at the last stage must
justify the cost incurred by the producer. But the separation in time of the two prices
means that the entrepreneur must speculate about the future state of the market
(he must “anticipate” correctly). These speculative judgments play the key role in deter-
mining the demand for the factors of production: “the participation in the market

16 Ludwig von Mises would later describe the different income-earning roles as “catallactic functions”
(Mises 1998, pp. 252–256). The concept of the catallactic function of the entrepreneur is discussed in
Salerno (2008).

17 Böhm-Bawerk seems to imply similar ideas in his criticism of Schumpeter (Böhm-Bawerk 1913a).
demand for iron on the part of each producer depends on *his own estimate*, and that he derives from the market price of his own special kind of ironware” (1959b, p. 250; emphasis added). Once again, the “estimate” implies an anticipation of some future state of prices and costs. Entrepreneurial decision making allocates resources to production, committing them for the specified period. Future prices, then, determine whether the entrepreneur’s earlier estimate was correct, and will result in either entrepreneurial profits or losses.

In the discussion above, uncertainty stems from the time element of production; specifically, the temporal divide between entrepreneurial decisions and the sale of the final product. It is important to note, however, that uncertainty is also introduced due to other factors, such as a lack of knowledge about the behavior of competitors. In such a case, uncertainty exists, not merely about whether one’s own product will prove valuable, but also whether it will prove valuable as compared to the product of a competitor. Böhm-Bawerk only mentions the role of competition for entrepreneurial profit (1987, p. 83), but his other remarks on entrepreneurs are certainly consistent with the idea. When making judgments about production, entrepreneurs must take into account a multitude of possible outcomes, including consumer preferences for alternative goods. The same is true of the problem of innovation, which can seriously disturb existing patterns of production and preferences and is closely related to the idea of uncertainty. Entrepreneurs do their best to make judgments in a world of change, whether they are themselves innovators, or even if they try to arrange production despite disruptive events such as innovations. Most of Böhm-Bawerk’s core theoretical writings, however, predate the emergence of innovation studies, particularly as pioneered by Schumpeter in his 1911 work on economic development (some implications of which are discussed below).

Given the above analysis, the claim made by Hawley appears somewhat weak. Hawley’s conclusion is that Böhm-Bawerk’s theory of profit cannot be sustained because it does not explain why the entrepreneur does what he does, because “on the average, the undertaker will get back … just what he has paid to the laborer, the landlord, and the capitalist, plus his own wages of management” (Hawley 1892, p. 284). But once we see that profit is not merely wages but a return to a distinct function, this critique collapses, because the average return is not zero, but some uncertain (possibly very great) value, and is not simply a wage. In fact, “Entrepreneurial profit is something quite individualistic and it fluctuates above the normal level [of return] like nothing else” (Böhm-Bawerk 1987, p. 83). Hawley seems to recognize these ideas, observing that for Böhm-Bawerk, “the wages of management, although earned by intellectual rather than physical exertion, are yet wages” (Hawley 1892, p. 282; emphasis added). It is not clear why the difference alluded to does not distinguish wages from entrepreneurial decisions, and Böhm-Bawerk makes no such claim; quite the opposite, in fact, as we show.

In his discussion of the law of costs, Böhm-Bawerk notes that exceptions to equivalence of price and cost are legion, and he points out two distinct reasons for this. One is, of course, the phenomenon of interest, with which Böhm-Bawerk’s work is primarily concerned. The second is a category of causes, which he describes broadly as “frictional obstacles.”18 Böhm-Bawerk uses this “comprehensive” term to mean

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18 It is important to note that this type of friction is not the one criticized by Mises (2009, pp. 44–47). Mises refers to Böhm-Bawerk’s claim that “frictions” in the economy ensure monetary neutrality.
anything that prevents factors at different stages of production from being uniformly
valued, leading to “asymmetrical deviations in price as between earlier and later stages
of production” (1959b, p. 256). As he puts it, “The stream of the means of production
does not maintain uniform breadth on its course toward the final stage where they
become consumption goods. Instead … the stream at some points is dammed up and it
broadens, while at others it falls and the stream narrows” (1959b, pp. 255–256).

He goes on to say:

In actual practice such “frictional obstacles” are infinite in number. There is no
moment of time and no branch of production which could boast a complete absence
of them. And that is what gives the law of costs its well known character of a law
which has only approximate validity and which teems with exceptions. And those
numberless big and little exceptions are the inexhaustible source from which flows
the constant stream of entrepreneurs’ profit—and of entrepreneurs’ losses as well.
(1959b, p. 256)

This appears to be consistent with Pribram’s claim that this theory attributes
profit to “a combination of fortuitous circumstances or to superior ability” (Pribram
1983, p. 330). Further clarifications are necessary, though. Frictions merely make
profits possible by driving a wedge between prices and costs of production, a wedge
that provides incentives for entrepreneurs to alter their demand for, and allocation
of, capital. Frictions represent opportunities; if entrepreneurs are correct in their
speculative judgments and successfully deploy capital goods, they can earn profits
(or, if they are incorrect, losses). Thus, the true source of profits and losses is the
entrepreneur, and not the environment, the “fortuitous circumstances,” in which he
acts. This is important because although events might be fortuitous in the sense that
they create opportunities, profits are not due to luck per se, but to superior judg-
ment. Without resource allocation, no combination of frictions can produce either
profits or losses.

Let us try to see this more clearly in Böhm-Bawerk’s writing. Böhm-Bawerk does
not elaborate on the specific causes of friction, referring only to “some disturbing
cause or other” (1959b, p. 256). Further remarks make it clear, however, that he attrib-
utes frictions in the production structure to speculative errors on the part of capital
owners, whose demand, as we have seen, anticipates the demands of consumers.
Böhm-Bawerk is quite clear on this point in a chapter explaining the relation between
the price and cost of the factors of production.

The divergence [between price and cost] is of two kinds: some of it [interest] is regular,
some of it is random. Both kinds are attributable to the circumstance that production
takes time. Often long periods of time will pass during which goods of sixth or eighth
order pass through all the intermediate stages before being converted into the final
form as mature consumption goods. And during that time people and things can
change. Wants can alter, so can the relations between want and coverage, and above
all, the insight into those relations can change. Naturally the estimates of the value of
the goods in the various stages of their progress toward maturity will change corre-
spondingly. It can readily be seen that the fluctuations which arise from that source
may be extreme or slight, may be upwards or downwards. They are deviations that
know no rule. (1959b, p. 172; emphasis added)
In other words, time introduces uncertainty into the data of the market. This, in turn, necessitates correct judgments on the part of the entrepreneur in order for production to coincide with future demand. The element of randomness ("friction") refers to changes in the tastes of consumers, which, of course, are inextricably linked with the problem of time. In this sense, the potential to profit is a random occurrence to the entrepreneurs, who do not know which way the preferences of consumers will change. Actually reaping profits is, in Böhm-Bawerk's view, the result of prescient production decisions by the owners of capital goods who foresee these changes through the fog of Knightian uncertainty. Böhm-Bawerk explicitly singles out the entrepreneur's perception of the state of the market data (the relation of goods and scarcity to consumer demand)—his "insight"—as the most important implication of uncertainty. This perception is, in fact, the primary source for Böhm-Bawerk of the value differential that results in entrepreneurial profits and losses. Furthermore, entrepreneurial profit performs a valuable social function, because it encourages entrepreneurs to adjust the structure of production: "Entrepreneurial profit should be judged very favorably. It contributes to capital formation. Only entrepreneurial profit that is not based on honest work, but on fraud and gambling is to be considered bad" (1987, p. 83).

While it is true, as Hébert and Link (1988) argue, that for Böhm-Bawerk the entrepreneur and capitalist are one, it would not be correct to infer from this that there is no distinct entrepreneurial function in Böhm-Bawerk's theory. Rather, it is merely the case that two, separate economic functions are combined in the person of the aptly named capitalist-entrepreneur; yet, these functions remain distinct theoretically. The entrepreneur's judgment is the deciding factor in the determination of profit, which exists independent of pure interest. The comments of Pribram, Hirshleifer, and Schumpeter mentioned above do not do Böhm-Bawerk full justice as an entrepreneurial theorist. Likewise, Hawley's contention that Böhm-Bawerk's theory reduces entrepreneurship to the wages of management must also be rejected.

V. BÖHM-BAWERK’S HERITAGE IN ENTREPRENEURSHIP

As a way of rounding out the discussion, let us briefly mention the place of Böhm-Bawerk's theory in the history of economic thought. In a sense, it is not surprising that his ideas on entrepreneurship have received less attention than those of his...
contemporaries, who were more direct in their writings. Friedrich von Wieser, in particular, elaborated a theory of the entrepreneur that proved more influential than that of his brother-in-law (Wieser 1927). Wieser’s approach is especially important because it influenced Schumpeter’s views (Samuels 1983), which, in turn, dominated entrepreneurship studies for much of the twentieth century.

Böhm-Bawerk’s and Wieser’s theories can both be traced to Menger’s broader views on entrepreneurship (Menger 1994, pp. 159–161; Martin 1979). Nevertheless, both Menger’s students inspired his own strand of entrepreneurial thinking. The Wieser line helped develop now-common ideas such as the notion of the entrepreneur as an innovative industrial leader (Wieser 1927, p. 327). Schumpeter would go on to popularize this idea, especially in *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (1942).

Commentators striving to explain the Schumpeterian view and clarify its historical context have pointed out that Schumpeter clearly distanced himself from Böhm-Bawerk on the subject of profits, while simultaneously taking an approach closer to Wieser (Kurz 2008). The Schumpeter tradition emphasizes dynamic, disequilibrating innovations that disturb the “circular flow,” and the entrepreneur is the leader introducing the innovations. On the other hand, economists who more closely followed Böhm-Bawerk’s lead, such as Ludwig von Mises and Frank Fetter, tended to focus on problems pertaining to the arrangement of the structure of production. As our discussion of Böhm-Bawerk’s ideas has shown, this view focuses on the relatively “mundane” entrepreneur who uses speculative judgment to coordinate the factors of production.

Differences between the two views became clear during a dispute that occurred after the publication of Schumpeter’s *Theory of Economic Development*. Shortly before Böhm-Bawerk’s death, he wrote a lengthy critique of Schumpeter’s book (1913a), to which Schumpeter (1913) responded, followed in turn by a rejoinder from Böhm-Bawerk (1913b). Although the dispute mainly involved the theory of interest, ideas about entrepreneurs and profit played a role as well.

Böhm-Bawerk comments, for instance, that Schumpeter uses the term “entrepreneur” in an unusual way that strips it of its conventional meaning. He suggests that “Others ought to discuss with Schumpeter whether this shining story of the captains of industry could have not been written so well and so absorbingly without knocking over the conventional terminology and without robbing 99% of old-style entrepreneurs of their name; I can pass over this terminological question here” (1913a, p. 4). This comment reveals once again Böhm-Bawerk’s reluctance to discuss entrepreneurial history and theory in detail, but it also shows that he considered Schumpeter’s terminology to be suspect. At the least, Böhm-Bawerk indicates that Schumpeter’s views represent a departure from his own tradition. The terminological change is, no doubt, Schumpeter’s use of the term “entrepreneur” to refer to the economic function of introducing innovations to the static circular flow. This conception, at least in Schumpeter’s more

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22 Another student of Menger’s, Victor Mataja, wrote extensively on entrepreneurship. When, in 1891, Böhm-Bawerk surveyed the contributions of the Austrians, he pointed to Mataja’s writings to show that scholars in the Mengerian tradition were “repeatedly working out the problems of the entrepreneur’s profits” (Böhm-Bawerk 1891). Mataja’s work has been mostly neglected by later Austrians, however (Schulak and Unterköfler 2011, pp. 56–57).

23 In his rejoinder, Böhm-Bawerk (1913b) also criticizes Schumpeter for conflating different types of entrepreneur, such as the leader–innovator and other “lower levels of entrepreneurship” (niedrigeren Stufen des Unternehmertums).
technical 1911 exposition, is more abstract than the type of entrepreneurship about which Menger or Böhm-Bawerk wrote. Rather than refer to entrepreneurship in a practical or everyday sense, Schumpeter’s efforts are sometimes described as “breaking out of the Walrasian box,” for his emphasis on the entrepreneur as an explanation of dynamic change in the context of an unrealistic static equilibrium (Rothbard 1987).

Despite (perhaps because of) the controversy with Schumpeter, it is clear that Böhm-Bawerk anticipated and influenced the theories of Ludwig von Mises and, perhaps ironically, Frank Knight (Hébert and Link 1998, p. 69). It is not surprising, though, that Knight did not see similarities between his own work and that of Böhm-Bawerk. Knight, for example, denied that Carl Menger developed a theory of the entrepreneur, and makes only a slight reference to Böhm-Bawerk (Knight 1950), despite the fact that his own theory is close to that of Menger and the Austrians in general (Martin 1979; Schumpeter 1989, p. 257). Of his rough contemporaries, however, Böhm-Bawerk was anticipated by Richard Cantillon and Frédéric Bastiat (among others),24 we mention Fetter specifically because his work is also typically neglected in the literature. Fetter’s theory is described in Joseph Salerno (2008) and Nicolai J. Foss and Peter G. Klein (2012, pp. 48–50), but it is worthwhile to very briefly touch on the similarities between the two economists.

Fetter also describes the essence of entrepreneurial activity as “active intervention and effort” in combining and arranging the factors of production (1915, p. 318). It is the successful combination of the factors that yields an income to the entrepreneur (1915, pp. 320–321). Profits and losses appear in accordance with the amount of uncertainty borne by the owner of the factors in his investment decisions (1915, pp. 332–334). In sum, for Fetter, “the peculiar function of enterprise is investment and ownership” (1915, p. 326). Entrepreneurship is, then, a matter of the successful anticipation of a profitable future arrangement of the factors of production by their owners. On these major points, both Böhm-Bawerk and Fetter are in agreement, a fact that fits nicely with both economists’ close relation to (and role in advancing) the tradition established by Menger. Fetter, however, goes into far greater detail than Böhm-Bawerk, for example, in separating the function of entrepreneur, on the one hand, and manager and promoter, on the other (1915, pp. 322–334). A full explication of Fetter’s view requires further research, but it is clear from this brief summary and the sources cited above that a common line of reasoning exists between Fetter and Böhm-Bawerk on the subject of entrepreneurial profit.

VI. CONCLUSION

We have argued that Böhm-Bawerk’s theory of the entrepreneur, although not systematically explored, is more developed than is commonly thought. First, Böhm-Bawerk conceives of economic affairs, especially those involving the capital structure, as

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25 Fetter uses the terms “enterprise” and “enterpriser.”
fundamentally future-oriented, and largely as a matter of coping with uncertainties inherent in the market. Second, the above comments clearly show that Böhm-Bawerk conceived of entrepreneurial profit as a return to successful adjustment of the structure of production through time, in anticipation of future consumer demand. This adjustment is performed by owners of capital, who exercise judgment in choosing the pattern of production, and earn profits or losses according to their ability. This theory is clearly seen, however, only after piecing together the relevant discussions in Böhm-Bawerk’s writings, but the ideas are explicit enough to show that he did consider the matter seriously. His views fit squarely in the Mengerian tradition of which he was one of the principal advocates, and, what is more, his ideas bear important similarities to other economists of the period. It is our hope that by further exploring Böhm-Bawerk’s thinking on this neglected topic, we can help inspire renewed appreciation for, and interest in, this giant of the older Austrian school.

REFERENCES


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