Dispersed Inflation Expectations and the Zero Lower Bound*

Mirko Wiederholt
Goethe University Frankfurt

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Abstract

Survey data on expectations shows that households have heterogeneous inflation expectations and their inflation expectations respond sluggishly to realized shocks to future inflation. By contrast, in models with a zero bound on the nominal interest rate currently used for monetary and fiscal policy analysis, households’ inflation expectations are not heterogeneous and not sticky. This paper solves a New Keynesian model with a zero lower bound in which households have dispersed information. Households’ inflation expectations are heterogeneous and sticky. The main properties of the model are: (1) the deflationary spiral in bad states of the world is less severe than under perfect information, (2) central bank communication (without a change in current or future policy) affects consumption and the sign of this effect depends on whether the zero lower bound is binding, i.e., an announcement that increases consumption when the zero lower bound is not binding reduces consumption when the zero lower bound is binding, (3) a commitment to future inflation can reduce consumption, (4) the government spending multiplier can be negative, and (5) shocks to uncertainty can have first-order effects.

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*E-Mail: wiederholt@wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de. I thank seminar participants and conference participants at Duke, the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, the SED 2012, and the conference “Rational Inattention and Related Theories” in Prague for useful comments.
1 Introduction

Survey data on expectations shows that households have heterogeneous inflation expectations. Different households expect different inflation rates.\(^1\) In contrast, most models used for monetary policy analysis and fiscal policy analysis assume rational expectations and perfect information. Since all agents have the same perceived law of motion and the same information, all agents have the same inflation expectation.

A related finding concerns the response of inflation expectations to shocks. Since inflation is persistent, one can ask how inflation tomorrow responds to a shock today, and how today’s expectation of inflation tomorrow responds to the same shock. Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) study survey data on inflation expectations and find that the average inflation expectation responds sluggishly to realized shocks to future inflation. In contrast, in a model with rational expectations and perfect information, inflation expectations respond immediately to realized shocks to future inflation.

One can summarize these statements as follows. In survey data, inflation expectations are heterogeneous and sticky. In models with rational expectations and perfect information, inflation expectations are not heterogeneous and not sticky.

Recently, there has been a growing interest in business cycle models in which the central bank cannot lower the nominal interest rate below zero. The reason is that the zero bound on the nominal interest rate appears to be binding in the United States at the moment. In standard New Keynesian models with a zero bound on the nominal interest rate, inflation expectations play a crucial role. Most of the propagation of a shock comes from movements in inflation expectations. Furthermore, monetary policy and fiscal policy mainly act by changing inflation expectations. Therefore, it appears crucial how we model inflation expectations in these models. It seems desirable to model inflation expectations in a way that is consistent with data.

This paper solves a standard New Keynesian model with a zero bound on the nominal interest rate, but with dispersed information on the side of households instead of perfect information on the side of households. Since different households have different pieces of information, households’ inflation expectations are heterogeneous and sticky. I derive the implications for dynamics at the zero lower bound and for the effects of monetary policy, fiscal policy, and central bank communication.

\(^1\)See, for example, Armantier et al. (2011).
The main properties of the model with dispersed information are: (1) the deflationary spiral in bad states of the world is less severe than under perfect information, (2) central bank communication (without a change in current or future policy) affects consumption and the sign of this effect depends on whether the zero lower bound is binding, i.e., an announcement that increases consumption when the zero lower bound is not binding reduces consumption when the zero lower bound is binding, (3) a commitment to future inflation can reduce consumption, (4) the government spending multiplier can be negative, and (5) shocks to uncertainty can have first-order effects.

2 Model

The economy consists of households, firms, and a government. The government consists of a fiscal authority and a monetary authority. The monetary authority controls the nominal interest rate, but cannot lower the net nominal interest rate below zero. Following Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2011) and many others, I study the effect of a temporary change in the households’ desire to save.

**Households.** The economy is populated by a continuum of households of mass one. Households are indexed by $i \in [0, 1]$. The preferences of household $i$ are given by

$$E_0^i \left[ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t e^{\xi_{i,t}} \left( \frac{C_{i,t}^{1-\gamma} - 1}{1 - \gamma} - \frac{L_{i,t}^{1+\psi}}{1 + \psi} + \varphi Z_{i,t} 1_{\Delta \xi_{i,t} \neq 0 \land t \neq 0} \right) \right].$$

Here $E_0^i$ is the expectation operator conditioned on information of household $i$ in period zero and $C_{i,t}$ and $L_{i,t}$ are consumption and labor supply of household $i$ in period $t$. The parameter $\beta \in (0, 1)$ is a discount factor, the parameter $\gamma > 0$ is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and the parameter $\psi \geq 0$ is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.

The variable $\xi_{i,t}$ is a preference shock. Before period zero, the variable $\xi_{i,0}$ equals zero for all households. In period zero, each household is hit by a preference shock $\xi_{i,0}$. The preference shock has $N$ possible realizations: $\xi_{i,0} \in \{\xi_1, \ldots, \xi_N\}$ with $\xi_1 < \xi_2 < \ldots < \xi_N$ and $\xi_{i,0} \neq 0$. There may be heterogeneity across households in the value of the preference shock: a mass $\lambda_1$ of households is hit by realization $\xi_1$, a mass $\lambda_2$ of households is hit by realization $\xi_2$, and so on; with $\sum_{n=1}^{N} \lambda_n = 1$. Let $\lambda = (\lambda_1, \ldots, \lambda_N)$ denote the cross-sectional distribution of preference shocks in period zero.\footnote{A special case is that all households are hit by the same preference shock: $\lambda_n = 1$ for some $n$.}
the following periods, the variable $\xi_{i,t}$ remains constant with probability $\mu$ and returns permanently to its normal value of zero with probability $1 - \mu$. The return to the normal value of zero occurs at the same time for all households. This specification of the preference shock is a generalization of the specification in Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2011). The preference shock can take on $N$ different values and there may be heterogeneity across households.

The economy is in one of two aggregate states in period zero, called good and bad. The two states differ in terms of the cross-sectional distribution of preference shocks. Let $\lambda^{good}$ and $\lambda^{bad}$ denote the cross-sectional distribution of preference shocks in the good state and in the bad state. The cross-sectional mean of the preference shock is negative in both states and lower in the bad state:

$$\sum_{n=1}^{N} \lambda_n^{bad} \xi_n < \sum_{n=1}^{N} \lambda_n^{good} \xi_n < 0.$$ 

Let $\theta \in (0, 1)$ denote the probability of the bad state.

To make it easy to solve the model, I assume that households have quasi-linear preferences in the period where the variable $\xi_{i,t}$ returns to its normal value of zero. This assumption is borrowed from the money search literature. In that period, the indicator function $1_{\Delta \xi_{i,t} \neq 0 \land t \neq 0}$ has the value one. The household can then choose $Z_{i,t}$ in addition to $C_{i,t}$ and $L_{i,t}$. A choice $Z_{i,t} > 0$ means the household consumes some of the final good purchased from firms in form of a $Z$ good rather than a $C$ good, and a choice $Z_{i,t} < 0$ means the household produces some of the final good itself with a linear technology.

Bond holdings of household $i$ between periods $t$ and $t+1$ are given by the flow budget constraint of the household:

$$B_{i,t} = R_{t-1}B_{i,t-1} + W_{t}L_{i,t} + D_{i,t} - P_{t}\left( C_{i,t} + Z_{i,t}1_{\Delta \xi_{i,t} \neq 0 \land t \neq 0} \right).$$

Here $B_{i,t}$ are bond holdings of the household between periods $t$ and $t+1$, $R_{t-1}$ is the gross nominal interest rate on bond holdings between periods $t - 1$ and $t$, $W_{t}$ is the nominal wage rate in period $t$, $D_{i,t}$ is the difference between nominal profits received by the household and nominal lump-sum taxes paid by the household in period $t$, and $P_{t}$ is the price of the final good in period $t$. The term $C_{i,t} + Z_{i,t}1_{\Delta \xi_{i,t} \neq 0 \land t \neq 0}$ is the quantity of the final good purchased by the household in period $t$. The household can borrow (formally, bond holdings can be negative), but the household is not allowed...
to run a Ponzi scheme.

**Firms.** The final good is produced by competitive firms using the technology

\[ Y_t = \left( \int_0^1 Y_{j,t}^{\theta-1} dj \right)^{\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}}. \]

Here \( Y_t \) denotes output of the final good and \( Y_{j,t} \) denotes input of intermediate good \( j \). The parameter \( \theta > 1 \) is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods. Final good firms have perfect information and fully flexible prices. Profit maximization of firms producing final goods implies the following demand function for intermediate good \( j \)

\[ Y_{j,t} = \left( \frac{P_{j,t}}{P_t} \right)^{-\theta} Y_t, \]

where \( P_{j,t} \) is the price of intermediate good \( j \) and \( P_t \) is the price of the final good. Furthermore, the zero profit condition of firms producing final goods implies

\[ P_t = \left( \int_0^1 P_{j,t}^{1-\theta} dj \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\theta}}. \]

The intermediate good \( j \) is produced by a monopolist using the technology

\[ Y_{j,t} = L_{j,t}, \]

where \( Y_{j,t} \) is output and \( L_{j,t} \) is labor input of this monopolist. Monopolists producing intermediate goods have perfect information, but they are subject to a price-setting friction as in Calvo (1983). Each monopolist can optimize its price with probability \( 1 - \alpha \) in any given period. With probability \( \alpha \) the monopolist producing good \( j \) sets the price

\[ P_{j,t} = P_{j,t-1}. \]

How firms value profit in different states of the world is determined by the ownership structure. I assume that each monopolist is owned by a single household and that the monopolist takes the marginal utility of consumption of this household as given because the household also owns many other firms.

**Monetary policy.** At some point in the past, the monetary authority announced that it would follow the rule

\[ R_t = \max \left\{ 1, R_{\Pi_t} \right\}. \]
Here \( R = (1/\beta) \) is the nominal interest rate in the non-stochastic steady state with zero inflation, \( \Pi_t = (P_t/P_{t-1}) \) denotes the inflation rate, and \( \phi > 1 \) is a parameter. This rule says the following. The monetary authority follows a Taylor rule as long as the Taylor rule implies a non-negative net nominal interest rate. The monetary authority sets the net nominal interest rate to zero otherwise. In period zero, the monetary authority can announce a new rule for the periods \( t \geq 0 \). More precisely, the monetary authority can announce a new value for \( R \) after observing the aggregate state perfectly in period zero.

**Fiscal policy.** The fiscal authority can purchase units of the final good and finance the purchases with current or future lump-sum taxes. The government budget constraint in period \( t \) reads

\[
T_t + B_t = R_{t-1}B_{t-1} + P_tG_t.
\]

The government has to finance maturing nominal government bonds and any purchases of the final good, denoted \( G_t \). The government can collect lump-sum taxes, denoted \( T_t \), or issue new bonds. In period zero, the fiscal authority announces a fiscal policy for the periods \( t \geq 0 \) after observing the aggregate state perfectly in period zero.

**Information.** I first compare the equilibrium under two benchmark information structures. Under perfect information, a household observes in period zero the own preference shock and the cross-sectional distribution of preference shocks. Under dispersed information, a household only observes the own preference shock in period zero. Therefore, households are unsure about the aggregate state. Households learn what the aggregate state has been when the preference shock reverts back to its normal value. Initially, there are no announcements by the monetary and the fiscal authority and there is no learning from endogenous variables to exhibit the properties of the model very clearly. Later, I introduce announcements and learning from endogenous variables.

### 3 Households’ and firms’ optimality conditions

**Households.** The consumption Euler equation in any period \( t \geq 0 \) reads

\[
C_{i,t}^{-\gamma} = E_t \left[ \beta \frac{e^{\xi_{i,t+1}}}{e^{\xi_{i,t}} \Pi_{t+1}} \frac{R_t}{C_{i,t+1}^{-\gamma}} \right].
\]

The first-order condition for optimal labor supply in any period \( t \geq 0 \) reads

\[
E_t \left[ C_{i,t}^{-\gamma} \frac{W_t}{P_t} - L_{i,t} \right] = 0.
\]
Let $T$ denote the period in which the variable $\xi_{i,t}$ returns permanently to its normal value of one. In period $T$ the household has quasi-linear preferences. The first-order condition for $Z_{i,T}$ reads

$$C_{i,T}^{-\gamma} = \varphi.$$  

To simplify exposition, I assume from now on that the parameter $\varphi$ equals the marginal utility of consumption in the non-stochastic steady state. Consumption in period $T$ then equals consumption in the non-stochastic steady state.

Log-linearizing the last three equations around the non-stochastic steady state yields

$$c_{i,t} = E_t^{i} \left[ -\frac{1}{\gamma} (\xi_{i,t+1} - \xi_{i,t} + r_{t} - \pi_{t+1}) + c_{i,t+1} \right],$$

$$E_t^{i} [w_t - p_t] = \gamma c_{i,t} + \psi l_{i,t},$$

and

$$c_{i,T} = 0,$$

where small letters denote log-deviations from the non-stochastic steady state with zero inflation. For example, $c_{i,t}$ denotes the log-deviation of consumption of household $i$ in period $t$ from the consumption of the household in the zero-inflation non-stochastic steady state.

**Firms.** An intermediate good firm $j$ that can adjusts its price in period $t$ and is owned by household $i$ sets the price

$$X_{j,t} = \arg \max_{P_{j,t} \in \mathbb{R}_{++}} E_t \left[ \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} (\alpha\beta)^{s-t} \left( \frac{e^{\xi_{i,s}C_{i,s}^{-\gamma}} P_t}{e^{\xi_{i,t}C_{i,t}^{-\gamma}} P_s} \right) (P_{j,t} - W_s) \left( \frac{P_{j,t}}{P_s} \right)^{-\theta} Y_s \right].$$

Log-linearizing the first-order condition for the adjustment price yields

$$x_{j,t} = (1 - \alpha\beta) E_t \left[ \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} (\alpha\beta)^{s-t} w_s \right].$$

The log-linearized adjustment price is the same for all adjusting firms and is independent of who owns firms. Therefore, one can drop the subscript $j$ and the superscript $i$. The last equation can be stated in recursive form as

$$x_t = (1 - \alpha\beta) w_t + \alpha\beta E_t [x_{t+1}].$$

Log-linearizing the equation for the price of the final good presented in Section 2 and using the fact that (i) adjusting firms are selected randomly and (ii) the log-linearized adjustment price is
the same for all adjusting firms yields
\[ p_t = \int_0^1 p_{j,t} dj = \alpha p_{t-1} + (1 - \alpha) x_t. \]

Using the last equation to substitute for the adjustment prices \( x_t \) and \( x_{t+1} \) in the previous equation and rearranging yields a standard New Keynesian Phillips curve for our incomplete markets economy
\[ \pi_t = (1 - \alpha) (1 - \alpha \beta) \frac{1}{\alpha} (w_t - p_t) + \beta E_t [\pi_{t+1}]. \]

(4)

4 Households’ inflation expectations and equilibrium outcomes at the zero lower bound

This section derives the equilibrium under two benchmark information structures. Under perfect information, a household observes in period zero the own preference shock and the cross-sectional distribution of preference shocks. Under dispersed information, a household observes in period zero only the own preference shock. In this section, the monetary and the fiscal authority cannot make announcements and there is no learning from endogenous variables to exhibit the properties of the model very clearly. In the following sections, I introduce announcements and learning from endogenous variables.

4.1 Perfect information benchmark

Let us first derive the equilibrium under perfect information as a benchmark. Let us begin by rewriting the New Keynesian Phillips curve (4). When households have perfect information, equation (2) implies
\[ w_t - p_t = \gamma c_{i,t} + \psi l_{i,t}. \]

Integrating across households and using labor market clearing, the production function of intermediate good \( j \), and the demand function for intermediate good \( j \) yields
\[ w_t - p_t = (\gamma + \psi) c_t, \]

(5)

where \( c_t \) denotes aggregate consumption of the final good in period \( t \). Using the last equation to substitute for the real wage rate in the New Keynesian Phillips curve (4) gives
\[ \pi_t = \kappa c_t + \beta E_t [\pi_{t+1}], \]

(6)
where
\[ \kappa = \frac{(1 - \alpha)(1 - \alpha \beta)}{\alpha} (\gamma + \psi). \]

Following Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2011) and many others, I consider equilibria of the following form: endogenous variables take on the same value in all periods \(0 \leq t < T\) and endogenous variables take on the same value in all periods \(t \geq T\). Equations (3) and (6) then imply that in all periods \(t \geq T\) we have
\[ c_{i,t} = c_t = \pi_t = 0. \]

What happens in periods \(0 \leq t < T\) depends on the realization of the aggregate state in period zero. Let \(c_{i,s}, c_s, \pi_s\), and \(r_s\) denote consumption of household \(i\), aggregate consumption, inflation, and the nominal interest rate in periods \(0 \leq t < T\) when the aggregate state is \(s\), where \(s \in \{\text{good}, \text{bad}\}\).

It is easy to solve for the endogenous variables in periods \(0 \leq t < T\) as a function of the aggregate state \(s\). Since households have perfect information and all variables remain at their current values with probability \(\mu\) and revert to their steady-state values with probability \(1 - \mu\), the consumption Euler equation (1) reduces to
\[ c_{i,s} = \frac{-1}{1 - \mu} \left[ - (1 - \mu) \xi_{i,0} + r_s - \mu \pi_s \right]. \]

Let \(\bar{\xi}_s\) denote the cross-sectional mean of the preference shock in state \(s\). Aggregate consumption in any period \(0 \leq t < T\) equals
\[ c_s = \frac{-1}{1 - \mu} \left[ - (1 - \mu) \bar{\xi}_s + r_s - \mu \pi_s \right]. \tag{7} \]

Furthermore, the New Keynesian Phillips curve (6) can be expressed as
\[ \pi_s = \frac{\kappa}{1 - \beta \mu} c_s, \tag{8} \]
and the monetary policy rule can be written as
\[ \ln (R_s) = \max \{0, \ln (R) + \phi \pi_s\}. \tag{9} \]

If the zero bound on the nominal interest rate is binding in state \(s\), substituting equations
\( (8)-(9) \) into equation (7) yields
\[
c_s = \frac{\frac{1}{\gamma} \xi_s + \frac{1}{1-\mu} \ln (R)}{1 - \frac{\gamma}{1-\mu \frac{\mu \kappa}{1-\beta \mu}}}. \tag{10}
\]

If the zero bound is not binding in state \( s \), substituting equations (8)-(9) into equation (7) yields
\[
c_s = \frac{\frac{1}{\gamma} \xi_s}{1 + \frac{1}{1-\mu} (\phi - \mu) \kappa}. \tag{11}
\]

Furthermore, the zero bound is binding if and only if
\[
\pi_s < -\frac{1}{\phi} \ln (R),
\]
or equivalently
\[
\bar{\xi}_s < -\frac{1}{\phi} \ln (R) \frac{1 + \frac{1}{1-\mu} (\phi - \mu) \kappa}{\kappa \frac{1}{1-\beta \mu \gamma}}. \tag{12}
\]

An important insight in the existing literature on the zero bound is that if the zero bound is binding, the drop in consumption can be arbitrarily large. Formally, the denominator in equation (10) is a difference between two positive numbers and can be arbitrarily small in absolute value.

To understand why the fall in consumption can be so large, I propose the following decomposition. The consumption Euler equation (7) can be written as
\[
c_s = \frac{1}{\gamma} \xi_s - \frac{1}{1-\mu} r_s + \frac{1}{1-\mu} \mu \pi_s.
\]

Aggregate consumption in state \( s \) equals the sum of three terms. The first term is the direct effect of the preference shock on consumption. The second term is the effect of the current nominal interest rate on consumption. The third term is the effect of expected inflation on consumption.

Substituting the equilibrium nominal interest rate when the zero lower bound is binding (i.e., \( r_s \equiv \ln (R_s) - \ln (R) = -\ln (R) \)) and equilibrium inflation when the zero lower bound is binding into the last equation yields
\[
c_s = \frac{1}{\gamma} \xi_s + \frac{1}{1-\mu} \ln (R) + \frac{1}{1-\mu} \mu \frac{\kappa}{1-\beta \mu} c_s + \frac{1}{1-\mu} \mu \pi_s + \left\{ \frac{1}{1-\mu \frac{\mu \kappa}{1-\beta \mu}} \right\} \text{expected inflation}. \]

\(^3\)Following common practice in the literature on the zero bound, I assume that parameters are such that the denominator in equation (10) is positive. For the other case, see Mertens and Ravn (2012).

\(^4\)More precisely, if condition (12) is satisfied, the unique equilibrium is given by equation (10); whereas if condition (12) is not satisfied, the unique equilibrium is given by equation (11).
The second term is positive because the monetary authority can lower the nominal interest rate to some extent relative to its steady-state value. The first term is negative and simply reflects the direct effect of the preference shock on consumption. The third term is also negative and reflects the indirect effect of the preference shock on consumption acting through inflation expectations. The reason why the fall in consumption can be arbitrarily large for a given size of the shock is the third term. The model of this subsection predicts that the fall in consumption can be arbitrarily large for a given size of the shock because the drop in inflation expectations can be arbitrarily large for a given size of the shock. All the amplification of the shock comes through inflation expectations! Hence, how we model inflation expectations is absolutely crucial for results concerning dynamics at the zero lower bound.

4.2 Dispersed information

For ease of exposition, I assume that the equilibrium real wage rate is still given by equation (5). An information-based micro-foundation for this assumption is that the household consists of a shopper and a worker. The shopper makes consumption decisions under dispersed information. The worker makes labor supply decisions under perfect information. I consider again equilibria of the following form: endogenous variables take on the same value in all periods $0 \leq t < T$ and endogenous variables take on the same value in all periods $t \geq T$.

The consumption Euler equation (1) reads

$$c_t = \frac{-1}{1-\mu} \left[ -(1-\mu) \xi_{t,0} + E_t \left[ r_s - \mu \pi_s \right] \right].$$

Let $\bar{E}_s [r_S - \mu \pi_S] = \int_0^1 E^i [r_S - \mu \pi_S] di$ denote the average expectation of the real interest rate in state $s$. Furthermore, let $\bar{\xi}_s$ denote the cross-sectional mean of the preference shock in state $s$. Aggregate consumption in any period $0 \leq t < T$ in state $s$ equals

$$c_s = \frac{-1}{1-\mu} \left[ -(1-\mu) \bar{\xi}_s + \bar{E}_s [r_S - \mu \pi_S] \right]. \quad (13)$$

Let $\bar{p}^{good}_s$ denote the average probability that households assign to being in the good state when the economy is actually in state $s$. Let $\bar{p}^{bad}_s$ denote the average probability that households assign to being in the bad state when the economy is actually in state $s$. The average expectation of the
real interest rate in state $s$ equals

$$\bar{E}_s [r_S - \mu \pi_S] = \bar{p}_s^{\text{good}} (r_{\text{good}} - \mu \pi_{\text{good}}) + \bar{p}_s^{\text{bad}} (r_{\text{bad}} - \mu \pi_{\text{bad}}).$$  \hspace{1cm} (14)$$

Under perfect information, households are absolutely certain about the current state of the economy. Therefore, $\bar{p}_s^{\text{good}} = \bar{p}_s^{\text{bad}} = 1$, and the average expectation of the real interest rate when the economy is actually in the good state equals

$$\bar{E}_{\text{good}} [r_S - \mu \pi_S] = r_{\text{good}} - \mu \pi_{\text{good}},$$

and the average expectation of the real interest rate when the economy is actually in the bad state equals

$$\bar{E}_{\text{bad}} [r_S - \mu \pi_S] = r_{\text{bad}} - \mu \pi_{\text{bad}}.$$

By contrast, under imperfect information, households assign some probability to the wrong state and this changes the average expectation of the real interest rate. I am now going to derive the implications for dynamics at the zero lower bound and the effect of different policies at the zero lower bound.

The New Keynesian Phillips curve and the monetary policy rule are again given by equations (8) and (9). An important difference to the previous subsection is that the outcome in the good state now affects the outcome in the bad state (and vice versa) through equation (14). For these reasons, we now have to distinguish three cases: (i) the zero lower bound is binding in both states, (ii) the zero lower bound is binding in no state, and (iii) the zero lower bound is binding in the bad state but not in the good state.

Let us begin with the case where the zero bound on the nominal interest rate is binding in both states. Stating equation (13) for the good state and the bad state and substituting in equation (14), equation (8), and $\ln (R_{\text{good}}) = \ln (R_{\text{bad}}) = 0$ yields a system of two equations in the two unknowns $c_{\text{good}}$ and $c_{\text{bad}}$. The solution can be stated as

$$c_{\text{good}} = \frac{\frac{1}{\gamma} \bar{\epsilon}_{\text{good}} + \frac{1}{\gamma} \ln (R) \frac{1}{1 - \mu} \frac{1}{1 - \mu \beta \mu}}{1 - \frac{\frac{1}{\gamma} \mu \kappa}{1 - \mu \beta \mu}} - \bar{p}_{\text{good}} \left[ \frac{\frac{1}{\gamma} \frac{1}{1 - \mu} \frac{1}{1 - \mu \beta \mu}}{1 - \frac{\frac{1}{\gamma} \mu \kappa}{1 - \mu \beta \mu}} (c_{\text{good}} - c_{\text{bad}}) \right],$$  \hspace{1cm} (15)

$$c_{\text{bad}} = \frac{\frac{1}{\gamma} \bar{\epsilon}_{\text{bad}} + \frac{1}{\gamma} \ln (R) \frac{1}{1 - \mu} \frac{1}{1 - \mu \beta \mu}}{1 - \frac{\frac{1}{\gamma} \mu \kappa}{1 - \mu \beta \mu}} + \bar{p}_{\text{bad}} \left[ \frac{\frac{1}{\gamma} \frac{1}{1 - \mu} \frac{1}{1 - \mu \beta \mu}}{1 - \frac{\frac{1}{\gamma} \mu \kappa}{1 - \mu \beta \mu}} (c_{\text{good}} - c_{\text{bad}}) \right].$$  \hspace{1cm} (16)
\[ c_{\text{good}} - c_{\text{bad}} = \frac{\frac{1}{\gamma}(\bar{\xi}_{\text{good}} - \bar{\xi}_{\text{bad}})}{1 + \frac{1}{\gamma} \left( \frac{\phi - \mu}{1 - \beta \mu} \right) \left( c_{\text{good}} - c_{\text{bad}} \right) > 0. \]  

(17)

When the zero lower bound is binding in both states, dispersed information on the side of households increases consumption in the bad state and reduces consumption in the good state. To see this, compare equations (15)-(17) to equation (10). The reason is that in the bad state households are now assigning some probability to a state with a lower real interest rate. This reduces the fall in consumption and the fall in inflation in the bad state.

Let us turn to the case where the zero bound on the nominal interest rate is binding in no state. Stating equation (13) for the good state and the bad state, and substituting in equation (14), equation (8), and \( \ln \left( R_{\text{good}} \right) = \ln \left( R \right) + \phi \pi_{\text{good}} \) as well as \( \ln \left( R_{\text{bad}} \right) = \ln \left( R \right) + \phi \pi_{\text{bad}} \) yields a system of two equations in the two unknowns \( c_{\text{good}} \) and \( c_{\text{bad}} \). The solution can be stated as

\[ c_{\text{good}} = \frac{\frac{1}{\gamma} \bar{\xi}_{\text{good}}}{1 + \frac{1}{\gamma} \left( \frac{\phi - \mu}{1 - \beta \mu} \right) c_{\text{good}}} + \frac{\frac{1}{\gamma} \left( \frac{\phi - \mu}{1 - \beta \mu} \right) c_{\text{good}}}{1 + \frac{1}{\gamma} \left( \frac{\phi - \mu}{1 - \beta \mu} \right) (c_{\text{good}} - c_{\text{bad}})}, \]

(18)

\[ c_{\text{bad}} = \frac{\frac{1}{\gamma} \bar{\xi}_{\text{bad}}}{1 + \frac{1}{\gamma} \left( \frac{\phi - \mu}{1 - \beta \mu} \right) c_{\text{bad}}} - \frac{\frac{1}{\gamma} \left( \frac{\phi - \mu}{1 - \beta \mu} \right) c_{\text{bad}}}{1 + \frac{1}{\gamma} \left( \frac{\phi - \mu}{1 - \beta \mu} \right) (c_{\text{good}} - c_{\text{bad}})} , \]

(19)

and

\[ c_{\text{good}} - c_{\text{bad}} = \frac{\frac{1}{\gamma}(\bar{\xi}_{\text{good}} - \bar{\xi}_{\text{bad}})}{1 + \frac{1}{\gamma} \left( \frac{\phi - \mu}{1 - \beta \mu} \right) (c_{\text{good}} - c_{\text{bad}})} > 0. \]

(20)

When the zero lower bound is binding in no state, dispersed information on the side of households reduces consumption in the bad state and increases consumption in the good state. To see this, compare equations (18)-(20) to equation (11). The reason is that in the bad state households are now assigning some probability to a state with a higher real interest rate, due to the Taylor principle. This increases the fall in consumption and the fall in inflation in the bad state.

Finally, when the zero bound on the nominal interest rate is binding only in the bad state (both under dispersed information and under perfect information), one can solve again analytically for consumption in the good state, \( c_{\text{good}} \), and consumption in the bad state, \( c_{\text{bad}} \). However, the
solution has a substantially more complicated structure than in the two cases presented above. To understand the effect of households’ dispersed information on equilibrium consumption in this case, it is useful to state the outcome under dispersed information relative to the outcome under perfect information. Let $c_s$ and $c^*_s$ denote equilibrium consumption in state $s$ under dispersed information and under perfect information, respectively. Let $r_s - \mu \pi_s$ and $r^*_s - \mu \pi^*_s$ denote the equilibrium real interest rate in state $s$ under dispersed information and under perfect information, respectively.

The consumption Euler equation (13) implies that

$$c_{good} - c^*_{good} = \frac{-1}{1-\mu} \left[ \bar{E}_{good} \left[ r_S - \mu \pi \right] - (r^*_{good} - \mu \pi^*_{good}) \right],$$

and

$$c_{bad} - c^*_{bad} = \frac{-1}{1-\mu} \left[ \bar{E}_{bad} \left[ r_S - \mu \pi \right] - (r^*_{bad} - \mu \pi^*_{bad}) \right].$$

Deducting the last equation from the previous equation and using equation (14) for the average expectation of the real interest rate in state $s$ yields

$$(c_{good} - c_{bad}) - (c^*_{good} - c^*_{bad}) = \frac{-1}{1-\mu} \left[ \bar{E}_{good} \left[ r_S - \mu \pi \right] - (r^*_{good} - \mu \pi^*_{good}) \right] - (r^*_{good} - \mu \pi^*_{good}) + (r^*_{bad} - \mu \pi^*_{bad}).$$

Finally, using the New Keynesian Phillips curve (8) and using the assumption that the zero lower bound is binding in the bad state but not in the good state (both under dispersed information and under perfect information) yields

$$
(c_{good} - c_{bad}) - (c^*_{good} - c^*_{bad}) = \frac{1}{1-\mu} \left[ 1 - \left( \bar{p}_{good} + \bar{p}_{bad} \right) \right] \phi (\pi_{bad} - \pi^*_{bad}) - \frac{1}{1-\beta\mu} \left[ (\phi - \mu) \kappa \right] \left[ (r^*_{good} - \mu \pi^*_{good}) - (r^*_{bad} - \mu \pi^*_{bad}) \right].
$$

Equation (23)
The last equation can also be stated as
\[
\left( c_{\text{good}} - c_{\text{bad}} \right) - \left( c_{\text{good}}^* - c_{\text{bad}}^* \right) = -\frac{1}{1-\mu} \left[ 1 - \left( \tilde{P}_{\text{good}} + \tilde{P}_{\text{bad}} \right) \right] \phi \left( \pi_{\text{good}} - \pi_{\text{good}}^* \right)
\]
\[
+ \frac{1}{1-\mu} \left( \tilde{P}_{\text{good}} + \tilde{P}_{\text{bad}} \right) \left[ \frac{\mu k}{1-\beta \mu} \left( r_{\text{good}}^* - \mu \pi_{\text{good}}^* \right) - \left( r_{\text{bad}}^* - \mu \pi_{\text{bad}}^* \right) \right].
\]

From equations (21)-(24) one can directly derive the following results. First, if the perfect-information equilibrium real interest rate in the good state equals the perfect-information equilibrium real interest rate in the bad state (i.e., \( r_{\text{good}}^* - \mu \pi_{\text{good}}^* = r_{\text{bad}}^* - \mu \pi_{\text{bad}}^* \)), then households’ dispersed information has no effect on equilibrium consumption (i.e., \( c_{\text{good}} = c_{\text{good}}^* \) and \( c_{\text{bad}} = c_{\text{bad}}^* \)).

Second, if under perfect information the real interest rate in the good state exceeds the real rate in the bad state (i.e., \( r_{\text{good}}^* - \mu \pi_{\text{good}}^* > r_{\text{bad}}^* - \mu \pi_{\text{bad}}^* \)), then households’ dispersed information pulls consumption in the two states apart (i.e., \( c_{\text{good}} - c_{\text{bad}} > c_{\text{good}}^* - c_{\text{bad}}^* \)) and reduces consumption in the bad state (i.e., \( c_{\text{bad}} < c_{\text{bad}}^* \)). Third, if under perfect information the real interest rate in the bad state exceeds the real rate in the good state (i.e., \( r_{\text{good}}^* - \mu \pi_{\text{good}}^* < r_{\text{bad}}^* - \mu \pi_{\text{bad}}^* \)), then households’ dispersed information pushes consumption in the two states together (i.e., \( c_{\text{good}} - c_{\text{bad}} < c_{\text{good}}^* - c_{\text{bad}}^* \)) and increases consumption in the bad state (i.e., \( c_{\text{bad}} > c_{\text{bad}}^* \)).

4.3 The effect of central bank communication

Before studying monetary and fiscal policy, let us study the effect of central bank communication. Suppose the central bank announces the aggregate state in period zero and this makes households assign a larger probability to the correct state. Equations (15)-(17) and (18)-(20) immediately imply the following result. When the zero bound on the nominal interest rate is binding in both states, announcing the aggregate state reduces consumption in the bad state and increases consumption

\[\text{footnote}{It is interesting to note several features of the case } r_{\text{good}}^* - \mu \pi_{\text{good}}^* = r_{\text{bad}}^* - \mu \pi_{\text{bad}}^*. \text{ The perfect-information equilibrium real interest rate can be the same in the two states only if the zero lower bound is binding in the bad state but not in the good state. The equilibrium real interest rate is the same in the two states, but equilibrium inflation is not the same in the two states. Hence, under dispersed information, households have heterogeneous inflation expectations.} \]
in the good state. The reason is that the central bank partially undoes the effect of dispersed information and dispersed information helps to keep consumption high in the bad state.

By contrast, when the zero bound on the nominal interest rate is binding in no state, announcing the aggregate state increases consumption in the bad state and decreases consumption in the good state. The reason is again that the central bank partially undoes the effect of dispersed information, but now dispersed information amplifies the fall in consumption in the bad state.

Hence, central bank communication (without a change in current or future policy) affects consumption and the sign of this effect depends on whether or not the zero lower bound is binding. An announcement that increases consumption when the zero lower bound is not binding reduces consumption when the zero lower bound is binding.

5 Monetary policy and fiscal policy

Announcing a new monetary policy or a new fiscal policy in period zero has two effects. First, the policy has the usual effect that is also present in a model with perfect information. Second, the policy has a new effect that is only present in a model with imperfect information on the side of private agents: The policy announcement can make private agents assign a higher probability to the correct state. This second effect can dominate and therefore a commitment to future inflation can reduce consumption today and the government spending multiplier can be negative.

6 Information diffusion

The model can also be solved analytically with information diffusion, as in Mankiw and Reis (2003).
References


